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Focus : **75 Years**
of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

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of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

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Had consecutive appointments as Ambassador of India to Mexico(1991-92);to the Russian Federation (1992-98); to the Federal Republic of Germany (1998-2002); as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom(2002-04); and as Ambassador to the USA (2004-09).He is the only Indian so far to serve as ambassador in three P-5 and five G-20 capitals: participated in 182 bilateral and multilateral summit meetings in six continents.

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
a former Ambassador to Myanmar. he retired as Special Secretary in India's Ministry of External Affairs : joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1962.



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
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Preface

This special issue of **FPRC Journal (45)** focuses on **75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)**. Prominent visionary leaders of Indian freedom movement had friendly relations with United States which continued after independence in 1947. The bilateral relations were soon engulfed in the Cold War, with India refusing to align with any military bloc. India decided to go for non-alignment, something not palatable to US. This led to many ups and down in bilateral relations. At this moment, it is particularly important to revisit the original aspiration of establishing diplomatic relations more than seven decades ago.

There are manifold challenges the two “great democracies” of the world have faced during this period. These have been identified by distinguished contributors of this special volume on the subject. They have also visualised the way forward for the two great nations.

We take this opportunity to express our heart-felt thanks to contributors who have shared our sentiments and accepted our invitation to enrich the contents of the Journal. They have always been a source of strength to us.

Dr.Mahendra Gaur
Director

Dr.Indira Gaur
Mg. Director



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Interviews

(1) **Amb. Ronen Sen**

Former Ambassador of India to the USA (2004-2009); the UK (2002-2004); Germany (1998-2002); Russia (1992-98) and Mexico (1991-92)

After joining the Indian Foreign Service in 1966, he served between 1968 and 1985 in the former USSR (twice), the USA and Bangladesh as Third/Second/First Secretary, Counsellor and Minister; as Deputy Secretary, DAE & Secretary to the Atomic Energy Commission, and as Deputy Secretary and Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs. He was the foreign and defence policy advisor to successive Prime Ministers from 1986 to 1991 and had several assignments as Special Envoy of the Prime Minister.

He had consecutive appointments as Ambassador of India to Mexico (1991-92); to the Russian Federation (1992-98); to the Federal Republic of Germany (1998-2002); as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom (2002-04); and as Ambassador to the USA (2004-09). He is the only Indian so far to serve as ambassador in three P-5 and five G-20 capitals. He participated in 182 bilateral and multilateral summit meetings in six continents.

He is a Jury member of the Indira Gandhi Prize for Peace, Disarmament & Development (2009-present); member of the India-US Strategic Dialogue (2009-present); Independent Director, Tata Motors Ltd. (2010-12); President, Federation of Indo-German Associations in India (2014-present); Independent Director, Tata Sons Private Limited (2015-19); Member of the Governing Council of the Indian Institute of Science (2019-present) and other forums.

In 2012 he was awarded India's third highest civilian award, the Padma Bhushan. He had also received honorary doctorates, degrees and citations from universities and other institutions.

FPRC Interview - INDIA-US Relations

A. How do you look at the four years of India-US ties under President Trump?

The Trump presidency was widely perceived as being disruptive and destabilizing in terms of its domestic and foreign policy orientation. However, it was generally positive and marked by continuity in terms of India-US relations. Both governments built on the foundations laid by their predecessors over the last two decades, particularly during the most transformational phase ever in our relationship which had resulted in the signing of the historic India-US nuclear deal and the long-term defense framework agreement. In fact, our defense and security cooperation gained new momentum during these four years.

The long pending “foundational” agreements-LEMOA, COMCASA and BECA- which were kept in suspended animation by us, were finally concluded. Our proposals for coordination with our liaison officers being stationed at the CENTCOM and Indo-PACCOM, These were agreed to by the Pentagon a decade and a half ago, were also kept in abeyance till recently. India was accorded Strategic Trade Authorization Status-1 by the Trump administration though it was not yet a NSG member. These made the sales of US high technology defense equipment to India easier and more competitive, These steps opened the door to possible joint operations.

The political moorings of India-US strategic cooperation were also strengthened in recent years. The broad-based Strategic Dialogue co-chaired by our External Affairs Minister and the US Secretary of State since a decade ago, was upgraded to annual 2+2 meetings of the foreign and defense ministers. The highly effective quadrilateral cooperation between the US, India, Japan and Australia for disaster relief operations led by their four Navies immediately in the wake of Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, marked the beginning of a short-lived QUAD. This was resurrected and energized at the foreign ministerial level. It has acquired special salience in recent years in the context of the Indo-Pacific strategies of the four countries.

Barring some initial equivocation, Trump was more consistent and decisive than his immediate predecessors in shaping a hard-line US approach to China, backed by overwhelming political consensus in the US Congress. This was reflected in the near unanimous passage of the Tibetan Policy & Support Act, the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, and the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in the last two years. You would also have noted the unprecedented declassification and release of a secret US policy paper of 2018 on its Indo-Pacific strategy just days before the change in US Administrations. This had flagged India’s role as a capable, reliable and preferred partner in the region. It was perhaps meant to place on record the previous Administration’s legacy as well as serve as a marker for the incoming Administration.

The significant forward movement in security and defense cooperation in the Trump years was not matched by progress in trade and economic cooperation. There was excessive US focus on the trade imbalance, imposition of unilateral US tariffs, withdrawal of GSP benefits, tightened visa restrictions and even far reaching measures affecting special and differentiated treatment of large developing countries like India.

B. What does the Biden Presidency mean for India? How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues-strategic and trade deals-and move forward?

President Biden, as two-term Vice President, Chairman and earlier Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had more foreign policy experience than most of his predecessors at the time of his inauguration. He and his closest advisors are well known to many of us, and they know India well. The Biden Administration will not be a Obama-2. The international situation has changed in recent years and so has the US, including in terms its self- perception and its global image. Biden had played a crucial role in promoting bi-partisan consensus in the US Congress on India-US relations during its most transformational phase from 2005-2008. This bipartisan consensus was based as much on shared values as intersecting interests, and accounted for the remarkable resilience and continuity in India-US relations.

The priority accorded to India, including in the Indo- Pacific context, was reflected by President Biden's initiative in hosting a virtual QUAD summit within two months of his inauguration- the first ever summit of this forum, the first multilateral forum hosted by him, resulting in the first joint statement of the QUAD focusing on Covid-19 vaccines, climate change and emerging technologies. All these contemporary global challenges - with their attendant domestic and foreign, economic, socio-political and security implications-will undoubtedly be recurring themes in most multilateral gatherings.

President Biden is temperamentally, ideologically and in his working style fundamentally different from his predecessor. However, he has not entirely abandoned his predecessor's America First policies. The deep-seated India-US differences on trade and economic issues, which have remained unresolved for decades, are unlikely to be comprehensively resolved just with a change of incumbency in the White House. The move from unilateralism to multilateralism is unlikely to make the resolution of these issues easier for us. Our fundamental differences on trade and economic issues are not limited to the US. In varying degrees, such differences exist with all our close partners in Asia and globally- in bilateral, regional, mega-regionals like the RCEP and CPTPP, in global multilateral forums like the World Trade Organization. Some very positive steps have been taken. But so have some reversals in terms of our revival of an import substitution programme, substantially increased and frequently changing tariffs, the scrapping of all our existing bilateral investment treaties, our retroactive taxation

practices, our non-adherence to international tribunal awards and so on. Ultimately what will count will be the outcome of these policies in terms of arresting the steady decline and rapidly accelerating our economic growth.

C. How can India look to the US for help to confront China?

India-US relations have stood on the basis of their own merits. No any third country has a role in determining the shape, direction and pace of the development of these ties. Democratic, pluralist and rapidly growing India was certainly viewed as a viable counter-balance to China, even at the time when the US and its allies were actively aiding China's phenomenal rise, regarding it as a "responsible stakeholder". The *raison d'être* of the QUAD was not to confront China. The positions of QUAD countries on China overlap but are not identical. Three of them are long-standing military allies. India does not fall in this category. Apart from India, only Japan has unresolved territorial differences with China. The threats to our territorial integrity are primarily, though not exclusively, continental. The others see their security challenges primarily in maritime domain. While continuing to be open about widening the horizons of cooperation with the QUAD, we will obviously not be drawn into a military alliance under any guise.

Our most important relationship, for good or for bad, will always remain to be with China. In the ultimate analysis we will have to deal with this relationship on our own. The historic breakthrough in India-China relationship in 1988, was preceded by comprehensive preparations, including getting a 360 degree measure of the outlook and influence of our principal interlocutor at that time, parallel actions in our neighbourhood, involving Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Nepal, confidential personal consultations at the highest levels in Washington DC and Moscow etc. We had proceeded on the basis of strength, or more accurately, on the basis of equal and mutual security. This was reflective of the reality of the very marginal asymmetry of power between the two countries at that time. India is far stronger and better placed today than it was at that time. But the power differential has widened dramatically since then.

Our international environment has also changed dramatically. Our relations with the US have been on a steady upward trajectory, but our time-tested strategic partner Russia emerged as China's closest strategic partner. We have for the first time a new emerging superpower as our immediate neighbor under an assertive leadership is determined to overtake the existing superpower and establish its hegemony in Asia. We have a

humungous, but not insurmountable, challenge ahead of us for reducing our power gap with this neighbor, particularly in the economic and technological fields, in the decade or two ahead. In the meantime, we need not be defensive about continuing with external balancing measures in the QUAD, as also with the majority of other countries which share some of our concerns about current Chinese policies but are unwilling to take sides. The shocking bloodshed in East Ladakh last year undermined all the India-China agreements concluded since the 1990s for maintaining peace and tranquility in border areas. We will have to establish a new framework of bilateral relations through direct negotiations with China, and continue our dialogue at all levels. A beginning has been made with the commencement of the first phase of the process of disengagement. We still have a long way to go and we will have to patiently persist in our efforts for a comprehensive settlement.

D. How do you look at the Pakistan factor in India-US relations under Biden's Presidency?

Pakistan is our third largest neighbor which is economically one-tenth our size. It has derived its leverage through its alliances with the US and then with China. It served China's purpose of containing our country within our subcontinent, trying to undermine our relations with our neighbors and, most importantly, assisting Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems to counter India. Barring some nuances, all US administrations since the 1950s have had close relations with de jure or de facto military regimes in Pakistan or elsewhere, as its perceived interests at any given time dictated, while advocating democracy and condemning military coups in places where it had no major stakes. Myanmar is a recent example but by no means not the only one. Even the most sympathetic US Administrations which were disturbed by Pakistani attempts to unilaterally alter the status quo, as for example, in Kargil or in the wake of the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack, advocated dialogue to defuse tensions, and the resolution of all differences, including in Jammu & Kashmir. This largely holds good today for all major powers. Even former President Trump's extraordinarily blunt public rebuke to Pakistan and suspension of military aid did not detract him from offering to mediate between India and Pakistan or finalizing an agreement on US troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, largely on terms amenable to the Taliban, and to Pakistan.

It is highly unfortunate that over the years Pakistan has loomed so large in our domestic political debate, even to the extent of defining our national identity in relation to that

country and in the process risking becoming its mirror image. This has the potential of severely undermining our social cohesiveness our national unity and providing oxygen to hard-liners in our neighborhood and leverage to usual suspects who fish in troubled waters. The notable restraint in invoking Pakistan during the current domestic campaigning augurs well for the future.

The recent announcement of a ceasefire along the international boundary and line of control in Jammu & Kashmir is a positive development. Hopefully we will be able to build on this measure for broader engagement.

E. How will Russia-US confrontation affect India-US relations?

Our relations with the erstwhile Soviet Union and then with Russia had been the most stable and resilient of post-War period. It is a pity that the two countries appear to have drifted apart in recent years, and the importance of this relationship has less resonance than earlier with the people of both our countries. Russia remains of great strategic importance to us, including as our largest defense partner, accounting for around 60% of our military hardware. It is a long-term partner in pioneering projects in nuclear submarines, BrahMos missiles, space programmes and other projects involving transfers of high technology over decades which have been unmatched by any other country so far. It would have suited our interests if US-Russia relations had improved. These have, however, declined from the already low levels under the previous Administration. The least that we expect is that we will remain excluded from some of the sanctions mandated by virtually unanimous majority in the US Congress on major arms supply to India, including the S-400 missile systems.

(2) Ambassador Preet Malik

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Was member of the core group on India's economic reforms from 1992-1995 when he retired from GOI.

Relations between the Trump led America and the Modi led India could at their core be described as transactional. For Trump everything depended on what he considered consistent to achieving an agenda defined by his concept of America First. It was no coincidence that America first and Trump first were effectively two sides of the same coin. This was likely, and did, end up in relations that had a degree of turmoil built into them. Modi in turn was looking at the relationship in terms of how it contributed to strengthening his hold on politics in India. For both Modi and Trump, the relations had behind them the understanding that they helped serve their respective domestic agendas and purposes' where for instance, Trump was willing to apply the Nelson's eye to Modi's actions of repealing the special constitutional provisions on J & K or on actions that carried human rights implications.

Before looking at the nitty gritty of the relations during the Trump era and the likely directions that the relations may take during the ongoing Biden Presidency it would be important to point out that from the last period of the Clinton Presidency and over the Presidencies of George Bush Jr and Barrack Obama there was a major shift in the way in which the relations between Washington and New Delhi developed. The two most important developments that reflected that there was a bi-partisan support for a closer relationship, were the Nuclear agreement and the designation of India as a 'Major defense Partner.' These two developments, in themselves marked the parameters of a strategic partnership that would spell out the essential building blocks to the establishment of a strengthened relationship that should withstand any vicissitudes of time.

The Modi-Trump period saw a further strengthening of the defence relationship that granted greater space to the strategic aspects of the relations. The areas that created concerns however were in the area of trade and business development. The pluses of the two plus two dialogue were however treated to some extent by the roller coaster of the Trumpian fetishes on trade and consular policies governed by Trump's rather personalised system of conducting relations within the four walls of conducting policy by twitter. What has to be understood is that the drivers of the relationship today are of greater weight because of the 'shared sense of values' as William burns puts it. It is here that the core of the relations has come to be centred and, in more ways, than one ensures that the peccadillos of personalities at the top would be overridden by the fundamentals of the relationship.

This is the factor that helped set aside the grandstanding that the two extrovert personalities had resorted to in the public hurrah-based events that were organised at Houston and followed through in Ahmedabad that in effect could be seen as Modi's attempts to endorse the re-election of Trump to a second term. Under normal circumstances this should have placed a dampener

over the relationship with Biden replacing a defeated Trump to the Presidency, instead the strategic aspects of the relationship and its many facets have not allowed this misstep to come in the way.

To sum up the personality driven relations between Trump and Modi did not come in the way of the substance of the relations between the two countries and events that have given content to the relations carry greater weight than the people who helm the countries from time to time. One defining aspect of the relations has been the aggressive rise of China and its penchant to ignore international obligations, including the rights of others, while forcing its decisions through as it has done in the South China seas. Washington and Delhi see eye to eye on ensuring the freedom of passage and the preservation of international maritime rules governing a peaceful Indo-Pacific. It is clear that a rising China and its implications to both India and America to a large extent has come to grant greater content and depth to the relations between the two countries. What is more the clear and present threat the China's actions first at Doklam and subsequently along the Ladakh borders and the unstinted support for the Indian position that was extended during the Trump Presidency, have granted greater strategic and security meaning to the relations.

In the same context the defence cooperation between the two countries has become a factor that can be further built upon both in the sense of greater technology flows and in the establishment of key areas of Research and Development that would help both countries to establish futuristic technologies.

Trump was erratic by temperament and tended to jump to conclusions without the necessary homework being done to arrive at considered opinions. Biden is obviously a more balanced and down to earth politician. He has a vast experience in both administration and foreign policy and has a clarity of purpose that is worked out on the basis of experience, expert advice and the setting of priorities that help America domestically as well as to ensure America's place within the global order as a leader. Obviously, the rise of China and the challenge that it poses is something that Biden is concerned by and there is a commonality of approach that could suit India and should be taken advantage off by the GOI. The Quad summit that Biden pushed for is one of piece in the push by America to reassert its position as a global leader that intends to work with partners to reduce the challenge that China poses. There can be little doubt that India needs to have a well-defined working relationship with America and China and the threat that it poses, both singularly and in combination with its all-weather friend Pakistan, requires a measure of understanding with both the United States and other Western powers that can provide India with the kind of leverage that it needs to help contain China's aggressive intent.

India needs to overcome its policy weaknesses that have had a negative impact on its economic and business environment. It has to move away from the ills of import substitution worked on punitive tariffs and non-tariff barriers and has to define ways and means to entertain technology flows that impart content to its make in India manufacturing targets. It also needs to find areas where supply chain resilience can evolve with the involvement of Japan, the ROK, ASEAN and very definitely the American business and technology giants pushed towards convergence with both American and Indian global targeting. This would require a greater degree of competitive and innovative policy thinking on the part of Modi et Co and it must be immediate in pursuit. The GOI and its policy/decision makers have to keep in mind that it is a more sophisticated White House that has now to be dealt with it is also focused on the rebuilding of America where the Trump concept of America First, is not ruled out in principle. How India fits into the equation is a major element that has to be worked out by New Delhi.

There is one aspect that can create problems for India. Biden has shown a greater degree of commitment to the strengthening of the ties among the democracies and also on the issue of human rights and democratic values. Here India is on slippery grounds there are several areas where the happenings in India particularly the discriminations of a majoritarian ideology, the pushing to the corner all institutional safeguards that govern fundamental rights and the utilization of administrative entities to suppress dissent are not matters that can be brushed under the carpet and are now on the radar of the international community. Here there are likely to be push backs by Washington both at the level of the Administration and Capitol Hill.

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Indian Diplomat for 34 years

Strategic Advisor India Engagement at UNSW Sydney at UNSW

(Published author; most recent book *'The House and other stories'* [Yoda Press; 2017]. Earlier books 'the Divine Peacock: Understanding Contemporary India' and 'The Perennial Tree' edited with Professor Satchidanda Murty; Wiley Eastern 1995 and 1996 respectively; 'Telling Tales: Children's Literature in India' [ed.] Wiley Eastern: 1995; 'SAARC Means Business' and 'Salvaging the WTO: Doha and Beyond' edited with Bibek Debroy; FICCI and Konark Press [2002] respectively; 'Strategic Shape of the World'; edited; Sage; 2008; 'Indian by Choice'; Wisdom Tree; 2009; 'India for a Billion Reasons' edited; Wisdom Tree: 2009; 'The Lost Fragrance' Wisdom Tree: 2013; 'Lessons from Ruslana: In Search of Transformative Thinking' Harper Collins: 2015]. Published extensively on foreign and security policy and on development and management related themes and, over past few years, on India's higher education challenges. Presently working on two titles: 'A Quiet Noise' [fiction] and 'Why we fail' [non-fiction].

Was inaugural head of Mumbai campus of the SP Jain School of Global Management for 14 months. July 4th, 2016: joined as the inaugural India country director of the internationally ranked University of New South Wales UNSW, Sydney)

Appointed Distinguished Fellow of the Australia India Institute [2016]; is also Fellow of the Society of Policy Studies, India.

Response to Questionnaire

FPRC Journal (45)- 75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

A) How do you look at four-years of India-US ties under President Trump?

Prime Minister Modi and President Trump enjoyed a personal equation and chemistry. This helped in close collaboration and alignment of views, especially with regard to China. In an unprecedented gesture, Prime Minister Modi endorsed Trump's candidature for a second term during his state visit to the US.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India?

How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - Strategic and Trade deals-and move forward?

It is in the nature of diplomacy that governments transact business and consolidate relationships irrespective of who is in power. It is incumbent on both the US and India to work closely together in this regard and towards goals that are mutually beneficial and contribute towards global welfare. There are shared aspirations, shared values and shared concerns. This needs to be the basis of consolidating an already robust relationship.

At the same time, New Delhi needs to recognize that Biden's style of working and leadership would be markedly different from that of Trump. Biden's priorities would be different. Democracy and the practice of democracy, especially in the way it is perceived, would be of critical interest to Biden. Furthermore, it is in the DNA of Democrats to voice their opinion and concern if they feel basic tenets of democracy are under threat, such as, civil liberties and human rights, communal harmony, freedom of speech, freedom of democracy's institutions, etc. Recall that President Obama had no hesitation in giving a public speech during his state visit to India to express concern at the treatment of minorities, especially Muslims. The US is not going to be persuaded by arguments that this is interference in the domestic or internal affairs of India.

On matters related to trade, the economy needs to liberalize and move away from protecting domestic industry. Unless India eases rules of business and becomes a more welcoming market, FDI flows would not reach the peak they are capable of. A strong trade and investment

partnership is the basis of a strategic relationship. It is only when we achieve such status that we would be equal partners at the dining table.

Climate Change issues would be another matter of deep concern and commitment for Biden. India has already taken several initiatives and needs to necessarily do more for its own future benefit.

There would undoubtedly be difficult terrain to o. Russia would be a key concern, especially arms purchase from Moscow and the acquisition of S400 missile systems from Russia would require tough negotiation and helping Washington understand India's point of view.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

India has unfortunately a Moscow in its bid to make new friends. We should never ignore old allies and friends and to do so can only be to our peril. We have seen how this panned out to our disadvantage.

As mentioned in the previous para, India requires the S400 missile system from Russia. The US is going to find that difficult to accede to and the longer the acquisition is delayed, the weaker would be our defence against the Chinese.

We also need to be mindful that a frosty relationship US-Russia relationship would see warmth in a Russia-China relationship. We would be caught in between and come out the loser.

Mature foreign policy requires that we do not put all eggs in the same basket. Strategic proximity needs to be balanced with Strategic Distancing. In an earlier time, this was referred to as non-alignment.

Building equations, building trust is the basis of a sustainable relationship and India needs to reach out to Washington to achieve precisely this. Washington needs to recognize New Delhi's compulsions.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

No country will fight another country's war unless there is a strategic advantage in doing so, such as, setting up a military base on long-term lease, for instance. China is better armed and equipped than India and if there is a war, it is likely that it would be fought on two fronts, including one with Pakistan. China is also technologically far superior to India and it is estimated that in the event of a war, the first casualty would be India's communication systems that would be hacked by Beijing.

This is a war if fought without support and allies would devastate India. The global community cannot afford that and would step in but by then, a fair amount of devastation is likely have

been heaped on India. Current friendly parley with Beijing notwithstanding, New Delhi needs to realize that China and India will have an uneasy relationship with Beijing enjoying greater sway because of his trade, technology and military clout.

India needs to build closer ties with both Washington and Moscow and get its own act together to meet the Beijing threat. This is not achieved through diplomacy alone but visible upgrading of its infrastructure, military acquisitions, cyber security, technology driven platforms, and a liberalized trade and investment regime.

E) How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency?

The Biden presidency would be open to a Pakistan that shows credible action on democracy and on terrorism. Unless this happens, Islamabad is likely to remain distanced. Concessions on the nuclear front given to India are not likely to be accorded to Pakistan.

Pakistan's main focus would not be the US but China. This should concern us more.

(4) Amb Anil Trigunayat,

Former Ambassador of India to Jordan, Libya and Malta

President, MIICCA Chamber of Commerce (www.miicca.com)

Secretary, Association of Indian Diplomats (Former Ambassadors) www.associationdiplomats.org

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Email Interview

FPRC Journal (45) 75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

A) How do you look at four-years of India-US ties under President Trump?

Xx I think it is a mixed picture for Indo-US relations during the Trump era but with more positives. India figured prominently in USA's South Asia Strategy. He focussed on Indo-Pacific with India as a major partner and driver and even changed the name not only from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific but their own Command structure to be renamed and reframed in that context. In order to increase closer security and defence collaboration Trump helped sign remaining Foundation Agreements, India also became a major beneficiary of hi-tech equipment and intelligence collaboration. As his foreign policy was somewhat eccentric and driven by his perception of *America First* he withdrew GSP benefits from India treating it as a developed country. He also imposed sanctions and tariffs on India calling it a "Tariff King". Harley Davidson issue is well known. It was difficult for Indian professionals to easily move to USA to undertake projects and his immigration policies and H1B visa regime became far more stringent. He also regarded PM Modi well and had developed a good personal rapport that was evident in public meetings in Texas and during his visit to Ahmedabad as he recognised the power and importance of 4mn Indian diaspora and realised the potential of the second largest market with a robust economy. It would be fair to say that he was probably the first US President who openly stood up for India during the Sino-Indian border tensions and conflict and called out China in no uncertain terms. Even during his last days a 2+2 foreign and defence ministers meeting was held in Delhi. At the same time Trump's West Asia policies especially against Iran created a very major problem as he enhanced the maximum pressure and severe secondary and tertiary sanctions regime forcing India to reduce its oil imports completely from Iran. Even critical Chabahar port came under stress and Iranians were peeved at India's inability to stand up to Trump but understood the compulsions in the larger context.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India?

Xx President Biden is a seasoned politician and has conducted foreign policy for far too long and has selected a highly professional team of professionals who are well versed with India's potential and prowess. Biden and Harris team would surely like to build upon especially in bilateral and Indo-Pacific context. As he builds on his return to multilateralism there will be greater scope for collaboration especially as India is also present at the UNSC as a non-permanent member for next two years. Indications and statements are that relationship with India will continue to grow as China is perceived as a major threat. The first ever QUAD Summit (March 12, 2021) and the consequent Joint statement as well as Op-ed in *Washington Post* clearly confirm that QUAD is here to stay. Of course the conservatives and liberals in his party and from the Republicans will keep bringing up the Human Rights issues in one form or the other which will have to be contended upfront. One of the key problems India will encounter is a threat to its strategic autonomy and defence procurements from Russia especially the S-400. But if the Americans are as mercantilist as they are made out to be they should be able to understand India's legitimate concerns and their own commercial interests. If not, it remains an open question.

---How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - Strategic and Trade deals-and move forward?

Trade deals and issues have to be handled in the spirit of accommodation and give and take since Trade is a two way street . We must have manageable expectations from one another and respect the strategic compulsions of the other.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

Xx We might say that India would like the two relationships to stand on their own. But the geo-politics and real politic have their own dynamic especially when super power rivalry becomes the defining factor for the third country partnership. India will have to do a calibrated fine balancing since the relationship between Putin and Biden is unlikely to become normal if the current indications are any measure. They are becoming more personalised and vitriolic despite the fact that the two countries will continue to work on major disarmament and Climate change issues. We might see a closer alliance between Russia and China and if it emerges into something more militaristic then the equations will have to be reviewed.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

Xx In my view India should develop its own capabilities and be able to confront Chinese aggression without banking too much on any of the other super powers. It has done well during Doklam and Galwan and that is the way to go. But if the QUAD leaders statement is a guide we could expect closer and greater support from US and other Quad countries when the push comes to shove.

E) How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency?

Xx Pakistan has discredited itself significantly and I think the US Administration will continue to use it until it has an ongoing Afghan problem. But given its own geo-political calculations it will not like Pakistan to sink and would prefer it to distance itself from Beijing which is quite unlikely as Islamabad is well embedded in Chinese long term strategic designs and owes a great deal to its security. Biden of course has closer personal contacts with Pakistan as he was even conferred with the second highest order of Pakistan. All said and done, for the US strategic calculations and China containment strategy India is a much bigger and better partner even if somewhat unpredictable given its strategic autonomy in conduct of foreign policy. A normal Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership devoid of standard US bullying tactics will go a long way in making India-US partnership trustworthy .

(5) Amb. Touqir Hussain
former senior diplomat from Pakistan

(Touqir Hussain is a former senior diplomat from Pakistan, having served as Ambassador to Brazil, Spain and Japan (1998-2003). He also held senior positions in the Pakistani Foreign Office, including that of Additional Foreign Secretary heading the bureaus of the Middle East and of the Americas and Europe. From 1996 to 1998, he was Diplomatic Adviser to the Prime Minister.

Since 2004 he has been pursuing an academic career in the United States. He was a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (2004 - 2005) and Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Globalization George Washington University (2006 - 2010). Currently he is Adjunct Faculty at Georgetown University and Syracuse University, and Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asia Studies of the National University of Singapore. Earlier he had also taught at Johns Hopkins University (SAIS) and University of Virginia Charlottesville.)

Email Interview

FPRC Journal (45) 75 Years of India –US Relations (1945-2020)

A) How do you look at four-years of India-US ties under President Trump?

To be honest I do not evaluate the Trump era in terms of policy. The Trump so called policies were brazenly transactional and openly political. There were thus two parallel trends going on in the US India relations during the Trump time. First under the stewardship of the State Department the strategic relationship begun during President Clinton's time continued to grow from strength to strength.

It reflected a steady march by India to foster external relations conducive to its economic growth and technological development begun in early 90s. It would define India will have to define how it engages with great powers, especially the United States, thus raising its economic weight, military potential, and diplomatic stature. Prime Minister Modi boosted it further. On the US side a big push came from Pompeo whose super hawkish approach to China gave a new dimension to US India relations.

The second track was of Trump. But it was politics of the relationship that dominated Trump's own approach to India. He thought it would raise his profile among the Indian diaspora. And it so happened that the politics of the relationship benefited Modi in equal measure. But for Trump politics cut in different ways. He was an irritant on trade issues. On the whole the relationship prospered a great deal not only in advancing the bilateral ties but specially in spoiling the US Pakistan relationship during the early period of the Trump Presidency.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India?

How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - Strategic and Trade deals-and move forward?

The US India extraordinary relationship has been steadily growing for the past nearly three decades indeed since the end of the Cold war. The present strategic framework was put in place during President Clinton's time. Today, there is bipartisan support from the Republicans and Democrats for a strong partnership with India. It is all embracing — economic, political and security. India's economic weight with a GDP of \$2.6 trillion, its increasing global political influence as evidenced by its current membership of the UN Security Council and G20 is important for the US economic and strategic interests.

Early signs are good for India. Biden appears to favor the continuation of strong ties with India. He has had long standing dealing with India as an important member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The geo politics will still be the guiding principle of US India relations. India serves a useful role in Washington's China policy that is likely to continue. But Biden will recognize that US and China relationship is complex and multidimensional. The two countries are geopolitical rivals. And China has become a domestic political issue in the US. It is seen as taking away jobs and factories from working-class Americans and posing a challenge to US technological superiority and economic pre-eminence.

The increased presence of Americans of Indian origin in powerful positions in the Biden administration may reinforce the trend of deepening cooperation between the two countries

To sum up, being a foreign policy traditionalist, Biden cannot have hostile relations with both Russia and China. With debt, deficits and job losses caused by the Covid-19 crisis, the need for US economic cooperation with China, a major engine of global growth, will remain.

So this will give the US some flexibility in dealing with China. As a consequence it will give India also room to exercise its strategic autonomy in its relations with China.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

My own view is it is be an irritant but not have a major impact on the relations.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

The decision is for India to make. Right now there is a review going on about the future US approach to China. China policy would be part of a new and broader Asia strategy. Washington

will also defer to the views and concerns of its European allies. Once in a while politics of the issue gets far ahead of the policy. It happened during early years of Clinton and is happening again. Perhaps (and this is my view) China's meteoric rise was not only unforeseen by the Americans but by Xi also. This has overplayed not only opportunities but threats also. Both sides need to step back from the brink. I think it is possible.

Yet whatever policy emerges the close US India ties will continue. India has its own perceptions of China and the US its own. They may not fully converge but there will some overlap, enough for India to seek American help.

E) How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency?

I think we may see some change in US approach to South Asia under Biden. Biden may not pair Pakistan with China as the target of Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy to exert dual American and Indian pressure as this will put Pakistan firmly in the Chinese camp and thus lost to Beijing's strategic purposes.

US relations with India and Pakistan have long been described as "hyphenated" by much of the American strategic community and it is said that now they have been "de-hyphenated". These labels do not fully embrace the complexity of the US, India Pakistan triangle. When America's critical interests were involved with Pakistan the US did not care much about the Indian reaction like during the Afghan Jihad of 80s. And when these interests were involved with India like in Sino Indian war in 1962 Washington did not care much about the Pakistani reaction. So where was the hyphen then?

It is true that now more than ever before, the relations with India have their own dynamics and strategic rationale and the relations with Pakistan have their own imperatives. And both are de-hyphenated whatever the case before. But there are some aspects of US interests in the region and in each country which are impacted by its relations with the other and relations between them. In fact both India Pakistan relations are going to be of importance to Washington.

There are new realities now. Washington needs Pakistan's help in the unresolved crisis of Afghanistan. The US is interested in the Kashmir dispute, although it is not the dispute so much Washington has been always concerned about, but the crisis it might generate. Biden may be concerned about human rights too. Lastly the US may not like to leave Pakistan solely allied to China.

(6) Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd)

Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM, ADC is a former Flag Officer of the Indian Navy. He served as the Chief of the Naval Staff from 31 July 2004 to 31 October 2006 and as the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee from 31 January 2005 to 31 October 2006. He is one of India's most decorated naval officers.

Email Interview

FPRC Journal(45)- 75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

A) How do you look at four-years of India-US ties under President Trump? Do you agree that populism and nationalism are good for home consumption, not for foreign policy?

Given Trump's transactional approach to foreign relations and his fixation on 'America first,' policies, it would have been unrealistic for India to have had great expectations from the Indo-US relationship during his presidency. While Trump's steadfast focus on the Indo-Pacific and his tough stance against China's aggressive posturing did work to India's advantage, his Iran and Russia policies created difficulties for us.

It is, also, doubtful whether the returns from Mr Modi's exuberant overtures to Trump - in Houston as well as Ahmedabad - were worth the huge political capital invested in it; especially since the US President failed to get re-elected and exited the White House, virtually, 'in disgrace'.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India?

How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - Strategic and Trade deals-and move forward?

While Biden has already shown his intent by reversing some of Trump's more myopic and damaging policy initiatives, he is not likely to be less focused on keeping US economic and security interests uppermost. On economic issues, Biden is unlikely to have much room for manoeuvre, and Indian negotiators will need to drive hard bargains, keeping in mind, India's need for FDI and US technology.

In the security arena, the US is locked in a fierce power-struggle as well as economic competition, with China, and needs India as a friendly counter-poise and partner in the Indo-Pacific. On its part, India has already conceded enough by signing all of the 'Foundational Agreements' AND investing over US \$ 20 bn in US military hardware. It is time that India demanded a *quid pro quo* in the form of advanced military technology from the USA.

However, India will need to be conscious of the Biden administration's great sensitivity about maintenance of democratic norms, civil liberties, and religious intolerance.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

Just as India is dependent on Russia for military equipment, as well as, some arcane technology in other sectors, for its security, Russian industry, too, needs India's huge patronage for economic reasons. So this relationship is important to both and will be kept alive. Similarly, India needs America's friendship for security and economic reasons. If the Russia-US confrontation continues or worsens, the MEA will just have to juggle its balls more adroitly.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

India can expect diplomatic support and military posturing as well as sale of weaponry by the US.

But certainly, no 'boots on the ground.'

E) How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency?

Pakistan will receive a degree of indulgence from Biden since it is needed as an intermediary, till there is some resolution /accomodation with the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, it is likely to be kept on a tight leash as far as terrorism is concerned.

(7) Timothy D. Hoyt, Ph.D.

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FPRC Journal(45)- 75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

Response to Questionnaire

A)How do you look at four-years of India-US ties under President Trump?

Four years of slow evolution in the relationship, mostly driven by inertia, but also mostly positive. The Trump administration, when it focused on Asia, focused primarily on other states - Pakistan (a more antagonistic policy), Afghanistan (the ongoing question of negotiation/withdrawal), China (fluctuated according to US domestic political needs), and

North Korea (truly unusual). Events that might have drawn more alarm and attention in other administrations (cross border raids and air combat) were handled more calmly by professional staff. The overall trends remain positive, but could be accelerated.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India?

The US-India relationship flourishes when it receives high-level (Presidential, on the US side - Clinton and George W. Bush) attention. It did not get this from the Trump administration (see above) but is likely to get it from the Biden administration. This is both because of the determination to restore good relations with allies and partners, and also because of the commitment to demonstrating the resilience and relevance of democracy.

In addition, once policy is determined, relations benefit from a strong professional staff and bureaucracy. Although some excellent people worked in the Trump administration, diplomacy and even the national security bureaucracy suffered from inadequate staffing (in both numbers and experience). The Biden administration is committed to fixing that issue, and its competence is already evident.

---How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - Strategic and Trade deals-and move forward?

Movement on the strategic side will proceed most effectively at whatever pace India is comfortable with, perhaps accelerated by an occasional nuanced nudge from the US side.

Trade deals tend to be complicated, and the new administration has to re-establish trust in Asia after the TPP fiasco. That might be a recipe for dramatic action, but might also be a recipe for slow and careful movement - it is hard to tell.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

Not much. The Biden administration will triangulate, and both states see too much from the bilateral relationship to seriously risk it over Russia. The main issue with Russian arms transfers will be concern over technology leakage (by all sides) - but that is an issue that has been around for quite a while.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

It depends on the definition of "confront" - a great deal will depend on what the issue is and what help India requests. Neither state wants to antagonize China or escalate a crisis to an actual war, but India has been cautious in its encounters with China to date. I cannot think of plausible situations where India would ask for assistance that the US would be unwilling to provide.

E) How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency?

Pakistan will try to find ways to make itself indispensable to the US, and in the past it has often succeeded. A great deal will depend on what decisions are made about Afghanistan, and how any transition takes place (because Pakistan, obviously, can bring a great deal of leverage to bear regarding Afghanistan's future if/when the US leaves for good). Broader US policies - the emphasis on democracy, great power competition with China - will not make US-Pakistan cooperation easy. And the US will try to keep it strictly separate from US-India policy. The lack of response from the Trump administration on changes in Kashmir and on border skirmishes suggests, again, that the US doesn't accept Pakistan's major claims re: India and will not let them stand in the way of continuing improvements in the US-India relationship.

(These opinions are my own, and not those of the US Naval War College, the US Navy, or any part of the US government.)

(8) Dr. Dov Zakheim

Senior Fellow at CNA Corp.

and a Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

(Previously he was Senior Vice President of Booz Allen Hamilton. Dr. Zakheim served as Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and DoD Chief Financial Officer (2001-2004) and as DOD coordinator of civilian programs in Afghanistan (2002-2004). From 1985 to 1987, he was Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Planning and Resources. He is an Executive Advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations. He has served on Congressionally-mandated government commissions, the Defense Business Board, which he helped create, and chaired the National Intelligence Council's International Business Practices Advisory Panel. He sits on several corporate boards and is Vice Chairman of both the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Center for the National Interest. He earned his B.A. from Columbia and his doctorate from Oxford. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Chatham House and is a Fellow of the Royal Swedish Academy of Military Sciences. He appears frequently in the media and is a regular contributor to *The Hill* and *The National Interest*.)

Email Interview

FPRC Journal (45) 75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

A) How do you look at four-years of India-US ties under President Trump?

Actually despite Trump's belittling of allies and friends, not to say immigrants, US-INDIA relations continued to warm. On a personal level, TRUMP and MODI got on well. As early as their first meeting in 2017, the two leaders committed to strengthening their defense partnership, cooperating on counterterrorism, and intensifying economic relations. The following year, after years of discussions, the two countries finally concluded the Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) which, among other things, calls for real time information sharing between the two militaries. and in 2020, the two nations signed yet another long-discussed agreement, The Basic Exchange And Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for sharing geospatial data that would increase the accuracy of Indian missiles and UAVs. The US also agreed to sell India \$3 Billion worth of military equipment.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India?

Trump and Modi could not agree to ameliorate trade tensions, and Trump aggravated them by terminating India's Preferential Trade Status, to which India responded by slapping tariffs on a host of American goods.

It is unclear whether the Biden administration will restore India to the Generalized System of Preferences given ongoing pressure from the DEMOCRATIC LEFT, and more generally, concern about intellectual property theft. On the other hand, the Administration's concern about China--which continues to bring the two countries together, as well as the growing influence of Indian-Americans (including the Vice President) might lead to an attempt to repair trade relations.

---How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - Strategic and Trade deals-and move forward?

India and the US can further ramp up their security cooperation through increased exercises, more exchange students at war colleges, and joint planning. A cooling off period on trade, with India reducing the tariffs it imposed in 2019 while committing to take action against IP theft, while the US restores India to the GSP would be a good start.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

India naturally seeks to avoid taking sides between the US and Russia, and is likely to continue to acquire military systems from both. It is in Asia that the US and India share a deep concern about Chinese aggressiveness, and it is in that sphere that cooperation could continue to intensify.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

It is arguable that apart from the face-off between China and India in the high Himalayas, the US is doing every bit as much, if not more, to send tough messages to Beijing. Biden has yet to roll back trade restrictions, and has promised a tougher, but more nuanced approach to China's IP theft, bullying of American companies, and abuse of its position in the WTO. Moreover, the US continues to conduct FONOPs in the South China Sea and to transit the Taiwan Straits. Finally, while the Biden Administration may not be as openly supportive of Taiwan as was the Trump administration, it is unlikely to revert to the more passive policies of the Obama years and will continue to emphasize its support, including military support, for Taiwan.

E) How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency?

Pakistan is no favorite of Democrats, and its alignment with China does little to improve matters. On the other hand, no agreement in Afghanistan will succeed without Islamabad's

cooperation. Biden policy could well reflect those of previous administrations--cautious friendship, while recognizing the limits to how deeply the two countries can become entwined.

(9) Richard M. Rossow

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Response to Questionnaire

On

75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

A) How do you look at four-years of India-US ties under President Trump?

We made real improvements in our defense relationship. This includes real steps in our bilateral nature, such as signing the remaining "defense foundation agreements," expanding cooperation on issues in the Indian Ocean region, and multilateral issues like building the Quad. But other areas of our relationship languished. Notably, our respective nationalist trade policies heightened trade frictions. And people-to-people issues were harmed with America's tightening immigration policies.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India?

How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - Strategic and Trade deals-and move forward?

We need to have sustained, leader-level focus on our economic relationship. There is enough momentum in our defense ties to continue moving ahead. But our commercial ties are weak. Opening to trade involves hard choices, especially as we deal with Covid-related slowdowns. But this critical leg of our overall relationship cannot remain so very weak, else it threatens progress in other silos. I think a progressive, cooperative approach to trade must revolve first around areas of manufacturing that we both want to pull from China. It's an excellent foundation for cooperation.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

Russia will have a powerful influence on U.S.-India relations during the Biden administration. At some point in the next two years, India will finally take possession of the Russian-made S400 Triumf missile defense system. The U.S. will consider sanctions against India under its

CAATSA sanctions program. It's unclear how a path forward will work under the current law; the waiver authority exists, but is narrow.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

Very far. There is very little India could ask for that the U.S. would not deliver. New types and complexity of exercises; access to other types of embargoed defense equipment; intelligence cooperation. India will be the determiner of the speed of cooperation, as well as the scope.

E) How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency?

There are few in the U.S. policy community that look at Pakistan beyond its direct role to play in Afghanistan's long-term security. The U.S. will retain a relationship based on this point and will look for opportunities to strengthen the civilian government and civil society- hoping for a day that Pakistan truly embraces playing a positive role in the region. Even this nominal level of cooperation with Pakistan will bother some in India's policy circles. But at senior levels, I believe there is a reasonable understanding and acceptance of the U.S. position.

(10) Dr. Richard Weitz
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(Richard Weitz is senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. His current research includes regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia, as well as U.S. foreign and defense policies.

Before joining Hudson in 2005, Dr. Weitz worked at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Defense Science Board, Harvard University, and the U.S. Department of Defense.

Dr. Weitz received his Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University, M.Phil. in politics from Oxford University, M.Sc. in international relations from the London School of Economics, and B.A. with highest honors in government from Harvard College, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. He is proficient in Russian, French, and German.)

Email Interview

FPRC Journal(45) 75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

A) How do you look at four-years of India-US ties under President Trump?

The Indian-US relationship under President Trump remained strong, symbolized by Trump's 2020 visit to India, which reaffirmed the U.S. view of India's importance as a foreign partner. Such camaraderie was on display at events like the "Howdy Modi" rally in Houston and the "Namaste Trump" event in Chennai. Though relations were strained over some economic and visa issues, these differences were fewer and smaller than those between the Trump administration and many other U.S. partners.

Under Trump, U.S. arms sales to India continued to grow, with a recent sale including the signing of a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for the acquisition of 24 MH-60R Seahawk anti-submarine warfare helicopters, at an estimated cost of \$2.6 billion. India also signed a LOA with the US for the sale of six additional AH-64E Apache Guardian attack helicopters, at an estimated cost of \$930 million. The Trump administration also upgraded the quadrilateral dialogues with Australia and Japan; established a "2+2" India-US foreign and defense ministers' dialogue; and the first India-U.S. tri-service military exercise in 2019. The Trump administration's critical stance regarding China was generally welcome in India, whose companies benefited as the United States sought to diversify its supply chain beyond China.

The arms sales symbolize the continuity between Trump and previous U.S. administrations regarding India's defense. Between 2008 and 2020, India ordered seven different major U.S. military platforms, with bilateral defense trade rising from \$200m in 2000 to more than \$20 billion today following the two recent procurements. The Trump administration also oversaw the signing of the last of the so-called foundational defense agreements, which the United States often signs with important U.S. military partners: The Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018 and The Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement on Geospatial Cooperation (BECA) in 2020.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India?

The Biden administration will likely remove some immigration and visa issues that have concerned Indians, such as limits on temporary H1B visas for skilled professionals, as well as take a harder line on anti-Asian hate crimes in the United States. The selection of Kamala Harris, who has Indian ancestry, as Vice President was well-received by some Indians. The administration's softer policy toward Iran will also remove a source of tension with India, which sees Iran as an important oil supplier.

On the other hand, the Biden administration may be more critical of New Delhi's policies regarding Jammu and Kashmir. Although some members of Congress had objected to the revoking of Article 370 and passage of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act and the application of nation-wide National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam, the Trump administration did not raise any strong objections.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

During the Cold War, Washington saw New Delhi's policy as more aligned with the Soviet Union than the United States. Since then, Indian-U.S. relations have sharply improved, particularly in the security realm, but New Delhi has generally remained neutral in the Russian-U.S. confrontation. While the United States and its allies have been eroding Russian arms sales to India, this has been due to factors largely unrelated to that confrontation. The main source of Russian-Indian tensions has been Moscow's increasingly close alignment with Beijing. Furthermore, Western countries can offer better investment and trade opportunities for India than Russia. However, concern in the United States has grown about potential Russian access to U.S. defense technologies provided to India. The focus of alarm has been India's impending purchase of the S-400 missile system, which could lead Washington to apply the U.S. Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act on India for conducting a "significant transaction" with Russia's defense sector.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

Recent Indian-U.S. security cooperation under the Obama and Trump administrations has more explicitly addressed China's rise. The United States will assist India against China under the Biden administration through the development of multilateral partnerships embedding both countries. The Quad looks to be a core instrument for Indo-U.S. multinational engagement with other partners favoring a "free and open Pacific" based on liberal norms and a democratic model of governance.

The Biden administration will also likely build on the foundational agreements to continue selling weapons, participating in military exercises, and sharing intelligence and defense technologies with India. Thanks to its superior space and signals capabilities, the United States can substantially aid India in defining Chinese threats. They will probably also deepen cooperation in the novel space, climate, public health, and cyber security domains. Congress will support these measures. A bipartisan consensus exists among Democrats and Republicans in Congress regarding India as a valued partner in dealing with China as a strategic rival and potential threat.

E) How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency?

How the Biden administration will deal with Pakistan remains a mystery. On the one hand, the Biden team harbors the same negative views as the Obama and Trump administrations regarding Pakistani support for Islamist terrorism against India and other targets. On the other hand, like the Trump administration, the current administration wants to secure Pakistani assistance in inducing the Taliban to end its war in Afghanistan and agree to a power-sharing agreement with the Kabul government. So Pakistani-U.S. official relations may improve, at least

initially, though Pakistan's dependence on China will also limit ties. Though Biden is unlikely to press India's interests in Afghanistan against Pakistani resistance, he is unlikely to repeat Trump's offer to mediate the Indian-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir.

(The author would like to thank Muskan Nagpal for her research assistance.)

(11) Daniel S. Markey

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(He teaches courses in international politics and policy. Dr. Markey's latest book, *China's Western Horizon: Beijing and the New Geopolitics of Eurasia*, was published by Oxford University Press in March 2020. It assesses the evolving political, economic, and security links between China and its western neighbors, including Pakistan, India, Kazakhstan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. It explains what these changes are likely to mean for the United States and recommends steps that Washington should take in response. From 2007-2015, Daniel Markey was a senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. While there, he wrote a book on the future of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, *No Exit from Pakistan: America's Tortured Relationship with Islamabad* (Cambridge University Press, 2013). From 2003 to 2007, Dr. Markey held the South Asia portfolio on the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff at the US Department of State. Prior to government service, he taught in the Department of Politics at Princeton University. At Princeton, he also served as executive director of Princeton's Research Program in International Security. Earlier, he was a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard's Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. Dr. Markey is the author of numerous reports, articles, book chapters, and opinion pieces. His commentary has been featured widely in US and international media.

Responses to FPRC Journal (45) Questionnaire

75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

A) How do you look at four-years of India-US ties under President Trump?

The four years of the Trump administration was a really mixed bag for the U.S.-India relationship. On the very positive side, defense ties improved in ways consistent with initiatives launched in prior U.S. administrations, all aimed at enhancing opportunities for strategic alignment and operational cooperation. The conclusion of final "foundational" agreements in defense communications and intelligence even started to pay more practical dividends, especially as India faced a heightened security threat from China. Indeed, the steep deterioration in U.S.-China and India-China relations during the Trump administration highlighted the shared strategic challenges faced by New Delhi and Washington.

Less positive were the economic and commercial aspects of the U.S.-India relationship, where both sides retreated to more protectionist stances that fail to unlock greater potential in U.S.-

India trade and investment, and where the Trump administration compounded that error with its disastrous visa policies that threatened business and educational ties, especially in the high technology sector.

Worse still were some of the political developments witnessed during the Trump administration, when the personalization of ties between President Trump and Prime Minister Modi threatened to undermine the broad liberal, democratic foundation of support on which the present U.S.-India relationship stands. Leader-level bonding over majoritarian and populist impulses, joint participation in highly partisan political rallies, and the bombastic use of Twitter diplomacy delivered only ephemeral highs and raise questions about how best to renew a commitment to more principled partnership going forward.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India? How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - Strategic and Trade deals-and move forward?

The Biden administration has – right out of the gate – demonstrated a keen eagerness to see India near the center of its strategic vision in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In other words, there should be no reason to doubt Biden’s commitment to the “strategic bet” that several U.S. administrations have placed on India. Each has believed that a strong India, and a stronger U.S.-India partnership, is mutually beneficial and a key to defending a peaceful and prosperous global order.

Unlike the Trump administration, we can expect President Biden’s team to revert to a more systematic and institutionalized process of diplomatic engagement with India, one in which outstanding issues will be addressed through interagency working groups and prepared for bilateral diplomatic engagements with a minimal level of surprise or drama. This, of course, will not necessarily alleviate trouble spots on trade deals and other areas where the two sides simply hold different political or economic interests. Where such disputes persist, I expect that Biden’s team will prefer to manage them through quiet diplomacy, preferring to stress the strategic benefits of closer U.S.-India ties in their public statements.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

Whereas the Trump administration delivered a dangerously mixed message on Russia, the Biden administration will open with a consistent toughness befitting U.S. concerns about Russia’s reckless, illiberal policies at home and abroad. One specific question this will raise in the context of U.S.-India relations is how Biden will manage the application of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) as India takes delivery of Russian-made S-400 air defense systems.

My expectation is that President Biden will seek a CAATSA waiver for India because the aim of U.S. sanctions policy is fundamentally intended to punish Russia, not India. Over time, it is conceivable that the Biden administration would welcome a relative thaw in U.S. relations with Russia, and that would be appreciated in New Delhi. But any thaw is difficult to envision as

long as Moscow's policies remain so clearly dominated by anti-U.S., anti-Western, illiberal motivations.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

Whereas the Trump administration may have at times framed U.S. goals in terms of "confronting" China, I expect the Biden administration will want to speak and act in "defense" against China's increasingly aggressive approach in Asia and beyond. My point is not merely semantic; I expect the Biden administration to willingly commit resources and attention to India's defense against China, but not to seek out new confrontations with Beijing for the sake of appearing tough. The stakes in U.S.-China relations are already exceedingly high, and it is essential that U.S. leaders show consistent resolve in the face of Chinese probing, not erratic "toughness" or mixed messages.

To the extent that the United States can be a helpful partner in India's efforts to secure its land, maritime, air, and cyber domains, I expect Biden administration officials will be open to a wide range of new initiatives, from arms transfers and joint exercises to intelligence sharing and even contingency planning. I would also anticipate that the Biden administration's desire to invest time and resources in the "Quad" (with Japan and Australia as well as India) could be a focal point for defense, not just through military means, but also through diplomatic and economic cooperation.

Having said this, part of the Biden administration's enthusiasm for close partnership India will depend on the extent to which New Delhi chooses to distinguish itself as a leader within the global community of liberal democratic states, not just as a security counter to China. Either way, the United States will work to defend against Chinese aggression, but a U.S.-India partnership founded on a sturdy bedrock of shared values can move faster and further than one conceived on narrowly self-interested terms.

E) How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency?

As in the past, Washington tends to view Pakistan through the lens of other pressing security issues. For now, the primary issue is the U.S. effort to manage the "endgame" of its military involvement in Afghanistan. How the Biden administration perceives Pakistan's role in that effort will color its impressions of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship overall.

If the Biden administration perceives Pakistan as a helpful partner in managing withdrawal negotiations and countering anti-U.S. security threats posed by groups like Al-Qaida and ISIS, then as in the past, Washington will be inclined to seek a cooperative, sustainable relationship with Islamabad. If, on the other hand, Biden officials perceive Pakistan as unhelpful or disruptive in Afghanistan, the opposite would be true.

The implications from an Indian perspective are relatively easy to draw, but as always, India should be careful what it wishes for. A disruptive Pakistan and a further deterioration in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship would not necessarily lead to stability in Afghanistan, more restraint from Islamabad, or less close cooperation between Pakistan and China.

(March 2021)

(12) Deepa M. Ollapally (Ph.D.)

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FPRC Journal(45)- 75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

Response to Questionnaire

A) How do you look at four-years of India-US ties under President Trump?

Donald Trump leaves a mixed record on India-US ties. He was able to strengthen the solid foundation steadily built up by his predecessors in strategic and defense areas. But in economics, it was a different story with Trump's strong America First idea and his penchant for transactional foreign policy taking a toll. India was targeted for having a trade surplus with the US and preferential trade status for India was dropped. Trump accused India of unfair trade practices and India was added to the list of countries that the President wanted the Commerce Department to investigate for such practices. Conversely, the Trump administration pushed through some long-stalled defense agreements that gave India much sought after technology and other capabilities such as intelligence and information sharing. Overall, I would say that Trump was not able to shake off his image as an unpredictable and untrustworthy partner, in part because he had no consistent foreign policy vision, for India or any other country. Ultimately, I would describe India-US relations as having been more transactional and not terribly reliable under the Trump presidency.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India?

How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - Strategic and Trade deals-and move forward?

When Biden came to power, it seemed that his focus would be domestic given the pandemic and related economic disruption and other internal political turmoil. The speed with which the Biden team has been moving on the Indo-Pacific and Afghanistan, two areas of importance to India is a big surprise, a welcome surprise. The elevation of Quad meetings to summit level and release of a joint statement for the first time is a harbinger of how close ties can become. The fact that Biden called for this meeting shows his strong personal commitment to partners in Asia. This immediate background of goodwill will be very useful in dealing with outstanding issues, especially in trade. India and the US are two critical countries that are not part of the two current Asian mega trade groupings—CPTPP and RCEP—and hence have some real incentives to shore up their economic ties bilaterally if not multilaterally. But it will be difficult if not impossible for any comprehensive trade deal, though more targeted economic cooperation could be actively pursued. The agreement for vaccine production in India for global distribution, to be financed in part by the US, signifies how new opportunities are being quickly tapped. Both have strong interests in next generation technology cooperation given their concerns with China and this is an area in need of immediate attention. Issues like the H1B visa suspension should be allowed to lapse, thus clearing out a notable obstacle in relations from the past.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

Any US-Russia confrontation is not likely going to be a significant factor in India-US relations for the simple reason that both countries know that the US does not have a veto over India's long-standing ties with Russia. Even under Trump, India was able to purchase Russian S-400 defenses and avoid any sanctions. While the US may continue to put pressure on India regarding defense purchases from Russia, New Delhi will have enough degrees of freedom to not disrupt relations with Moscow. Besides, with the Afghan peace process now a priority for Biden and Russia's key role in it, an implacable hostility by Washington toward Moscow will not work. The Biden administration will be more realistic and accept the limits it has over India's Russia policy. India in turn may or may not moderate its relations with Russia, so I think the ball will be in India's court.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

The symbolic gestures and supportive rhetoric on behalf of India will continue to get stronger like we saw under Trump during the Himalayan standoff, but more importantly, the sale of defense equipment to India to redress its military imbalance on the border, will increase. The US will be much more forthcoming in this regard. But there should be no illusions that the US will come to India's aid beyond this level. The US will be particularly open to enhancing Indian maritime power in the Indian Ocean where India has an advantage over China, to give India a realistic maritime hedge. Also, recent moves such as the first Quad summit held at the behest of Biden in March 2021 and the steps they announced to coordinate policy in key sectors play to Indian strengths vis a vis China. One example is the decision to coordinate vaccine diplomacy among the four which indirectly increases Indian soft power over China given India's huge

vaccine manufacturing capabilities. This diversified approach to competing with China takes some of the pressures off India in its own competition with its neighbor. US interests in this regard become clearer when we ask the question the other way around —how much help India will give to the US to help confront China.

E) How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency?

Over the years, Pakistan's staying power in US foreign policy interests has been remarkable. India has had to live with this reality, even as US-India relations soared. I don't see this changing. If anything, Pakistan's importance is set to rise given its singular ability to affect the Afghan peace process. The Biden team has already made it clear it wants a speedy political resolution to the Afghan imbroglio, and whether it likes it or not, Washington will be dependent on Islamabad to ensure that stability is maintained if and when US forces withdraw. Additionally, the huge inroads that China has made into Pakistan with its investments could give Islamabad new leverage over the US and India. Finally, the Biden administration's greater attention to human rights makes Indian policies in Kashmir more vulnerable to criticism. Against this, it needs to be noted that strategic mistrust between Pakistan and US is higher than ever whereas strategic trust between Washington and New Delhi is higher than ever.

(13) Dr.David Arase

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Email Interview

FPRC Journal (45) 75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

A) How do you look at four-years of India-US ties under President Trump?

Relations got progressively better after Prime Minister Modi's visit to the US where he and President Trump seem to have established a warm relationship and the focus of bilateral relations shifted from trade friction to strategic cooperation due to China's own actions at Doklam in 2017 and last year in Ladakh.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India? How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - Strategic and Trade deals-and move forward?

So far it seems that President Biden's Asia policy has accepted the premise of the Trump Administration's approach, which identified China as the main strategic threat to a range of vital US interests in the region. It also continues the status quo protecting Free and Open Indo-Pacific agenda which rests heavily on the Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue—and India's participation.

For India, advancing its own geopolitical agenda in Eurasia and speeding up its own economic development are strategic priorities. So, if the US wants a sincere strategic partnership with India—which it does—it will have to make some concessions in these areas even as it asks India to meet certain baseline requirements for secure exchange of military and intelligence information, technology transfer, and joint operational capabilities. For example, the US needs to work with Japan and the EU to help India integrate into global value chains as well as accommodate a necessary degree of Indian economic cooperation with Iran and a degree of continuing cooperation with Russia.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

No doubt India is put in a difficult position, as neither the US nor Russian will welcome Indian cooperation with a strategic rival. But the picture is not complete without China. Russia is increasingly becoming the junior partner supporting China's rise as a geopolitical Eurasian hegemon—supplying energy, weapons, high technology, military training, political/diplomatic support, and strategic accommodation of BRI in and around Russia to influence Central Asia, Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. In this situation, will Russia favor India over China in future Sino-Indian confrontations? This is a problem that India cannot fail to recognize.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

It will depend on circumstances because without an actual alliance treaty that spells out the privileges and obligations of the contracting parties, who can say? But the fundamental interest of the US in the face of an aggressively militant and revisionist China under Xi Jinping is to strengthen India so that it can stand on its own two feet in at least its home region.

E) How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency?

The US relationship with Pakistan is bound to weaken as it becomes an economic and strategic client of China. But it would be unwise to let it disappear because the US still has to find a way to extricate itself from Afghanistan and it retains important non-proliferation and anti-terrorism interests.

(March 16, 2021)

(14) Nilanthi Samaranayake

Director of the Strategy and Policy Analysis program at CNA, a nonprofit research organization in the Washington area.

(She is the author of publications on Indian Ocean security issues and studies US alliances and strategic partnerships globally. The views expressed are solely those of the author and not of any organization with which she is affiliated.)

FPRC Journal(45)- 75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

Response to Questionnaire

A) How do you look at four-years of India-US ties under President Trump?

NS: Building strategic ties with India has consistently been a bipartisan issue in Washington. The Trump administration continued to develop deeper ties with India, such as through the conclusion of defense foundational agreements. On a multinational realm, the Trump administration devoted considerable attention to rejuvenate the Quad cooperative construct with India, Australia, and Japan, with success at the ministerial level.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India? How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - Strategic and Trade deals-and move forward?

NS: The Biden presidency indicates continued progress in bilateral US-India relations. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin is scheduled to travel to India. Such travel early in the administration conveys the priority Washington places on its relationship with India. While strategic cooperation has much momentum, agreement on trade by contrast has much farther to go.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

NS: The Biden administration has not been clear about whether India will face some sort of penalty under the US Congress' Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) due to India's purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system. For the US, enforcement of CAATSA goes beyond India, extending to other countries seeking Russian defense platforms and systems such as Egypt and Turkey. The issue certainly holds the potential to disrupt what has been a soaring trajectory in the domain of strategic and defense relations.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

NS: I think both countries have mutual apprehension on this issue. The US has actively sought to become closer to India, but it does not want to become engaged in a conflict in the Indian

Ocean. At the same time, India does not want to become a US ally and understandably insists on its strategic autonomy, fearing the potential of becoming ensnared in a US-China conflict. So I see both countries drawing closer to each other, but having a concern of the other inadvertently escalating tensions with China.

E) How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency?

NS: Pakistan appears to have been successfully “dehyphenated” from the US policy calculus for many years. The US and Pakistan will need to continue their bilateral relationship, due to the significant tensions there. However, this does not detract from bilateral US-India relations.

(15) Sanjay Upadhya

Sanjay Upadhya is a Nepalese journalist, author and analyst based in the United States.

(He has worked for the British Broadcasting Corporation, the Times of London, Inter Press Service, Khaleej Times and the United Nations. Upadhya is the author, most recently, of 'Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China' (New Delhi: Vitasta, 2021). His previous books include 'Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry Between China and India' (New York and London: Routledge, 2012) and 'The Raj Lives: India in Nepal' (New Delhi: Vitasta, 2008).

Response to Questionnaire

FPRC Journal (45) 75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

A) How do you look at four-years of India-US ties under President Trump?

Although relations had been strengthening across the board since the Clinton administration, growing American and Indian concerns about China accelerated more in-depth and more institutionalized defense and security ties. Platforms for bilateral and multilateral engagement – including the once cast-off Quad – were strengthened. Moreover, consultations were stepped up in bilateral, regional and global institutions on a bevy of traditional and emerging issues.

All this has had beneficial effects on the bilateral economic engagement, which, in any case, had acquired a logic and momentum of its own. The regularity and vibrancy of the dialogue process has been able to keep bilateral political/security and economic/trade differences within manageable levels.

The personal chemistry of the two leaders and ideological convergences between the ruling parties over the past four years also carried the risk of casting the relationship in a partisan

light. However, realities on the ground and a broader convergence of interests have been able to offset that risk.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India? How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - Strategic and Trade deals-and move forward?

New Delhi will closely watch the Biden administration's approach to China and the Indo-Pacific region generally. President Trump's declassification of the "US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific" – which states that "a strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a counterbalance to China – was perhaps intended to commit his successor to his policies. While New Delhi may have some misgivings on that formulation, particularly relating to its evident impingement on India's vaunted 'strategic autonomy', Biden's early statements have cast Beijing as a "long-term competitor". This would signal continuity in the content of the US-India-China triangle.

However, over the next few months, if the Biden administration were to depart from its predecessor to seek greater cooperation with China on other issues such as climate change and health security while sorting out the more contentious bilateral challenges, India may find itself having to make adjustments.

While India will welcome a return by the United States to multilateralism, New Delhi would continue to prefer issue-based coalitions rather than formal alliances. India's engagement with Russia and Iran, among other things, could prove to be periodic irritants, but not necessarily roadblocks to closer relations.

Over the next few months, there is a likelihood of greater cooperation on such issues as the supply and distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine. As the challenge of economic recovery starts to predominate, differences over trade, investment and immigration could become more prominent.

At another level, the Biden White House – as Democratic administrations traditionally have been – could be more assertive and outspoken on domestic developments in India. This, in turn, would prompt New Delhi to ward off no less ebulliently Washington's interference in what it considers internal matters. The echo chamber of the daily news cycle and the effervescence of non-state actors in both countries could make things appear worse than they actually are. The Biden administration would be hamstrung by the United States' own struggles with ensuring full rights and representation to marginalized communities within. On the other hand, the general vibrancy India's democracy and institutions should be able to withstand undue pressures. All this perhaps would indicate an urgency for loosening linkages between strategic and trade issues.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

India's decision in 2018 to buy five Russian S-400 missile systems has strained bilateral ties and threatened Washington's own defense sales in New Delhi. The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), passed by Congress in 2017 to punish Russia for interfering with the 2016 US elections, comes very close to requiring the White House to impose sanctions on any country that makes "significant" purchases of military equipment from Russia.

As the law stands, therefore, Biden must invoke CAATSA on India. However, he can waive the implementation of sanctions under the national security exception built into the legislation. Since that exception is narrow, Biden and his advisers would need to muster much executive creativity while contending with the legislature.

What would help here is the countervailing argument in favor of India's value as a partner in confronting China across Eurasia. We can debate who needs the other more. Still, the fact remains that New Delhi possesses a growing and palpable willingness and ability to act as a counterbalance to China, something the Americans cannot be oblivious to. Thus, the United States may feel it has an incentive to go soft on sanctions if it wants India's full-fledged partnership.

This, of course, ties into the broader issue of India-Russia relations. Here, too, there seems to be growing recognition in Washington that strong ties between New Delhi and Moscow might help check undue Chinese influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

India has publicly maintained that its relationship with any one country is not about containing any other country. However, realities on the ground also dictate India's necessity to build strong partnerships with like-minded countries to counter the threat from China.

The United States is ready to help India as a full-fledged ally. However, India has no desire to become one because of the vibrancy of the economic dimensions of its relations with China. After all, India remains an active member of the China-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the largest borrower from the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Last year, China again emerged as India's biggest trade partner, relegating the United States to the second position after two years.

Evidently, New Delhi's preferred option is to cooperate with Beijing when possible and compete only when necessary. In other words, New Delhi feels complete reliance on Washington would seriously constrain the country's strategic space, especially when it sees

little to suggest the Americans would be ready to assume new security obligations in the region. The challenge would thus lay in defining the terms of any partnership.

E) How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency?

Early statements from the Biden administration indicate that the United States will be taking a tougher position on Pakistan. Senior administration officials have affirmed that Washington's history of accommodation has not worked.

Still, the United States has to square this realization with the importance Pakistan holds in its Afghanistan policy, particularly in relation to the peace process and eventual military withdrawal.

India and the United States both recognize they can leverage their bilateral relations to maintain stability in South Asia as the Pakistan-China partnership, despite evident irritants, continues to deepen. The case for strengthening India's role as a regional leader in any recalibration of Washington's South Asia policy under Biden remains strong.

The corollary is that India will be expected to play a more prominent role in stabilizing Afghanistan's situation by deploying more significant assets. Much would depend on India's readiness to shed its past reluctance to do so. Yet, again, neither side seems prepared to allow Pakistan to constrain the US-India relationship. Perhaps India's near-simultaneous de-escalation with China and Pakistan marks a conscious recalibration in all three countries amid the change of guards in Washington DC.

(16) Sourabh Gupta

Resident Senior Fellow

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(Sourabh Gupta) is a senior Asia-Pacific international relations policy specialist with two decades of Washington, D.C.-based experience in a think tank and political risk research and advisory capacity. His key area of expertise pertains to the intersection of international law, both international maritime law (Law of the Sea) and international trade and investment law, with the international relations of the Asia-Pacific region. His areas of specialization include: analysis of major power relationships (China-U.S., China-Japan, China-India, U.S.-Japan, U.S.-India, Japan-India; Russia-Japan relations) and key flashpoint issues in the Asia-Pacific region; analysis of outstanding territorial disputes and maritime law-related developments in Asia; and analysis of developments in World Trade Organization and Asia-Pacific investment, trade and economic regionalism-related policy and politics.

He is a member of the United States Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (USCSCAP) and was a 2012 East Asia Forum Distinguished Fellow. Prior to joining ICAS, he was a Senior Research Associate at Samuels International Associates, Inc., an international consulting firm specializing in government relations

and global trade and investment matters. He holds master's degrees in security studies and international relations from the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University and the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, respectively. His bachelor's degree was awarded by the University of Mumbai.)

FPRC Journal (45) - 75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

Q & A

A) How do you look at four years of India-US ties under President Trump?

On the whole, the four-years of India-US ties under President Trump were productive ones. The bilateral relationship took two very important strides forward during these years. First, in spite of a vulgar, unpredictable and anti-globalist American president who did not necessarily hold a favorable personal opinion of India, the relationship was able to limit any damage stemming from this significant obstacle (i.e., Mr. Trump) and make concerted forward progress. It would be good to have an American leader who is personally well-disposed to India, as Bush and Obama were, but the bilateral relationship is no longer dependent on American presidential leadership – let alone the president's whims and wishes – in order for it to make forward progress. The positive dynamics in the relationship are much more broadly institutionalized now. Second, for the first time since U.S. and India committed themselves to a strategic partnership in the early 2000s, the two countries were able to find increasing alignment on a host of *foreign policy* issues. Bilateral defense cooperation has typically imparted the dynamic energy to the relationship, and the Trump years were no different with the signing of the COMCASA and BECA foundational agreements. But on a host of regional and even multilateral *foreign policy* issues, India was for the first time able to overcome its 'hesitations of history' and structurally align itself with U.S. foreign policy objectives. This degree of foreign policy coordination was evident episodically during the Bush and Obama years but since the arrival of Modi (and Jaishanker) at the helm, there has been a qualitatively greater congruence in India-US foreign policies.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India? How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - Strategic and Trade deals-and move forward?

The India-US bilateral relationship in the 21st century long ago achieved takeoff velocity and has now stably established itself at cruising altitude. The more internationally-minded as well as ally and partner-minded Biden Presidency will ensure that predictable forward progress in ties is realized, and stability and consistency of approaches is prioritized. Solutions to bilateral strategic irritants might not be entirely resolved but they will be discussed in a consultative and respectful tone and without deflecting from the big-picture vision of creating greater strategic

congruence between the two sides. Tackling climate change is a topic of great importance to the Biden team, and hence India will have to consider ways in which it could contribute to climate change mitigation efforts too. On China, the Biden Administration will take a somewhat-less adversarial stance compared to the Trump Administration; as such, India will need to accommodate and protect itself in the course of this(modest) U.S. policy adjustment.

The one area where India and the U.S. are fated to suffer deep divisions will be in the area of international trade policy. Both countries are moving in the wrong direction on trade policy. America is shrinking inwards in terms of market access and openness in order to cater to the protectionist interests of its working classes. This applies to immigration and visa policy too. Besides, after many years, there is a head-of-steam built up in Washington to aggressively mainstream labor rights, including against child labor, more fully into U.S. trade policy. For its part, India is embarking on a predatory and mercantilist trade path by planning to invite export-oriented manufacturing behind steep tariff walls. This will inevitably incur a reaction from the U.S. (and maybe other trading partners too). And so, while India and the U.S. might be able to stitch-up a mini-trade deal or two in the years ahead, their overall approaches on trade policy are fated to collide. How significant or damaging this collision is remains to be seen though. Finally, on human rights issues, the Modi government's questionable record will probably be called out by the U.S. but there won't be any material sanctions applied. The calling out will mostly be for *pro forma* purposes, so New Delhi shouldn't worry too much on this front. It would be useful though if the Modi government could bring a more positive record on human rights to the table when it attends the Democracy Summit that Biden plans to call later this year.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

The Russia-US confrontation, which is slated to worsen during the Biden years, will indeed affect Indian-US ties - but up-to-a-point only, and a shallow point at that. There is understanding in Washington that Moscow is a valued strategic partner for New Delhi and, therefore, that New Delhi must not be forced to undergo a litmus test to prove its pro-Washington credentials on Russia-related matters. By and large, the U.S. will delink its (bad) relations with Russia from India's (relatively good) relations with Russia. And even in the one area - CAATSA sanctions related complications - where New Delhi's and Washington's equations with Moscow clash with each other's interests, Washington will find ways to accommodate New Delhi's essential arms procurement-related needs from Moscow. The CAATSA guillotine, frankly, is being dangled over India's head by the U.S. not so much as to torpedo an important Russian arms sale to India (the S-400 missile system) as much as to

implicitly alert India to, and coerce India to, acquire big-ticket defense items from U.S. suppliers. Like its predecessors, the Biden Presidency, has an interest in deepening India's dependence on U.S.-origin systems and technologies to pull the country more deeply into the American interoperability net. And so, if India keeps placing ever-bigger orders for big-ticket defense items from Washington, the latter would be happy to keep winking and providing waivers episodically from its CAATSA sanctions. At the end of the day, the U.S. does not want CAATSA to be a litmus test over which the India-U.S. defense acquisitions relationship could failor bilateral mil-mil trust set back grievously.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

Well, India can look to the US for help to confront China – but, again, up-to-a-point only. The U.S. has a keen interest in India's success, both as a geopolitical balancer against China and independently, too, to prove that democracy can be a means for the upliftment and betterment of people's lives as compared to alternative models of authoritarian governance. The U.S. also has a keen interest that India maintains naval preponderance over China in the Indian Ocean Region, and thereby help ensure that these 'global commons' remain open and accessible to all. And in the event of a military confrontation with China, Washington may even be prepared to provide targeted - but limited - rear-end logistical support to Indian forces as well as, of course, public political support at international fora.

But beyond this point, the U.S. interest by-and-large tends to fade away. The reasons are two-fold: First, there are no essential U.S. national interest considerations or obligations involved if India and China clash (unless the hostilities engage a nuclear dimension). India is not a U.S. alliance partner and no American defense obligation is engaged if India is attacked by its northern neighbor. Second, the U.S. is hardly in a military or diplomatic position to do much in these Inner Asian frontier lands. The U.S. already has its hands full dealing with China in the Asia-Pacific maritime realm and its appetite for major land forces warfare in Eurasia, writ-large, is exhausted after the Afghanistan experience. So, the depth of U.S. reputational involvement on India's side will be tailored commensurately to the degree of diplomatic and military weight that it can bring to the table and on the ground during a major boundary-related crisis. At the end of the day, even if the U.S. was not in a semi-retrenchment mode, Washington's support to India would be capped at a particular point - and the tap of cheap rhetoric allowed to flow beyond that point in order to sympathize with but not materially support India with regard to its China conundrum. Besides, if India was to be humiliated again in a border conflict, it would drive an even deeper wedge into India-China relations – which, at the end of the day helps, not harms, the U.S. strategic interest in the Indo-Pacific.

E) **How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency?**

I wouldn't worry too much about the Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency. Pakistan is becoming a *less* provocative and *less* irresponsible state actor by the day, and I fully expect its relations with Washington to continue in slow improvement mode during the Biden Presidency. Besides, Washington is looking for closure from its 'forever war' in Afghanistan and retrenchment from the theater is critically dependent on maintaining a tactically useful working relationship with Islamabad. The U.S. might even need to cater to Pakistani grievances if the human rights situation in Kashmir deteriorates significantly. But make no mistake – the days of India-Pakistan hyphenation in Washington is forever over. New Delhi and Islamabad are to be treated as two separate entities that are placed in two separate baskets and which merit two very separate policy approaches. The relationship with Islamabad could turn out to be a tactically useful one for Washington if the former gets its political and economic act together and can leverage its strategic and geo-economic location to the benefit of both parties. India on the other hand is a valued (anti-China) strategic partner on the grand canvas of the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific. So long as China remains America's foremost strategic competitor, India will be America's leading geopolitical partner – not ally – in Asia (so long as New Delhi chooses to remain in that pattern). And in no circumstance will the tactical be allowed to override the strategic in the conception of America's interests in Asia, although there might be rare occasions when Washington chooses to downplay its strategic proximity to New Delhi to accommodate or assuage a short-term Pakistani interest.

(17) Dr. Shaista Tabassum

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Email Interview
FPRC Journal (45) 75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

A) How do you look at four-years of India-US ties under President Trump?

U.S. foreign policy has one unique feature—remarkable continuity. This continuity finds credence in U.S.-India relations, predicated on solid grounds—i.e., defense relations, increasing trade dependence, regional concerns about China, and a coordinated posture in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Trump administration has not brought any drastic changes in foreign policy but brought the two countries closer in some ways. During his tenure, the United States expressed outright support for India during the ongoing border conflict with China, took a tough stance on terrorism, and strengthened bilateral and multilateral mechanisms such as the 2+2 dialogue and the Quad. There was also economic, political, and strategic alignment in the Indo-Pacific.

Despite extant strains in the U.S.-India relationship—including restrictions on H-1B visas that affect Indian American skilled workers in the United States, an increased tariff on items that impinges on export and import in both countries, and concerns from the United States on data localization in India—the Trump administration has improved India and U.S. relations, particularly in defense and trade. The Trump administration's relationship with India brings added meaning to the elevation of India as a major defense partner through a sustained supply of critical platforms in the defense sector, some of which were purchased during the early stages of the ongoing India's border conflict with China. Moreover, when the two countries carried out regular diplomatic interaction at the highest levels between India and the United States through the 2+2 and the Quad forums, they engaged in sharing not only best practices, but also exchanged joint regional responses during crises. At the regional level, the Indo-Pacific strategy has been a strong binder for U.S.-India ties, with increasing promise of bilateral interoperability and regional cooperation.

Thus, the last four years of the Trump administration demonstrate a positive trajectory in India-US relations overall.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India?

The strength of US-India relations, bolstered by each administration over the last few decades, is likely to continue onward under President Biden, with Kamala Harris (Indian and African American by descent) cementing ties. On a personal level, Biden is also perceived as close to India given his role of improving ties with New Delhi in the Obama administration. He also boasts close relations to the India Caucus members and those who helped secure congressional approval for the 2008 U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement. In addition, although Biden and Harris

emphasized human rights issues in Kashmir after the abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution—which changed the administrative and political status of Jammu and Kashmir from an Indian State to a Union Territory and has resulted in a prolonged curfew—Biden’s recent statements and approach have depicted more balance concerning India. As such, his statement that “India will be a high priority” attracted both Indian-American diaspora voters, and induced a sense of stability and continuity in one of the cornerstones to U.S. Asia policy.

Further, the United States’ emerging strategic competition with China, especially during the pandemic, has emphasized the value of relations with India. This is both in the domestic context of the run-up to the November elections in the United States and in the international context, where India plays an indispensable role in creating a multilateral front to balance China. Using strong relations with India against China will be the main impetus and driving force behind Indo-US ties for the Biden presidency. In the recent past, this bilateral constant has brought these two countries together.

Indo-US partnership in defense can be expected to continue. In October 2020, the US and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) that provides India with real-time access to American geospatial intelligence. This would greatly improve the accuracy of Indian missiles, armed drones, and automated systems. Indo-US militaries—and the navies in particular—have been regularly training together in joint exercises, whilst simultaneously engaging in visitations and exchange programmes. In fact, Kenneth J Braithwaite, the US Secretary of the Navy, recently visited India.

---How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - strategic and trade deals-and move forward?

As mentioned above, the China factor, and the United States’ desire to curtail Chinese influence, will continue to pervade and be significant in all matters moving forward. Militarily, the United States prefers India over its seven-decade-old South Asian ally, Pakistan. It has been transferring state of the art weapons and shares geospatial intelligence for military purposes with New Delhi to pursue its strategic objectives in Asia-Pacific, including balancing China’s steady rise and strengthening India’s role in the Indian Ocean region. Strategically, it is likely that India will continue to pursue the bilateral defense trade and technology cooperation with the United States that it is already a part of—a partnership that grew to approximately \$16 billion in 2018 from nearly zero in 2008. The conclusion of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) finalized the key defense agreements between India and the United States. The execution of BECA will revolutionize the Indian armed forces’ offensive and defensive capabilities.

Given Trump’s focus on exacting “fair and reciprocal” trading arrangements, his administration vocalized apprehensions against nations that had amassed trade surpluses over the US. Even

though India's trade surplus is less than a tenth of the US-China trade imbalance, New Delhi did not escape Trump's action against nations "cheating" the US.

Furthermore, the US failed to acknowledge India's rationale on issues like, its insistence on the certification of dairy imports (owing to socio-cultural reasons) or its duty on information communication technology imports (in order to guard against cheaper Chinese tech flooding the market). Such contentions only hampered the prospect of a limited trade deal, which was expected to be finalized during Trump's February 2020 visit to India. Perhaps India may strike a trade deal during the Biden administration—and India and the US can focus on emergent opportunities and avoid past apprehensions from preoccupying their bilateral trade portfolio.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

While US-Russian relations remain tense, it is possible that the United States will not allow this to interfere with the strength of Indian-US relations. The United States might even welcome India's purchase of Russian arms. For India, the United States is a welcome and valued security partner but too far away and not particularly reliable. For the United States, India is its only friend in the region that is willing and able to act as a counterbalance to China, and possibly Russia. When it comes to confronting China and Russia, the United States may need India much more than India needs the United States.

Moreover, although India purchases arms from Russia, India is not a Russian or post-Soviet satellite state. It buys from Russia because Russia is a reliable commercial supplier of high-quality equipment. India also buys from France, Israel, and increasingly the United States. But even without the S-400 purchase, India would already be on the CAATSA bad countries list for all the other equipment it buys from Russia—and will continue to buy from Russia. Sanctioning India for its Russian purchases will not lock in a future U.S. ally. It will merely drive away a potential partner—and increasingly lucrative military customer.

If the United States wants to contain countries like China, Russia, or both—it will need countries like India to do the heavy lifting. One way to guarantee that China will not exert undue influence over the relatively vulnerable countries of Central Asia is to keep the Russo-Indian relationship solid. This is also the most likely path for a stable future for Afghanistan, a country where India has a diplomatic presence.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

The China factor will be a principal factor in the US–India convergence for some years to come. The United States and India signaled that they would enhance their reliance on each other to counter China regionally and globally, even at the risk of giving too central a place to this single factor. Trump’s visit to India was an important reaffirmation of the US–India strategic partnership. With India’s increasing concern over China’s growing presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and the US also seeking to counter China’s growing global influence, India and the US have reached an increasing level of strategic convergence on the need to counter China’s role in the Indo-Pacific region. This is most apparent in defense and security, and particularly under the governments of Narendra Modi and Donald Trump.

However, while the United States will diplomatically and rhetorically support India against China, it is unlikely to do so in a kinetic manner (i.e., mobilization of troops or deployment of weapons) on India’s behalf in the event of a direct security threat from China. While India is an ally, in the absence of formal assurance or deterrence commitments such as those of Japan or South Korea, kinetic action from the United States is unlikely.

E) How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden’s Presidency?

It is safe to say that a deepening bond between the United States and India is less than desirable for Pakistan, particularly regarding multilateral support such as from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) — the support of which it desperately needs.

A tougher U.S. policy on China will have ramifications for Pakistan. The brewing trade war is already having ripple effects across the world, and with China emerging through the global pandemic as the biggest economy in the world and the only one projected to show moderate growth, the United States will be keen to stem this flow. The U.S.-India partnership makes more sense in this context, as a stronger, more economically sound India will offset the global shadow cast by Chinese hegemony.

Moreover, Pakistan will continue to be relevant if the Afghan crisis endures, which seems to be the case. Biden will be the fourth U.S. president to face the 19-year-old — some argue 41-year-old — Afghan crisis. If the United States’ focus on the western border diminishes, its only interest in the region would be countering China and elevating India, which will be an undesirable outcome for Pakistan. Pakistan would rather that the U.S. troop presence be responsibly maintained in Afghanistan until the negotiations are successful and a power-sharing formula between Kabul and the Taliban is enacted.

Pakistan may need to play a noticeably positive role in Afghanistan to shed decades of vitriol, ensure security in the region, focus on economic growth, and avoid direct commentary on the U.S.-China trade war. There should also be some headway in thawing relations with India to move towards regional economic connectivity. In the short term, not a lot will change for Pakistan, but peace in Afghanistan (or lack thereof), and a remarkable improvement in U.S.-India relations will determine its course of action in the long term.

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Response to Questionnaire

FPRC Journal (45) 75 Years of India-US Relations (1945-2020)

A) How do you look at four-years of India-US ties under President Trump?

During the entire span of the Cold War, India-US relations had been the victim of US strategic decision making based on Cold War priorities, which means that India's stated policy of non-alignment while tilting towards the Soviet Union was weighed against America's perception of Pakistan as a valued ally against the USSR and these coloured US views on India. However, following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, in addition to India's liberalization programme announced in the early 1990s, India-US bilateral relationship was detached from the trilateral conundrum that included Pakistan and began to improve. This period coincided with the rise of China, which replaced the erstwhile Soviet Union as the new bogey in US perceptions as a challenge to its interests in retaining its global leadership role. It also coincided with Pakistan declining into an almost 'failed state'. In the recalibrated foreign policy interests of the United States, India's standing began to increase and this is reflected in the improving relations between the two countries with each US administration building on the legacy of the previous one and in recent times, India has been wooed by the US as a 'partner'. However, this does not imply that the two countries have identical views on all global issues and there have been differences on matters of trade, climate change, cross-border terrorism etc. although security relations have prospered.

The Trump administration was not very different – it built on the already flourishing security relations but there were major issues on trade deals. Given both countries' antipathy towards China, the security and strategic partnership went one step further with India committing itself further to the Indo-Pacific Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and holding the first 2+2 security dialogue with the US, only the second country to hold such a dialogue. Defence ties were sealed further with the signing of the BECA for geo-spatial cooperation. However, there was tension over each other's tariff policies and even a limited trade agreement was not penned. Although there is cooperation on vaccine development, it needs to be remembered that President Trump used bullying tactics to demand that India should provide hydroxychloroquine to the US, which was at one point of time considered as an antidote for Covid-19.

The fact is that there was much bonhomie about India-US relations during the Trump administration because of the personal chemistry between President Trump and Prime Minister Modi and also because the former's priorities did not include sticky issues like human rights, climate change, personal liberties etc, and he never commented on India's

internal issues. However, a comprehensive bilateral relationship does not rest on only the pillar of defence ties. If India-US relations during the Trump administration is viewed in a holistic manner, only defence ties stand in good light.

B) What does the Biden presidency mean for India? How should the two countries go for amicable settlement of outstanding issues - Strategic and Trade deals-and move forward?

President Biden is a very different person from Donald Trump and has a long history of dealing with international relations as a Senator and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which he chaired twice. His views on global challenges like climate change, human rights, democratic values, immigration, non-proliferation, international terrorism etc. are well known and publicly recorded. His perception of China and its leader too have been openly expressed. That he helped to push the India-US nuclear deal through the US Senate is also known. As Vice-president during the Obama administration, he brought a large delegation to Mumbai to help ease trade deals between the two countries.

His aversion to China ensures that India-US security ties will improve further during his term. His emphasis on dialogue as a strategic tool in diplomacy also points to sane counsel vis a vis China's expansionism in not only the Indo-Pacific but also along India's border. The US will continue to be a reliable partner in this area. However, his priorities include climate change and democratic values, and prior to his election, he has publicly critiqued issues like the restriction of internet facilities in J&K and detention of Kashmiri leaders following the withdrawal of Article 370, as also the CAA etc. The fact that he is keen on a climate deal may make him toe a softer line with China.

This may mean that there may be some friction in India-US relations during the Biden administration that were non-existent under the Trump presidency. However, his appointments so far have been judicious and he has chosen highly experienced personnel in key posts. No one will rock the boat. Further, it is expected that as President, Joe Biden will be more restrained in his public comments and whatever he may think he will not say anything that may hurt the bilateral relationship.

One also gets the feeling that India is not quite among his priority list as he tries to rebuild America's relations with its European allies as well as with neighbouring countries like Canada and Mexico.

Regarding trade, following the pandemic and the resultant economic slowdown of 2020, both the US and India have emphasized self-reliance in order to boost employment and production. In any case, the two countries have always differed on the agenda for liberalization and economic reform. Prime Minister Modi's plan for an *atma-nirbhar Bharat* also lacks clarity and may cause confusion. In the near future, trade deals will be a sticking point but as economies recover and China's economic power again becomes a

priority issue, particularly if China attempts to leverage it against the US, India-US trade obstacles may ease to each other's benefit.

C) How will the Russia-US confrontation affect Indian-US relations?

While there has been some tough talk by the new Biden administration on Russia, the two countries recently renewed New START, opening doors for further dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation. Therefore, to speak to "Russia-US confrontation" is not correct.

That said, the US has always been wary of India's arms purchases from Russia which is not only a long supplier to India but its arms sales come without strings attached, while all defence purchases from the US are governed by inflexible protocols. The latest systems to attract adverse comments from the US are five Russian Almaz-Antei S-400 Triumf self-propelled surface-to-air (SAM) systems for \$5.5 billion, which the IAF has purchased. The last US ambassador to India Kenneth Juster showed a velvet glove when he said in veiled language that this could attract sanctions under Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). It may be remembered that he was a Trump appointee and President Trump was known for using hard tactics to get his way. I personally think that this will not happen since the Biden presidency will not wish to rile a defence partner, especially one so important in the Indo-Pacific region. President Biden is also well aware having served so long in the Senate, that India values its autonomy, both internal and external. The US may refuse to sell sensitive defence material to India if it thinks that Russian systems possessed by India may jeopardize their own security systems, but the US knows well enough that it cannot dictate what defence systems India can buy or from whom, since this is India's own security matter done in its own national security interests.

D) How far can India look to the US for help to confront China?

President Biden's views on China, Ji Jinping and China's human rights practices particularly vis-a-vis the Uighurs are well known. After his election, Biden slammed China for 'abuses' in trade, technology and human rights and noted that America can best pursue its goals through "security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region", when it is "flanked" by like-minded allies and partners. Among these like-minded partners, India, a member of Quad, has a special place. In fact, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has stated that India is a "key partner" in US attempts to contain China. Even though the present administration will focus on climate change and non-proliferation in North Korea in the near future, both of which may entail cooperation with China, it is expected from various statements by key officials, that there will be no compromise in defending US global standing against China's growing power.

The point is that both countries have strong economic relations with China and will not willingly jeopardize these for a military confrontation with China. So, the question of 'how far can India look to the US for help to confront China?' is wrong; international relations do not take anarchy and confrontation as a given whatever certain theories may say. No country really wishes to 'confront' any other country. There are many variables involved and India, of its own, will not wish to 'confront' a major trade partner. But if a 'confrontation' is forced on us, and if it is of a military nature, one can expect the US to stand by us under the present circumstances.

E) How do you look at Pakistan factor in India-US Relations under Biden's Presidency?

India always thinks of the 'Pakistan factor' in India-US relations. But as noted earlier, the US disengaged itself from equating the two countries in South Asia about 20 years back. However, US-Pakistan defence relations certainly has a bearing on India as was demonstrated in earlier India-Pakistan military confrontations when US tanks etc were used against India. In the future, US policy in Afghanistan may also affect India because India has its own economic and security interests in Afghanistan just as Pakistan has, and these are not similar. On the whole, the Pakistan factor is of much less importance than during the Cold War years, in India-US relations.

Articles

(1) **INDO-US Relations: PAST and the PRESENT**

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Dr. Chakrabarty has by now completed five Major Research Projects, (1) "Judicial Behaviour and Judicial Decision Making of the Indian Supreme Court " sponsored by the Indian Council of Social Science Research. (2) "Women and Politics: A Study of Women Parliamentarians" sponsored by the University Grants Commission (UGC). (3) "Indian Railway Trade Unions", sponsored by the University Grants Commission(UGC). (4) "Women Empowerment at the Grass Roots: A Study of Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling Districts "sponsored by the University of North Bengal. (5) "Self Help Groups: A Tool of Women Empowerment", sponsored by the University Grants Commission. (UGC).

His areas of interest are: Indian Government and Politics, Judicial Behaviour and Judicial Decision Making, Trade Unionism, International Politics and Comparative Politics.

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He has successfully supervised Twenty six Ph.D. scholars and several M.Phil dissertations.

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INTRODUCTION

Before we go into the discussion of the Indo-U.S. relationship, it would be pertinent to throw some light on international relations. International relations (IR) are the study of the political

and social interaction of state, non-state actors, and individuals. (Griffiths, O'Callaghan and Roach (2008). The story of the origins of International Relations usually begins with an account of the Great War (1914–18), a war so horrific that many people believed it was the war to end all wars. The destruction and devastation, the physical and economic effort expended on killing and the horrific slaughter of an entire generation (of predominantly young men) was on a scale few could have imagined before 1914. The study of International Relations grew out of the belief that war was the gravest problem facing humanity and that something must be done to ensure that there would be no more 'lost generations'. The history of international politics since 1945 was dominated, down to the 1990s by the origins, development, and sudden end of the Cold War. Although defined in a number of radically different ways, the Cold War fundamentally distinguished the post-Second World War period from the earlier years of the twentieth century in political and socio-economic terms and in its rapid technological changes. (Young and Kent 2013). Every country of the world maintains a foreign policy on which depends the nature and content of relationship with a specific country. In fact, foreign policy gives a guideline but the relationship with all countries is not same as in the case of a human being. The nature of foreign policy of a country towards another country much depends on the status of relationship with a country concerned. Relationship refers to the bonds of dependent or reciprocal relations. (Martin, 1986). International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. (Morgenthau, 1985). International relations include the study of all human interactions across national borders and factors that affect those interactions. (Pearson & Rochester, 1988). It is an agreed fact the relations of states are comprehensible against a context, as the relations of individuals are comprehensible against a context. (Bajpai & Shukul1995). We should also keep in mind that there exists a context which gives meaning to and channels the behaviour of the states in their relations with other states and other external entities. (Bajpai & Shukul, 1995). International relationship always carries much importance and significance because on it depends the much desired concept of 'peace' It must be said that in the present day society, man is social, not by choice but by necessity. (Chakraborty, 1970). Therefore, man by nature

and necessity a social animal. (Malhotra, 2001). It can therefore be said that international relations is of prime importance in the world society from any aspect that is taken for analysis or consideration. It is all the more important because global politics is in the midst of dramatic and accelerating change. (Raymond et al (2002). In our present era, international relations have assumed all the more great significance. In the twenty first century, we live in a world that is both fascinating and terrifying-one that exhibits deep contradictions and yet manifest high hopes. (Mansbach & Taylor, 2012). Further, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, demonstrated just how complex international relations have become in the past decade. (Wenger & Zimmermann, 2003). It should be stated that the relationship of nations emits a great mark of implications not only in the relationship status of two or more countries but also exerts a tremendous influence all over the region and finally on the world politics. Therefore, inter-national relationship is significant from all dimensions. (Chakrabarty, 2014). The relationship between the two countries is always significant not only from the regional politics but also from the point of view of world politics at large. It is very natural that if the relationship of the countries, particularly, the neighbouring countries, is friendly, the atmosphere of the region remains filled with good oxygen which produces peace but if it is reverse, the entire environment becomes smoky and poisonous.(Chakrabarty,2014). A special care should be taken for understanding international relationship because there has been a paradigm shift in its content. In fact, the disciplinary dimensions of international politics have witnessed quantitative expansion as well as qualitative complexities since 1945. (Jaitly, Anam (1986). It is also significant to note that a cursory look at the expanded scope of international relations and politics unambiguously indicate that these have reached the farthest corner of human creativity and as such deeply influence mankind. (Jaitly, Anam (1986). The traditional conceptual categories are no longer sufficient for comprehending the dynamics of international politics. (Jaitly, Anam, 1986). It is a time to look into the aspects of international relations through a new and fresh lens.

INDO- U.S. RELATIONS IN THE PAST

India had a peculiar hot and cold relationship with the US ever since India came into being. During the Cold-War era, the relations between India and the US witnessed many ups and downs. (Singh, 2017). Over the past few decades, the India-US relations have grown steadily. seen steady growth. The leaders in both the countries have always tried to take forward. A thorough analysis of the pattern of relationship between India and the USA would reveal the fact that the relationship between the two countries was not so encouraging. There had been at least an iota of mistrust between the two governments. It became clear throughout the Cold-War era, despite having many shared common values, both the countries lacked conviction in their respective policies and couldn't convince each other of their respective policies.

A cursory glance through the pages of history would reveal the fact that historical links between the United States and India can be traced to the year 1492, the year when Christopher Columbus discovered America in the course of his search for a new route to India. But the formal and official relations between the two countries actually began after India gained independence. (Kumar, 2009). From a political angle, the relationship between India and America may be said to be started when Benjamin Joy of Boston was appointed as the first American Consul at Calcutta in 1792. With the passage of time, both the countries developed mutual contacts through various agencies. The most important role in this regard was played by the missionaries, tourists, intellectuals and Indian freedom fighters. It should be mentioned in this regard that among the India's political leaders, it was Lala Lajpat Rai who was the first to visit the United States as early as in the year of 1905. The major objective of this visit was to convey to the American people regarding the dire necessity for Indian Independence. There is no denying the fact India and the United States of America is miles apart from each other in many dimensions. There are actual differences in geographical setting, race, culture habits and tradition, history and many other areas. But it must be said that there are many common areas also between the two countries. Both the countries cherish common ideals, both were under subjection to a common power, viz. the British for quite a long period time. For gaining independence both had to fight vigorously although the methods they adopted were different.

The most striking difference of freedom struggle of the two countries was different. While the Americans attained their freedom through the means of violence and bloodshed but India adopted the path of non-violence. After India attained independence, there was an attempt on the part of India to develop very friendly relations with the United States. The U.S.-India partnership is founded on a shared commitment to freedom, democratic principles, equal treatment of all citizens, human rights and the rule of law. Another factor that needs a special mention is that the United States and India have strongly shared interests in promoting global security, stability and economic prosperity through trade, investment, and connectivity. The most important pillar in the strong relationship between India and the U.S.A. may be attributed on the fact that the United States strongly supports India's emergence as a leading global power and vital partner in efforts to ensure that the Indo-Pacific is a region of peace, stability, and growing prosperity. Mentions should be made to the strong people-to-people ties between the two countries which clearly reflect a strong Indian American diaspora. This is definitely a strong and durable source of strength for the partnership between the two countries. However, if we proceed further it can be seen that the Indo-USA relationship got strategic content in the early 1960s. In fact, the rise of the People's Republic of China became a factor of head ache for the policy makers in Washington. The Chinese assertion in Tibet, its role in the Korean War and other acts became a serious concern for the administrators in Washington. On the onset of the boiling bowl in the status of relationship between India and China during the late fifties, the Americans found a golden opportunity to take advantage of this situation to promote India as a counterweight to China. The Indo-U.S. relationship got a shining colour and the relationship became much cordial and congenial during the tenure of John F. Kennedy as the American President. The congenial relationship between the two countries continued even after President Kennedy. His successor, President Johnson also walked in the same line and maintained a cordial relationship with India. America's assistance for establishing the Tarapur Atomic Plant and the supply of a large quantity of food grains to enable India to fight over the acute shortage caused by the severe drought in 1966-67 made the relationship between India and America much friendly. From the perspective of Indian political scenario, the status of relationship between India and America

showed much improvement after the formation of the Janata Government in India in the year of 1977 and the assumption of power by Jimmy Carter in the United States. In this regard the goodwill visit of the American President Jimmy Carter to India in 1978 played a catalytic role. It was followed by a return visit by the Indian Prime Minister, Morarji Desai. These two visits from the side of the US and India is considered by the scholars on international politics as very significant in the domain of bilateral relationship of the two countries. During the aftermath period, the two countries developed a mood of maintaining a good and friendly relationship. The major purpose of the visit of Jimmy Carter is attributed by the scholars in international politics was to register and restore American sympathy and amity for India. In fact, the relationship became slightly strained because America's economic aid to India was kept suspended since the Bangladesh crisis. But it was resumed and the U.S. government agreed to supply the fuel for the Tarapur Plant. It should be said that from the perspective of international politics, Jimmy Carter was predisposed to look to India as the leader of South Asia. But the trend could not continue for a long time for one reason or the other. As we find that the status of relationship between the two countries got strained after Mrs. Indira Gandhi came back to power in 1980. After the assumption of power by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Congress Government refused to take the side of the United States in international politics. The major issue which got a focus was America's anti Soviet crusade over Afghanistan. America also advocated for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. During the period that followed, witnessed further shrinking of the relationship between India and America after the taking over of the office of the Presidency by Ronald Reagan. The tough stand taken by him towards Soviet Union, considerably damaged and vibrated the foundation of the closer relations between India and America. It was so because India consistently reflected her leanings towards the Soviet Union. An analysis of the perspectives of the international relations would reveal the fact that since the time of early eighties, India pursued a well-planned policy of improving and strengthening relations with that of the United States. It can be said that the ice started melting after the visit of Indira Gandhi to America in 1982. This visit definitely worked as "operation defrosts" in the true sense of the term and the relationship between the two

countries started improving substantially. The trend of improvement process continued even after Rajiv Gandhi took over the office of the Indian prime Minister in 1985. The visit of Rajiv Gandhi to America in the month of June 1985 was path breaking and improved the bilateral relationship between India and America in a substantial manner. It should be mentioned that the Memorandum of Understanding regarding technology transfer also contributed a lot in solidifying the relationship of the two countries. It should be said that the world politics experienced some dramatic changes in the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century. The most significant development was the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The world further witnessed the end of the Cold War. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the nature of world politics changed significantly. The world politics earlier was of a bipolar nature. On the one hand there was the United States of America and on the other there was the Soviet Union. But after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world politics became unipolar in nature. The United States gained the status of a supreme power and the leader of this unipolar world. The next development in world politics can be seen after the Uruguay Round of GATT. We can find that this marked the beginning of liberalization and globalization in the world. Amid, the election of P.V.Narsimha Rao as the Prime Minister of India in the year of 1991 and the election of Bill Clinton as American President in 1992 led to some significant changes in global politics. As a result of this, the bilateral relationship between India and America was greatly affected and marked a new beginning in the status of Indo-U.S. relationship. The Indian Prime Minister P.V.Narsimha Rao paid a visit to the United States in the year of 1992. Subsequently and after a gap of eight years of the visit of the Indian Prime Minister, the US President Bill Clinton visited India during 21-25 March 2000. The visit is much significant because of the fact that it was the first U.S. Presidential visit to India after a gap of long 22 years. Subsequently, in September 2000, the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited the United States. President Clinton's five-day visit to India in March 2000 and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's reciprocal visit to the U.S. that September threw the spotlight on a much-improved bilateral relationship. (Anderson, 2001). The five-day tour covered five cities. It was definitely one of the most extensive visits undertaken by the U.S. President to any country. During the visit, India

and U.S.A. agreed to cast aside the doubts of the past and look ahead to open a new chapter of an old book of bilateral relations. President Clinton described the objective of his visit as "strengthening a friendship that indeed is critical to the future of the entire planet."

George W. Bush was elected as U.S. President in 2001. He succeeded Clinton and looked ahead for a good relationship with India. The meeting between Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President George W. Bush is regarded as a very important chapter in the development of India - U.S.A. relationship. In the dynamic relationship of India and the USA found a new path in the year of January 2004 when the United States and India launched the "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership" (NSSP). It was definitely a significant milestone in the process of transformation of status of bilateral relationship and laid a blueprint for further progress. After Dr. Manmohan Singh became the Prime Minister of India in 2004, the American President Bush hosted the Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh in Washington D.C. in July 2005. The two leaders announced the successful completion of the NSSP. Subsequently, the U.S. President Bush paid a reciprocal visit to India in the month of March 2006. During the visit of President Bush, the progress of the initiatives was reviewed, and several new initiatives were launched. President George W. Bush and Dr. Manmohan Singh signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement on March 2, 2006 in New Delhi. The successful passage through the United States Congress of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 was definitely a landmark incident in the process of bilateral relations between the two countries. After the 2014 General Election in India, the UPA government regime came to an end the NDA government came into power in 2014. After the NDA government came to power in 2014 and Narendra Modi took over as the Prime Minister of India, we find a dramatic change in the bilateral relationship between India and America. It is known to us that Narendra Modi's US visa had been revoked while he was the Chief Minister of Gujarat and he was boycotted by the US officials for almost a decade. But history took its own course. Following his 2014 election as the Prime Minister of India, President Obama extended his congratulations to him over telephone and invited him to visit the United States. The US Secretary of State, John Kerry visited New Delhi on 1 August, 2014 in order to prepare the grounds for Modi's first ever

US visit as Prime Minister. In September 2014, days before visiting the United States, in an interview to CNN's Fareed Zakaria, Prime Minister Modi said that "India and the United States are bound together, by history and culture" but at the same time he also acknowledged that there have been "ups and downs" in relations. Prime Minister Modi travelled in the United States from 27–30 September 2014. He began his maiden address in the United Nations General Assembly. It was followed by attending a gala public reception by the Indian American community in New York's Madison Square Garden. No doubt, Modi's visit acted as a boosting factor in revamping Indo-US relationship. As a counter visit, President Barack Obama visited India and he became the first US President to be the Chief Guest at the 66th Republic Day celebrations of India held on 26 January 2015. During the visit of Obama, India and the US held their first ever bilateral dialogue on the UN and multilateral issues in the spirit of the "Delhi Declaration of Friendship" that strengthens and expands the two countries' relationship as part of the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Prime Minister Modi again visited the United States in 2016 and met President Barack Obama in the Oval Office, at the White House, in Washington DC, on June 07, 2016.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi while visiting the United States addressed a joint session of the Congress and highlighted the common traits of both democracies and long-term friendship between the two countries. In the following year, viz. on June 26, 2017, Prime Minister Modi again visited the United States of America and met the US President Donald Trump. The outcome of the visit can be seen when on 8 November 2017, the US announced a grant of nearly US\$500,000 for organisations which came up with ideas and projects to promote religious freedom in India and Sri Lanka. With a gap of one year Prime Minister Modi again visited the United States in 2019. This visit is popularly known as Howdy Modi. In September 2019, Prime Minister Modi visited Houston and addressed a large Indian American contingent in the Houston NRG stadium. Along with President Trump, Prime Minister Modi reaffirmed Indian American ties, with an emphasis on increased military cooperation with the initiation of the Tiger Triumph exercises. It should be mentioned that the next significant chapter in the

bilateral relationship between India and the USA has been definitely President Trump's visit to India in February, 2020. The visit has been termed as **Namaste Trump**. President Trump visited Ahmedabad, Gujarat, to address a large Indian crowd. The event, titled "Namaste Trump", was a response to the "Howdy Modi" event held in 2019. The event served as a platform for the U.S. President and the Indian Prime Minister to show off their friendly relationship. As the experience goes, with the change of Head of Administration some changes are reflected in the pattern and dimension of the bilateral relationship of two countries. In view of the last Presidential election in the USA, there has been an end of Trump administration and Joe Biden has taken over as the 46th President of the United States of America.

It remains to be seen how the Indo-US relations flow in the coming days. Geopolitics operates in a diplomatic ecology. It is necessary to be mentioned that relations between countries are rarely decided by linear equations. Instead, diplomatic relations are usually polynomial. In this regard, it may be pointed out that the USA was a dead critic of India in view of the nuclear tests (Pokhran 2) conducted in 1998, but this USA began to show magnanimity during Bill Clinton's visit to the country in 2000. There are of course some major reasons like the rise of China and cosmetic changes in India's economy brought both the countries nearer and the factor of terrorism brought the two countries closer. We have seen that in the last 20 years or so, the US has extended huge assistance to India so that she can move out of nuclear apartheid and tried to make it a strategic defense partner of USA. Since Joe Biden is much vocal about liberalism, this will perhaps help India to negotiate trade relations. It is also expected that Biden would extend his support to India over China as the US is definitely afraid of the rise of China. The US support is likely to effectively resist China. As per historical and diplomatic records, from 1947, after India attained independence only seven American Presidents paid visit to India and India will be waiting for Biden to be the 8th President to visit the country. If the current President of the USA visits India, it would definitely put the relationship between India and the USA on a solid foundation.

CONCLUSION

While concluding this paper it should be said that as we are passing through a critical phase in view of the COVID 19, a key foreign policy challenge for the Modi administration has been how to manage its relations with China, the United States and others in an environment of emerging multipolarity. So far as USA is concerned, they recognised India as a key to its strategic interests. This is the main purpose as to why USA is much interested to strengthen its relationship with India. The two countries, viz. India and the USA, are the world's largest democracies and both are committed to political freedom protected by popularly elected representative government. The United States of America and India have a common interest in the free flow of commerce and resources, including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. As a part of joint venture, in recent years, India has conducted large joint military exercises with the US in the Indian Ocean. Since the major purpose of America's policies revolves round the factor to counter China, one of the Trump administration policies is to make India as one of the major defence partners. In this regard, there is a continuous move on the part of the USA to gain ground and this is perhaps the reason for a better bilateral relationship between the USA and India. In fact, international relationship is ultimately based on national interest is proved by this fact. However, whatever is the reason, India is always for a good relationship and this purpose is being served. It is expected that India and the US would maintain good and friendly relationship in the coming days for their own benefit and for the benefit of the entire world community.

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(2) Recent Views and Reviews of India-US Nuclear Relations

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ABSTRACT

In recent past, the United States has been doing everything in its power to get India signed both the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT), and thus make it entirely sub-servient to Washington.¹ Having these measures failed, since the 1990s, the US government made overtures to the Indian government for a military alliance. When the Bush administration came to power, it wanted India to be a part of its missile defence shield. After 9/11, the Indian and US navies and Special Forces have conducted a number of joint exercises in the Indian Ocean and in the hills of India's North-East. In the context of new developments, Christian Rocca said in 2002, 'Military to Military cooperation is now producing tangible progress towards the objective of strategic diplomatic and political cooperation as well as sound economic ties.'² In going forward for the nuclear deal there are two clear US motives, articulated as explicitly as possible by various US sources: the commercial gain from nuclear commerce, and the more important one of containing India's nuclear weapons programme, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Bring the breeder reactor programme under international safeguards, pushing India to sign the FMCT and continuing embargoes on uranium enrichment and re-processing are all parts of this strategy.³ The fundamental flaw lies in the fact that the US has provided unenforceable commitments in lieu of enforceable commitments from India. Under it, India has undertaken several obligations, including identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities, declaring civilian facilities to IAEA and placing them under safeguards; continuing its nuclear testing moratorium; and working with USA for 'Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty'. It has agreed to abide by MTCR and NSG guidelines, although it belongs to neither. But unlike India, the US accepts no similar obligations, like safeguarding more facilities or continuing its nuclear testing moratorium.⁴ All this sufficiently indicates that deal treats India as a junior partner.

Basics about Recent Agreement

Basically, the Indo-US nuclear deal was founded on July 18, 2005 joint statement and March 2006 agreement between India and US. The July 2005 agreement gave the impression regarding fuel supply that when India placed some of its reactors under "voluntary safeguards" such

safeguards were linked to nuclear fuel supplies being maintained. In March 2006 agreement on the issue. Washington insisted on the provision of “safeguards in perpetuity. To assuage Indian concerns, the US agreed that India could maintain adequate stockpiles of nuclear fuel to tide over any possible disruptions in supply. It also agreed to work with other nuclear suppliers to enable India to secure nuclear fuel so that its nuclear power stations could continue to operate.⁵ But the overall conclusion drawn from the July statement was that it was poorly negotiated: First, while the US obligations contained in the statement are essentially those of intent, India’s obligations are definitive and substantive like the commitment to continue the moratorium on testing as part of the deal. Second, the suggestion in the statement that the Indian obligations such as separation of civil and military nuclear facilities, placement of all civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and signing of an Additional Protocol in respect of such facilities are identical to those undertaken by nuclear weapon states constitutes a factual inaccuracy. And third, the statement contains a dissonance between an effort in the Indian projection to try and pass off does not lend itself to and such interpretation. The July statement was sought to be justified on the grounds that the nuclear deal was the answer to India’s energy problem; that it would help anchor India’s strategic ties with the US, that establish India’s status as a nuclear weapon state; and that it would promote flow of high technology to India.

Further in 2006, the US in the name of adjusting its internal laws to pave the way for nuclear deal passed Hyde Act which is also called United State–India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of, 2006. There are several provisions in the Act that cause serious concern as they put in place a series of measures designed to neuter India’s strategic capabilities, compromise its sovereignty and erode the independence of its foreign policy. The intent of the Hyde Act is to bring India into the NPT obligations without conferring on India an NPT weapon state status. In the debate on the Bill the legislators realised that without India in, US non-proliferation policies could not succeed. After India held out against the NPT for more than three decades and established an independent nuclear future in spite of great odds, it does appear that the US wishes to induct the country into the NPT, essentially as a non-weapon state, but with perhaps a weapons programme as a transient phase. In the statement of policy, the Hyde Act called for achieving a moratorium on the production of fissile material for explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People’s, Republic of China. It also goes on to say that the US shall “seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South Asia and to promote their reduction on eventual elimination”⁶ India’s policy has always been that nuclear weapons should be eliminated as early as possible in all parts of the world. India has consistently opposed proposals for regional nuclear disarmament. By going ahead with nuclear cooperation with the

US under the Act, India will lose all leverage to pursue the goal of universal nuclear disarmament and will be tied to elimination of nuclear weapons in South Asia.

Criticisms of the Agreement

In course of evaluation of the deal finally made in 2008, it was found that it failed to accomplish the promises and commitments mentioned in the joint statement of July 2005 and March 2006 agreement between the two countries. It left India indefensible on future nuclear testing and assurances on fuel supply issue along with reprocessing of spent fuel. Among the issues, the most important provision, which directly affects India's future nuclear programme/strategy is relating to its nuclear testing. As outlined in Article 14 of the 123-Agreement, should India detonate a nuclear explosive device, the United States has the right to cease all nuclear cooperation with India immediately, including the supply of fuel, as well as request the return of any items transferred from the US, including fresh fuel.⁷ Especially, in the situation when India has to be wary of two countries, Pakistan and China, this provision of the deal is unacceptable as it hampers India's ability to conduct nuclear tests. India has border disputes with China while Pakistan's armed forces hate India, as do certain Islamic fundamentalist elements and Islamabad has waged four wars against India including the last at Kargil in which the Pakistan Army was even contemplating use of nuclear weapons against India. China may test its own improved design and Pakistan too may carry out a test for its own reasons. We are aware that the United States itself is working on the design of a 'Reliable Replacement Weapon (RRW)' to modernise its nuclear arsenal and may indeed carry out a test in future, if it considers this necessary. Regarding testing the 123 states, "Parties agree to consider whether circumstances that may lead to termination resulted from a Party's serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security".⁸ Firstly, the US only agrees to consider our circumstances, not necessarily accept them. Secondly as soon as we test, all hell will break loose. Nobody will look at the elaborate convoluted wording in the Agreement⁹. The US Congress will immediately demand the cancellation of the nuclear deal under Hyde. Likewise India's position on fuel supply and reprocessing of spent fuel is very weak and several substantial powers have been given to the United States of America.

On September 10, 2008 US President George Bush repudiated a key provision of the 123-Agreement when he declared the fuel supply assurances recorded in Article 5 (6) of the agreement were not legally binding. In its replies to the House Foreign Relations Committee (HFRC), the State Department also undermined the sanctity of the fuel supply assurances in six ways. First, it refuses to consider the assurances in March 2006, Bush-Manmohan joint statement

to be of a binding legal character, calling them instead “important Presidential commitments” that the US will uphold only to the extent they are “consistent with US laws”. Secondly, it arbitrarily restricts the meaning of “disruption of supply” in Article 5-6 of the 123-Agreement by saying this “is meant to refer to disruptions in supply to India that may result through no fault of its own” such as a trade war resulting in the cut-off supply; market disruptions in the global supply of fuel”, etc. Reprocessing of spent fuel to separate plutonium is extremely important in the Indian context. The Indian nuclear fuel-cycle is crucially dependent on the use of Fast Breeder Reactors is the second stage and of thorium-based systems in the third stage. Separation of plutonium is essential for the eventual use of thorium as a nuclear fuel. India, therefore, expects that reprocessing will be an important activity of its nuclear energy programme. While the process designs will no doubt be an Indian activity, denial of access to certain equipment or materials required by India, even when these activities are under IAEA safeguards, would be most unreasonable.

The Indo-US nuclear deal and allied national laws as a result of the understanding invited a lot of criticisms—nationally, regionally and globally. In Indian context, the issue involves US suzerainty over India’s national economy and foreign policy. American nuclear big business is keen to make India its mega- market using for the purpose of a willing and weak Prime Minister. George Bush’s stubborn hegemonistic strategy promoting US bigbusiness investment has become India’s national policy, facilitated by the Sonia-Manmohan commitment. This is virtually a reversal of the Nehru-Indira socialistic non-alignment stance and the principles of PanchSheel. In the whole process, we remained a mere satellite and not a sovereign nation. We do not decide our import investment policies, the direction of Swadeshi agriculture and native industrial development. The three great nuclear scientists—Dr. P. K. Iyengar, Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan and Dr. A.N. Prasad, have fiercely opposed US imports for reasons they have spelt out in a signed statement.¹⁰ Among them P.K. Iyengar, a former chairperson of the Atomic Energy Commission, frankly stated, the so-called “benefits” of a US-India nuclear deal “are outweighed by costs in terms of the strains on our sovereignty”. Delicately put, but so true. The US wants to control Indian scientific thinking. “The control on the thinking process is the worst thing that can happen to any country”.¹¹ But that seems to be Bush strategic aim. Quoted in the Asian Age, A.N. Prasad, the former director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre had said ‘India’s three-stage nuclear programme, which is geared towards harnessing thorium, is a prized jewel that cannot be sacrificed at the altar of politics’.¹² Given the reality of the agreement on the ground and the different priorities of both governments it has to be remembered in New Delhi that this is not a two-way deal: ‘India is not selling something of critical interest to America in return for nuclear fuel or nuclear technology. India is a buyer. It is

a one-way transaction.¹³ This of course makes the situation an unequal one, one which is heavily contested both by the opposition, mainly BJP and Left parties.

Regional and Global Viewpoints

Regionally, many including Indian scholar Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik are critical of the deal because of their concern for peace. Analysts view that the deal would intensify the instability of South Asian sub-continent. Over the past few years, the Indian and Pakistani governments have made strides toward easing the tensions between the two countries. People-to-people contacts have increased and the governments are in discussion over the many outstanding issues that divide the two states. One of the means to build confidence in the region was the creation of a natural gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan into India. The "Peace Pipeline" would have tied the region together and raised the stakes for negotiations over belligerence. The Bush administration offered India's nuclear power in exchange for Iranian gas as part of its plan to isolate Iran. Apart from this, the nuclear deal does nothing to hamper the Indian nuclear weapons sector, whose growth would fuel an arms race with Islamabad and Beijing.¹⁴ According to Bidwai, 'Contrary to the claim that waiver and more generally the US-India nuclear deal, will bring India into the global non-proliferation mainstream or promote nuclear restraint for India's part, it will allow India to expand its nuclear weapons arsenal and encourage a nuclear arms race in Asia, particularly in the volatile South Asian sub-continent, where Pakistan is India's significant rival. With the waiver under its belt, India can proceed to import Uranium fuel, and a range of other nuclear materials, equipments and technologies for its civil nuclear programme.¹⁵ But it can divert uranium exclusively for weapons purposes. Achin Vanaik is also of the view that though India has placed 14 out of its 22 civilian nuclear reactors under IAEA's safeguards, which means that no nuclear material from them is allowed to be diverted to military purposes. India can still use the remaining eight reactors to produce as much plutonium as it likes for its weapons programme.¹⁶ However, in US calculations a strong India is the world's best bet for peace and stability in South, South East and Central Asia, as also in the Persian Gulf. This volatile region, with some two billion inhabitants, needs a strong secular and democratic power from within the region, to ensure stability and to serve as a counterpoise to transnational fundamentalism as also to China. Neither the US nor Israel can play this role, as they will end up stoking religious fundamentalism as has happened in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. Like the Americans, the Russians too have no cultural affinity or acceptability in most of these regions.¹⁷ It is therefore, in the US interest not to curb the natural growth of India's military and soft power, so that it can play an increasing role in this region.

In addition, the nuclear deal with the US cast a dark shadow on India's relations with two controversial neighbours—China and Pakistan. There have been a hardening on the Border dispute in Arunachal Pradesh. China is a major player in the nuclear supplier group and is worried how the deal would impact on them. China is further worried by the quadrilateral for democracy which includes India, the US, Australia and Japan and which it sees as anti-Chinese. The quadrilateral is due to hold naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal in the first week of September 2007 with Singapore. Nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, destroyers and frigates will participate and it is coined the largest exercise since the end of the Cold War¹⁸. After signing the nuclear deal relations between India and Pakistan could be profoundly altered as India is seen as given preferential treatment despite Pakistan's cooperation with the US in the war on terror. In fact, Pakistan's first reaction was to warn the US of a potential arms race.¹⁹ Strategic stability has been threatened as India will be able through the nuclear deal to develop larger amounts of fissile material for nuclear weapons. In one possibility among others, the deal will help Pakistan to seek a closer alliance with China to balance the new geo-political reality in South Asian community, although not explicit, that the deal has weakened the framework of international law. In one stroke, the deal has exhibited the Bush administration's disregard for the Kyoto protocols on climate change, for the International Criminal Court, for the Geneva Conventions, for the United Nations and so on. India refused to sign the non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 because, it claimed, the NPT put into place a hierarchy between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. There is no demand for universal nuclear disarmament. Neither the US nor any other state is in legitimate possession of nuclear weapons. Now, the US government is playing King-maker, pretending that it is in a lawful position to welcome India into the nuclear weapons club. India's nuclear history is similar to that of Iran, but that Iran signed the NPT and yet the Bush administration with contempt for reason and international law, made a deal with one country and demonises another.²⁰ Even American scholars, Joseph Cirincione and Miriam Raj Kumar, considered the nuclear deal as reversing the US nuclear policy of non-proliferation measures adopted so far. They think the nuclear deal would be a trend-setter in extending similar exceptions to NPT to other states. They quoted the example of Pakistan approaching China for similar deal.²¹ In May 2010, the deal between China and Pakistan to build two nuclear reactors in Pakistan came to be a reality which had drawn several criticisms from non-proliferationists. Unlike them, the Indian scholars, Bidwai and Vinaik not merely supported non-proliferation but are also against destructive weapons and in favour of global nuclear disarmament. To quote Bidwai, 'Indian nuclear scientists campaigned against inclusion of fast breeder reactors under the supervision of IAEA and succeeded but at its core is a cynical agenda of legitimising the most destructive weapons known to humanity by sealing as a close Indo-US strategic partnership.'²² Thus, upon closer evaluation, terms of the agreement

show that the US has very cleverly hidden key clauses in it that places India in an unfavourable position.

In the aftermath of the successful conclusion of the US- India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, a number of concerns have been raised in India. The main concerns are that India's strategic programme including nuclear weapons testing would be compromised; that the Agreement would compromise India's three-stage programme leading to the utilisation of thorium; and finally, that it would impinge upon India's autonomy in the conduct of its foreign policy. But the fact is that in the light of constraints, this is the best and most practical agreement that could have been hammered out.²³ In the final negotiations, as the deal proves, Washington had conceded a lot of ground but of course, without India everything. Now, it would be entirely unpragmatic to even think of getting everything one wants from a bilateral agreement.

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(3) The impact of the (Indian Lobby) in the United States on the American policies towards combating the fundamentalism terrorism tide in South Asia

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Abstract

The thesis of our study is briefly highlighting the problem of the incursion of **(terrorist and fundamentalist movements)** between Pakistan and India, and the mutual accusations between them about striking and targeting targets such as those by terrorist elements. This was what imposed itself recently in February 2018, especially after the **(Indian military base)** in the **(northern state of Jammu and Kashmir)** was attacked by an armed attack, which led to the fall of a number of Indian victims. From here the tension between India and Pakistan returned to its head again, and the attempts of the Indian prime minister “**Narendra Modi**” to benefit from the “**influence of the Indian lobby at Washington to practice pressures on the USA to stand with India against Pakistan and China to fight terrorism**”, while the biggest and most dangerous disaster related to the **(confrontation patch)** in which **(China could clash with its neighbor India)**, and between this and that we see **(an American role that is almost seeking to ignite confrontation between all parties with the encouragement of the “Indian lobby”)** in Under the US desire to **(contain and restrict China in South Asia and India)**, and the Chinese response as **(Beijing is attempting to defend its interests in Pakistan and its project of the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” (CPEC) and the Chinese “Gwadar Port” in Pakistan within the framework of the Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative”)**, at a time when Beijing's interests are exposed. The threat of terrorism and fundamentalism targeting its interests Chinese internal interests in **(Xinjiang)**, the Muslim Uighur region in northwest China, and its extensions with terrorist elements and militias in **(South Asia, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and on the borders between (Pakistan and India)**, which led to targeting terrorists and striking China's interests in Pakistan. Here, the **(security, political, and strategic)** conflict began between **(China and the United States)** and their allies **(Pakistan and India)**, with each side accusing the other of **(sponsoring terrorism)**.

Hence, each of the previous parties tried to use **(strategies and tactics)** to respond to the other side, for example India, through the **(Indian Lobby in Washington)**, tried to influence the US administration to confront **(the fundamentalist tide from Pakistan)**. India also submitted requests to the “**United Nations Security Council**” (UNSC) to include Pakistani groups and classify

them in the **(Terrorism list)** in the United Nations Security Council, but China used **(the right of veto against the Indian request)**, while **(Washington presented a proposal to form “Asian NATO”)**, directed mainly against **(China and Pakistan)**, accusing them of the growth of terrorist elements in the Asian region, with China officially defending its ally **“Pakistan”** that has denied charges it has harbored or supported terrorists.

Thus, we find ourselves in front of a **(network of intertwined and contradictory relations between all parties)**, which was exploited by **(terrorist and fundamentalist groups)** to carry out terrorist attacks against both China's interests in Pakistan and hit its projects within the framework of the **(Belt and Road Initiative)**, in addition to India's exposure to several internal attacks, the most difficult of which was in the beginning of 2018 and India accusing members of the “Army of Muhammad armed terrorist group” or as known **“Jaish-e-Mohammed” (JeM)** in Pakistan of being responsible for the attack, the United States standing by India and threatening former US President **(Trump)** to **(cut off military aid to Pakistan)**, and **“China's defense of its ally Pakistan for its strategic importance to Chinese economic interests”** that have already hit by several terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Hence, the study carried out by the Egyptian researcher seeks to study all these security problems and difficulties facing all parties, with **(drawing a general vision and future scenarios)** for how the shape of the confrontation between Washington and Beijing and then between India and Pakistan will be evolved?, and the extent of the success of these extremist armed and terrorist groups in achieving their goals to strike and targeting the interests of all the concerned parties.

▪ **Keywords:** *Indian Lobby, lobbies, lobbying, policy making, pressure groups, American Administration, fundamentalism tide, terrorism, terrorist groups, combating and fighting terrorism, Pakistani extremist movements, extremist movements extensions, Belt and Road Chinese Initiative (BRI), Indian Lobby, American security rapprochement, Washington's policies and strategies, Chinese response, Future scenarios and expectations.*

- Prologue:

The study contributes to the extensive literature on influences by **“conceptualizing of the Indian Lobby to pressure on the American administration regarding fighting terrorism and combating fundamentalism tide in India, And the mutual accusations between the two sides (Pakistan and China) and the other side (India and the United States of America) of supporting terrorism in order to achieve their interests”**. We find that the US position was more biased with India against Pakistan on the issue of **(its war with terrorism)**, as the former US president **(Donald Trump)** reduced the **(military aid package to Pakistan)** in August 2017, while prominent American officials criticized them for cutting aid. If the nuclear-armed state did not show greater cooperation in the **(field of preventing militants from using their lands as a safe haven for them)**. Supporters of the US decision to reduce aid say that **“Pakistan sees militants like the Taliban as useful tools to curb the influence of its historic foe, India”⁽ⁱ⁾**.

On the other hand, Pakistan denies allowing militants to take refuge in its territory, noting that **“Pakistani government is always taking measures against these groups”**. China views (terrorism, separatism and extremism) as posing potential threats to a wide range of national security interests that include (social stability, national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity). Terrorist incidents appear to have risen significantly towards China internally and internationally at **“Xinjiang”** and the around its periphery and regional areas like **“Pakistan”**, as Chinese authorities expressed their fears towards **“Uighur separatists could use these areas as staging grounds for attacks against China or link up with Islamic radicals already operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan which are the primary focus of Beijing’s efforts in this regard”⁽ⁱ⁾**.

Both **“India and China”** have engaged in (joint counter-terrorism exercises). In May 2015, when Indian Prime Minister **“Narendra Modi”** visited China, both the countries **“reiterated their strong condemnation of and resolute opposition to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and committed themselves to cooperate on counter-terrorism. They agreed that there is no justification for terrorism and urged all countries and entities to work sincerely to disrupt terrorist networks and their financing, and stop cross-border movement of terrorists”⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾**.

But, here we find the (Chinese stance in support and support of the government of Pakistan against Washington and India), and this is illustrated by the words of the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman (Hua Chunying), and her assertion that **“Pakistan was on the front lines in the struggle against terrorism and made great sacrifices and important contributions in this war”**. Adding that **“China believes that the international community should fully recognize Pakistan's (efforts) in combating terrorism”**, according to her statements in the daily Chinese press release.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman (Hua Chunying) transferred the Chinese official vision by saying **“We are pleased to see cooperation between Pakistan and the United States in the field of combating terrorism based on mutual respect, and that they work together for stability and security in the region and the world”**, she added **“China hope that relevant US policies will help promote security, stability, and the development of Afghanistan and the region”**. She was trying to formally convey China's view to the United States, India and the international community regarding the Chinese support for the government of Pakistan in its war against terrorism, contrary to the vision of India and the United States^(v).

China seeks (regional and global support for targeting Uighur Islamists) but refrains from backing India’s efforts to weaken the terror groups like the **“Jaish-e-Mohammed” (JeM)** and **“Lashkar-e-Taiba” (LeT)**, who are being accused by the (American and Indian) sides, as **“they are the Pakistani army’s ‘strategic assets’ to wage asymmetric war against India”**. Beijing has

also blocked New Delhi's proposals on several occasions at the "UNSC" to designate "**Hizbul Mujahedeen**" chiefs (Syed Salahuddin, Abdul Rehman Makki and Azam Cheema) of the "**Lashkar-e-Taiba**" as terrorists. This "**selective characterization**" poses several challenges for the success of "**counter-terrorism efforts in South Asia**". India's application to the "**Security Council**" (UNSC Sanctions Committee), also known as (1267 Committee), to designate (JeM chief, Masood Azhar), as terrorist has been repeatedly rejected because of "**China's veto against the Indian and American attempts**"^(v).

The Chinese official support for Pakistan in its war against terrorism comes as a result of the importance of the (economic corridor and the Chinese port of Gwadar at Pakistan) that passes in Pakistan within the framework of the "**Chinese plan for the "Belt and Road"**", with targeting Chinese projects in Pakistan and that region. Therefore, the Pakistani army decided to deploy a new contingent to protect the security of the "**China-Pakistan Economic Corridor**" or what is known as "**Sepak**", and the Pakistanis assert that the "**China-Pakistan Economic Corridor**" (CPEC) is a (vivid example of the deep-rooted friendship between Pakistan and China, and they are fully determined Ensuring the security of the project), and Pakistan believes that the success of the Chinese project will lead to the injection of more employment and business opportunities with more economic opportunities to come, the people's lifestyle will improve and the hostile elements will gradually fail in Pakistan and Southeast Asia^(vi).

Therefore, with the help of China, Pakistan strengthens all the (security measures taken by the Pakistani army to protect the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project), especially since this project was a "**target of extremist elements and the fundamentalist tide**" in the (Baluchistan) region in Pakistan. With the Pakistani government's assurance that the "**security situation in the "Baluchistan" region has improved since the launch of the Economic Corridor project, and now there is better infrastructure, as many Chinese projects were under implementation, and with each coming day, the security situation and development will improve, besides the Chinese investments at the Pakistani city and "port of Gwadar" within the framework of the "Belt and Road Chinese Initiative" has become stronger today, not as it was two years ago, and it will be in the future on par with the ports of developed countries**"^(vii).

Hence, we find the Pakistani assertion that "**its war on terror is a task to protect its interests and those of its ally China, and that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor provided benefits to both China and Pakistan, questioning the double standards of some specific countries regarding investment and refuting the allegations of a "debt trap"**"⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾.

Assad Omer, Chairman of the "Standing Committee for Financial Affairs of the National Assembly in Pakistan", said, "The false accusations that have been directed at China's

investments in Pakistan and the region aim to create bad feelings among people by defaming the motives of Chinese investment and making China's interests a target for terrorists".

The former Pakistani Minister of Finance "Assad Omer" also defended the "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project", as a "major project" within the framework of the "Belt and Road Initiative proposed by China", in an interview with the "Chinese news agency" (Xinhua)^(x).

One of the "major determinants" of Chinese President "Xi Jinping's South Asia policy" is to (neutralize the perceived American strategy to contain China with the support of China's regional allies' like "Pakistan" in the face of American allies like "India"). The US and China share a complex and multi-layered set of ties that cuts across each other's economic, political and security interests in both "Pakistan and India"^(x).

- Research Significance:

We will address the importance of studying the main (terrorist militants, jihadists groups and extremist fundamentalists) in India and Pakistan, and the other external pressures, as follow:

A) Theoretical Significance, our thesis will study the different debates and approaches on the extensions of the (terrorist militants, and fundamentalists tide and networks) in India and Pakistan, and their extensions abroad the Asian regions, focusing on the main terrorist attacks targeting the Indian interests, and the main challenges against the South Asia region.

B) Practical Significance,

our study will explain some case studies experiences for the interventions and extensions of the (extremist militants, terrorist jihadists groups and tide fundamentalism), focusing on the roles of the (great and regional powers in combating terrorism) and the main adopted policies to defend the Asian region, besides the (reciprocal accusations) and arguments between (India and Pakistan) in (sponsoring and supporting terrorist and fundamentalist movements and militias) and the (US and Chinese roles and strategies) to support its allies.

- Research problem:

It is well known that (terrorist jihadists and extremist fundamentalists), in South and Southeast Asia, and especially on the borders between (India and Pakistan), have established a (network of cooperation and extensions to Salafi groups active in the Middle East and the Asian continent), and on they were headed by (Jaish Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Mujahedeen Groups) in Pakistan, and its extensions into India and accusing it of launching many terrorist attacks against Indian targets and interests. The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that most of the jihadist groups operating in South and Southeast Asia have

established strong links with **(ISIS, Al Qaeda, the Taliban)** in Afghanistan and the Middle East^(vi). The problem is that some of these fighters who belong to the countries of South and Southeast Asia, especially **(Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan)**, have established **(jihadist networks)** that have received funding, support and advice from **(Al- Qaeda and ISIS)**. They carried out many terrorist attacks against Indian interests such as **(Jammu and Kashmir State)** which was targeted by a severe attack in February 2018, which resulted in Indian casualties. Hence, **(India made many accusations against Pakistan of sponsoring, supporting and harboring many Islamic militants to harm its interests)**.

On the other hand, Pakistan (supported by the Chinese side and its Belt and Road projects in Pakistan) is rejected the Indian accusations (supported by the US).

Here, we will find **the (role of the external factor in supporting regional differences between India and Pakistan, with China standing and supporting Pakistan and the United States for its ally India)**. This exacerbated the problem in each party's use of several **(strategies and tactics)** to strike at the interests of the other party and harm it.

-The paper seeks to answer the following questions:

The researcher is mainly seeking beyond the tools for combating the **(terrorist jihadists, fundamentalism tide and extremist groups)**, in South and Southeast Asia, and especially on the borders between **(India and Pakistan)**, and the role of the foreign, external and regional powers, mainly **(USA and China)** in intervention to resolve this dilemma. To answer this question, we should study **the (map of the spread of the terrorist and fundamentalists)** and the American and Chinese roles in the Asian region. The study will basically answer the major interrelated **(main questions)** about:

What is the main (terrorist jihadists, fundamentalism tide and extremist groups), in on the borders between (India and Pakistan), and the role of the external factors (China and the USA), besides the (Indian Lobby) to influence the American administration against them?

The study will also address the domination of the main **(terrorist jihadist groups, and the fundamentalism tide)** between India and Pakistan from different approaches and perspectives, analyzing the main challenges of combating terrorism in the Asian region and the roles of the great powers. Thesis will discuss foundational and cutting-edge research that addresses some **"sub-questions", such as:**

1- What are the main (terrorist jihadists and extremist fundamentalists), in South and Southeast Asia, and especially on the borders between (India and Pakistan)?

2- What are the main roles of the **(Indian Lobby)** in the United States of America on **(the American elections)** and Washington's policies combating the **(fundamentalism terrorism tide)** and **(Pakistani extremist movements)**?

3- What are the consequences and challenges of the American **“political and security rapprochement with India”** and its implications on Chinese interests and the **“Belt and Road Initiative”** in the region?

4- What are the differences of the **(American and Indian)** scenarios to combat the **(fundamentalist tide and jihadist movements)** and the **(Chinese and Pakistani plans and policies)** to defend their interests?

-Methodology

The study is based on a secondary analysis of the literature available through the reading and analysis of research studies that address the topic, putting in our consideration the diversity of more specialized publications are dealing with the impact The impact of **the (fundamentalist tide and terrorist movements)** in India on its relations with its neighbor Pakistan, and the role of external factors **(China and Washington)** in interfering with its **(regional allies to impose its interests and agenda)** on all parties.. So, the most relevant approaches and methodologies to our study theoretical framework would be:

1) “Case Study” Methodology

A case study is a research method common in social science. It is based on an in-depth investigation of a single individual, group, or event. Case studies may be descriptive or explanatory^(xii). The main proposed methodology provided the basis for our study is the **“Case Study”** of the **(Jihadist, fundamentalist forces, and the armed terrorist movements)** in the Pakistani and Indian regimes, and the role of their great power supports of the U.S. and China to intervene for maintaining dominantly their interests in many cases, additionally the ability of **the “Indian Lobby”** to play a vital role to influence the **“American administration”** to be involved to control the **“Pakistani fundamentalism tide”** which is supported by China to protect its initiative for **“Belt and Road”** and its projects located at Pakistan^(kiii). This case of interventions is a good test for our theory for three reasons, as follows:

1) First, (Jihadist terrorism) - (as a case study for causing internal chaos in countries, especially the case of Pakistan and India, and harming their interests) in many cases, using overt or covert mechanisms by **(penetration and targeting the economic and political interest)** - which is forming the deadliest threat facing the states and peoples of South Asia, including India and Pakistan. Most experts agree that the **(“Army of Muhammad armed terrorist group”**

or as Know **"Jaish-e-Mohammed" (JeM) in Pakistan**) is the most threatening to the Indian interior, especially its responsibility for a number of terrorist operations in the state of **(Jammu and Kashmir)** in northern India, in addition to other movements that extend with Pakistan and the India, such as: **(Taliban movement, the group) The Sunni Islamist group allied with Al Qaeda, the Mujahedeen Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba)** and others, which want to re-impose **(strict Islamic rule)** in the Pakistani state, and **(spreading chaos and turmoil in India, Pakistan and the region)**, and strike China's interests and projects within the framework of its **(Chinese Belt and Road initiative)** and its mega projects In Pakistan^(xiv).

2)Second, A recent development that raises deep concern in Jammu and Kashmir is the rise in the **(popularity of ISIS and its ideology related to the caliphate, especially among the Kashmiri youth)** in India, Where indicators confirm that there are **(internal reasons related to the nature of the Indian political system)** itself, and its way of dealing with internal problems, especially the problems and demands of Muslims in the Indian Kashmir, which has a Muslim majority of its population.

3)Third, The starting point for understanding the most important developments of the issue is to study **(the role of the external and regional factors and pressures to deal with the fundamentalist and terrorist movements inside Pakistan and India)**, especially the US and Chinese roles. With the **(US strategy)** of practicing a policy of **(containment and security pressure on China in Pakistan)**, and terrorist groups targeting Chinese interests and projects in the **(China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Gwadar Port and its Chinese investments in Pakistan)**. Hence, we find that each of those **(external parties exert their influence on the interior of India and Pakistan)** to impose its interests in the region^(xv).

The role of the **(external factor)** is also represented in **(the role of the Indian lobby in Washington in pressuring and influencing the passage of the Indian state's agenda)** and persuading the US decision-maker to impose sanctions on Pakistan to curb the growth and increase of **(terrorist operations and attacks)** that target the Indian interior lands and harm its interests.

2)"National Interest" Approach

'National Interest' is a key concept in managing politics of the states, according to the context in which it is used. Statesmen and policy-makers have always used it in ways suitable to them and to their objective of justifying the actions of their states^(xvi). "Hitler" justified expansionist policies in the name of **"German national interests"**. This approach saying that: *"all the nations are always engaged in the process of fulfilling or securing the goals of their national interests"*. The foreign policy of each nation is formulated on the basis of its national interest and it is always at work for securing its goals. It is a universally accepted right of each state to secure its national interests. A state always tries to justify its actions on the basis of its national

interest. The behavior of a state is always conditioned and governed by its national interests ^(xvii). Hence, it is essential for us to know the meaning and content of **"National Interest of the USA strategy and Chinese interests and benefits to intervene to Pakistani and Indian regimes" for combating "tensions between India and Pakistan" due to the increase in (terrorist attacks), and India's accusation of Pakistan's incursion into the Indian state of "Jammu and Kashmir" to harm its national security.**

Our theoretical framework of the study is testing our arguments using **"National Interest approach"**. So, we can apply, as follows:

A) We assess the national interest impact of the area of **(mutual threats)** between the Pakistani and Indian countries, which is in fact terrifying threats to the entire world, especially Washington and Beijing, as each party seeks to protect its interests in the Asian region. The Indians, in turn, do not overlook such a scenario, and therefore they prepare their strategic cards to deal with various possibilities. Strategic benefits are accelerating between the **(three Asian poles)**, which are **(China, India and Pakistan)**, while **(Washington is trying to take advantage of the regional and global balance game to neutralize and restrict the Chinese role in Pakistan and South Asia with the help of its ally of India)** ^(xviii).

B) We perform a case study of defending the national interests by the U.S. and China as **"hegemonic actors"** intervene in Pakistani and Indian regimes in many cases since we have seen with the **(Donald Trump)** administration. And the attempt of the US administration in 2018 **(suspending and withholding military aid to Pakistan in support of its ally India, and Washington's support for New Delhi in accusing Pakistan of causing many terrorist attacks inside Indian territory).**

C) On the other hand the **(Chinese response represented by the use of the right of veto in the Security Council in support of for Pakistan against the Indian and American requests and proposals against Pakistan)**, and the Chinese refusal to include some terrorist groups that India requested to be listed as **"terrorists"** supported by the United States of America, and thus we find that **"each side defends its interests differently from the other side"** ^(xix).

D) Both the United States of America and the **"Indian Lobby at Washington"** are supporting India to **"control and restrict the Chinese emergence and role in South Asia and Pakistan and to harm the Chinese Initiative for Silk and Road"** there are many **(intense and deep accusations from the American side against Pakistan)** that it is **(not fighting terrorism enough)**, which is rejected by Pakistan, which could push them to **(alliance with the Chinese interests game)** and the matter is further complicated by **(American support for India)** to defend as well its interests against China ^(xx).

Finally, we recapitulate our findings and explore their relevance for current US and Chinese foreign policy debates of intervention to combat the **“Fundamentalism tide and the terrorist groups”** in the Asian region.

- Study Division

Whereas the researcher is seeking through the study of the impact of the **(increase in terrorist attacks and activities)** on the **(US and Chinese foreign interference with its allies India and Pakistan, and its general and comprehensive impact on stability in South Asia and the surrounding region)**, so the researcher will identify and study the following aspects, which are themes relevant to the concerns of the researcher, **it entails addressing the following:**

- **First:** Role of the **“Indian Lobby”** to influence on the **(American elections)** and Washington's policies
- **Second:** The ability of the **“Indian Lobby”** to influence on the USA towards political and security rapprochement with India in the field of **(combating the fundamentalism terrorism tide)** and Pakistani extremist movements
- **Third:** Different facets of terrorism and fundamentalism in India, South and Southeast Asia, and Pakistan: **Map of the spread of (terrorist groups)**
- **Fourth:** Reciprocal accusations and arguments between **(India and Pakistan)** in **(sponsoring and supporting terrorist and fundamentalist movements and militias)** and the **(US and Chinese roles)** between them
- **Fifth:** The impact of **(Chinese Silk and Road strategy)** to build the **“China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” (CPEC)** and the Chinese **“Gwadar Port”** in Pakistan to control the area of **(marine lines)** on the American influence and Indian policies against the **(Pakistani fundamentalist movements tide)**
- **Sixth:** A comparison between **(American and Indian)** scenarios to combat the **(fundamentalist tide and jihadist movements)** and the **(Chinese and Pakistani plans and policies)** to defend their interests
- **Seventh:** The conclude remarks and proposed recommendations

1. The role of the (Indian lobby) in political influence in the American administration, the presidential elections and the American decision-making centers to obtain American support with India to “fight fundamentalism and terrorism against Pakistan and limiting the Chinese influence in the face of India”

Indian Lobbying, means: Exercising pressures on the American administration, it is as well an impressive term used to describe **“Indian groups or organizations”** whose members try to influence the American decision-making in a particular body or entity, and in the United States there are more than one lobby, the most famous lobbying of which is the **“Indian Lobby”**, in addition to, of course, the Jewish lobby that exerts pressure on the **(American administration,**

the American legislative authorities “Senate and the Representatives” to support India's policies against Pakistan and China on the issue of combating terrorism and fundamentalism in South and Southeast Asia). Recently, studies focused on the (community coming from India, which is known as the “Indian Lobby in the United States of America”), especially, after it became a large number of the population, and it became clear that it is one of the most effective, influential and wealthy communities^(kxi). Despite the close personal relationship between US President “Donald Trump” and Indian Prime Minister “Narendra Modi”, New Delhi maintains balanced preferences towards the American presidential race, as the efforts of Democratic candidate “Joe Biden” to attract the votes of the “Indian community in the United States”, and his assertion of “supporting India in the border clash with China”, and the legacy of cooperation relations between the former American administration under “Barak Obama” and New Delhi, increased the reassurance of Indian political circles regarding the results of the presidential race^(kxii).

. On the other hand, the Indian rapprochement with the “Trump administration” through the “influence of the Indian lobby at the USA” at the geostrategic level did not prevent the existence of fundamental differences between the two parties on issues of (fighting fundamentalism tide and terrorism militants against Pakistan and China, trade, immigration, Indo-Iranian relations, especially those related to oil imports), in addition to New Delhi's endeavor to maintain “open channels with Moscow” regarding arms imports without exposure to US sanctions^(kxiii). We can clarify the extent of the (Indian Lobby) influences on US decision-making and within the US administration itself, *through the following mechanisms and sections:*

1.1 The role of the “Indian lobby in Washington” in managing the complex relations between the US administration and the government of India: focusing on the term of President “Trump” and Prime Minister of India “Narendra Modi”

It turns out that the (Indian category in America) has become a large number of the population, and it is also one of the most effective and influential groups of American society. In a report published in the “American Foreign Affairs magazine” about the “success of the Indian lobby in the political and economic spheres in Washington), it proves the importance of the (rapprochement between the Indian government and the “Indian lobby” to pass and pressure on Washington in favor of India, especially in cooperation in the field of combating terrorism and fundamentalism in Pakistan and Afghanistan with Washington's help), especially during (Trump's period) and his successor “Joe Biden”^(kxiv). Here, we can trace the President's (Trump) relations with India during his tenure and the role of the (Indian Lobby) in his visit to India on February 2020, *through understanding the following:*

1)

The mutual hospitality of President **“Trump”** and Prime Minister **“Modi”** during the exchange of visits was nothing but an expression of that personal closeness, and the mutual awareness of the place of **“image policies”** in strengthening relations, which was also evident in the huge celebrations and mass crowds that were organized during these visits which seemed exceptional at the level of organization, letters and pledges to strengthen relations.

2)

At the strategic level, relations between India and the United States have not been closer than the current stage, as the **“Trump administration”** stands firmly in its **“support for India in the border clash with China in the Ladakh region”**, and pledged to export quality weapons to New Delhi after the amendment of the rules restricting the sale of advanced drones. For foreign partners especially (**MQ-1 Predator**), India is looking to acquire (**combat helicopters, multi-role fighters, transport aircraft and advanced artillery**) from the United States. This parallels with the succession of advanced naval maneuvers between the (**Quartet countries of the Indian Ocean led by Washington**)^(xxv).

3)

Indian analysts describe relations with Washington during President **“Trump's term”** as extremely complex, governed by intricate contradictions to say the least. In this regard, the leaderships of the two countries are partially similar in their affiliation with the currents of the populist right, and their belief in the **“strong man”** model in managing domestic and foreign policies, as well as the congruence of Indian and American interests in limiting Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean and South Asia, and their adoption of the **“Hindu-Pacific”** concept in the regional policy that is based on the close geographical link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, in addition to membership in the **“quadripartite security dialogue”** in Asia, which also includes Japan and Australia, as well as New Delhi and Washington, and aims to contain Chinese influence in Asia^(xxvi).

4)

And the visit of the US President (**Trump**) to India on February 2020, and his meeting with the Indian Prime Minister (**Narendra Modi**), as a result of pressure from the (**Indian Lobby in Washington**), to strengthen the strategic partnership with India, given the (**influence of the Indian Lobby in the US elections in November 2020**). There is a relationship between (**President Trump's visit to India in February 2020 and the strong Indian lobby pressure in Washington**) comes through an understanding of the strong influence of the Indian Lobby in the United States, as follows:

A.

Trump's visit becomes more important in light of the important the (**increasing importance of the Indian lobby's role in the United States, and its success in accessing American political and economic centers**). In addition to what is characteristic of a component (**Americans of Indian origin have important qualitative features compared to other Asian Americans**),

because they are the **(most educated, and the highest income in the United States)**, which made the Indian lobby one of the powerful American lobbies^{xxvii}.

B.

Americans of Indian origin have succeeded in gaining access to **(important American institutions)** in recent years, on top of which **(membership in both houses of Congress. In addition to that, the strong relationship between the Indian lobby and its Jewish counterpart in the United States)**, and the role that each plays in strengthening US relations With Israel and India, strengthening Israeli-Indian relations.

C.

In other words, strengthening the strategic partnership between the United States and India at this time for **(Trump's visit to India)** on February 2020, will in turn be strengthened the **(Indian lobby's activity during the US election period, on the political and economic levels)**. The importance of this dimension increases in light of (some studies conducted on Americans of Indian descent), which indicated that the largest proportion of these people **(about 65%)** tend to vote for the **(Democratic Party competing with President Trump and his Republican Party)** ^(xxviii).

D.

In the same context, another important American motive behind Trump's recent visit on February 2020 to India, is to work on **(strengthening economic and trade relations)** between the two countries, under the influence of two main factors. **The first** of them relates to the new Corona virus crisis and its possible repercussions on the volume of Chinese demand for American goods, which means the difficulty of implementing the US trade agreement, signed in mid-January. **The second factor** relates to the positive estimates of the Indian economy, which paves the way for an American bet on strengthening the volume of Indian demand to compensate for the expected decline of its Chinese counterpart, at least during 2020.

E.

Trump's visit to India also gains additional importance in view of the **(accelerating developments in the Afghan file)**, starting with **(direct talks between the United States and the Taliban)** that ended with the signing of the agreement to reduce the level of violence that took effect on February 22, 2021, and then the **(peace agreement)** to be signed on February 29, 2021.

F.

The success of the peace process in Afghanistan after **(Trump's visit to India)** requires a number of conditions, the most important of which are: **(obtaining the support of the regional neighboring countries, especially India)**. Most importantly, however, **(strengthening US-Indian coordination on Afghanistan at this stage is a necessary condition for balancing - or limiting - the Pakistani role)**, a role of which the American perception remains negative despite the support that Pakistan provided to the **(US dialogue with the Taliban)** during 2018-2019^{xxix}. *Based on the previous analysis, the Egyptian researcher concluded that the US President Trump's unprecedented visit to India was affected by (the influence of the Indian lobby in*

Washington, especially before the American presidential elections on November 2020 and the attempt to **(attract the voices of the powerful Indian lobby in Washington)**, as it comes within the framework of managing a group of **(transformations and strategic interests in the regions of Central and South Asia)**. So, the aggregate of these data is what makes the visit important.

But, in the personal opinion of the researcher, I think that it is likely that the visit of "Trump" to India will not change the Indian attitudes towards the main actors and other strategic partners, and it is difficult to speculate that it will play an influential role in changing India's role in the current international match. Although Trump's visit and the talks that follow between the American and Indian administrations may lead to **(expanding India's regional role and strengthening its position in the policies of containing China, and making more room for New Delhi to play an advanced role in the Afghan arena and balancing the Pakistani role there)**, but, in all cases, this is still subject to a future analysis, especially under **(the change of the American administration of "Trump" and the arrival of a new administration led by "Joe Biden")**.

1.2 Influences of the Indian lobby in Washington to support the United States' policies in favor of India

The relations between the United States and India during the term of President **"Trump"** were not without clear disparities and interest disagreements, which India sought to put under control and prevent it from coming out into the open, which is related to the **(clash in the priorities of national policies pursued in the two countries)**, and the conflict between the slogans **"America First"** raised by **"Trump"**, and **"India first"**, which is adopted by **"Modi"** (xxx). **The most prominent of these contentious issues were as follows:**

1-

Immigration restriction policies: India is one of the most prominent countries affected by the policies of restricting immigration and granting work visas followed by the **"Trump"** administration, especially for specialists in the technology sector, as a large part of immigrants to Washington fall under the category of skilled workers, a group that has been threatened a succession of stopping entry visas to the United States and restricting their stay periods, which is related to sectors such as **(technology, medicine, engineering and other advanced sectors)**, in addition to the restrictions that may be imposed on study and educational missions to the United States.

2-

The American trade war: Washington's targeting of China by the trade war did not prevent India from being harmed by these measures, as the Indian steel industry suffered huge losses due to US anti-subsidy fees, which prompted New Delhi to sue Washington in the **"World Trade Organization"**, and it also responded by raising tariffs on Many American products.

New Delhi fears of **“Trump's expansion in imposing dumping duties and protectionist policies”**, which seriously threatens Indian exports to the United States, in addition to the **“indirect negative repercussions of the raging war between the United States and China”^(xxxi)**.

3-

Pressure on energy security: The tightening of sanctions on Tehran, and the **“Trump”** administration's adoption of a policy of **“zero exports”** of Iranian oil, puts pressure on India, which is one of the largest importers of oil from Tehran. Washington's reluctance to renew India's import exemptions has led to its search for alternative sources to import oil from the Arab Gulf states and African countries. American pressure also caused a review of close economic relations with Iran, which includes massive movement of foreign trade and investments due to the increasing US sanctions against it, which affects the **“India First”** policy pursued by the **“Modi government”** in maximizing economic interests.

4-

Restricting the diversification of arms sources: The Law of **“Combating the Enemies of the United States Through Sanctions”** known by the acronym **“Katsa”** is considered one of the issues that cause muffled disagreements in US-Indian relations, as India has contracted during the last period on several Russian arms systems, including The **“S-400 air defense system** and specific weapons systems in the maritime domain, in addition to efforts to obtain **“Russian MiG-29 and “Su-30 fighters**, which may cause them to fall under US sanctions. The **“Trump administration** more than once hinted at the sanctions in response to the **“S-400 deal**, including the US President's comment on the deal in October 2018, saying: **“India will see the American response sooner than you think”**, which prompted the Indian military leaders to affirm the independence of the Indian decision regarding armaments, an issue that was overlooked at a later stage without implying the end of US pressure regarding Indian arms resources^(xxii).

5-

Disputes over Afghanistan: The **(US military withdrawal from Afghanistan raises concerns in New Delhi about the effects of the spread of terrorist threats across South Asia)**, as Indian think tanks reserve reservations about the US plan to withdraw from Afghanistan, while President **“Trump's administration”** criticizes from time to time the limited participation of neighboring countries and Including India in **(security arrangements to ensure stability in Afghanistan, contentment with symbolic and economic support, and burden the United States to confront terrorism without participating in it)^(xxiii)**.

So, according to our mentioned analysis, the Egyptian researcher concluded that it has become evident that the Indian Prime Minister **(Narendra Modi)** won power for the second time in a row in May 2019, has strengthened his directions that he took in the first period, towards a **(partnership with the United States of America with the help of the influence of the Indian lobby in Washington to confront the Chinese rise and its support for Pakistan)** Which is a reflection of the desire of the Indian Prime Minister **(Modi)** and the ideology adopted by his **(Bharatiya Janata Party)** to make India as the **(dominant power in South Asia)**, and to elevate it to the ranks of great powers, and he will devote his foreign policy in the coming period to

achieving this goal with the influence of the **(Indian Lobby)** in Washington and his influence on the current US President **"Joe Biden"**, especially since his deputy, **"Camilla Harris"**, is coming from an Indian origin roots in the first place.

1.3 The role of the "Indian lobby" in the US presidential race between "Trump" and the winning president "Joe Biden" in November 2020 to support American political decision-making in favor of "limiting Chinese influence in the face of India" and "confronting common terrorist threats" between New Delhi and Washington

Despite the **"geographical divide between India and Washington"**, New Delhi has been no more present in the US presidential race than the 2020 elections, whether in the aide nominations, the election campaigns, or the pivotal issues that New Delhi places first^(xxiv). **In this regard, the most prominent features of this presence were as follows:**

1)

The targeting of "American Indians": The American electoral campaigns focused on **"attracting the votes of American Indians as a demographic bloc with an increasing influence"**, and a report published by the **"Foreign Policy Magazine"** indicated that the community that constitutes only 1% of the American elective force is considered the **"second bloc among immigrants after the Americans of Mexican origins"**, their numbers are increasing rapidly by more than **(150%)** between 2000 and 2018, in addition to being the **(ethnic group with the highest income)**, exceeding \$ 100,000 per person on average in 2015, which made its members increasingly among the groups that **"donate to electoral campaigns"**. The targeting operations included **(extensive advertisements in Hindi and local languages in areas of concentrated communities)**, in addition to **(broadcasting advertisements on television networks)** targeting **"South Asian communities"**, as well as focusing on Indian issues in the discourse of election campaigns and organizing virtual events for Indian celebrities to motivate young people to vote. Because **"Indian communities are concentrated in swing states"**, such as **(Pennsylvania, Texas and Michigan)**, where every vote makes a strong difference in the presidential race track^(xxv).

2)

The employment of "identity politics": The election campaigns focus on identity politics in winning the support of American Indians. In addition to the vice presidential candidate **"Kamala Harris"**, whose mother belongs to the Indian community, Biden's campaign has sought help from a number of Indian aides and advisors, at their forefront **"Dr.Vivek Merthy"**, a specialist in surgery, whose association with Biden dates back to his tenure as Vice President Barack Obama. He contributed to drafting Biden's plan to confront Corona, and the Indian economist, **"Raj Shetty"** of Harvard University, who worked with **"Biden's team in drafting his economic program"**. On the other hand, the US President's campaign launched the **"American Indian Coalition"** in the government and the private sector led by the president's son, Junior Donald Trump Jr., under the name **"Indian Voices for Trump"** to support the

strong strategic partnership between the United States and India, which parallels **“Trump’s display of the strength of his friendship with Indian Prime Minister “Narendra Modi” in an attempt to polarize “American Indians away from their traditional party affiliations” supporting the “Democratic Party”, as “72% of American Indians support Trump’s rival, Joe Biden”.**

3)

Indian observers motivate against “Trump”: President **“Trump”** statements during the last presidential debate in October 2020 sparked increased anger in India after describing the air in India as **“dirty”**, which prompted many citizens to call on the Indian Prime Minister to take these statements into account. **“Trump”** mentioned poor air quality in India in justifying withdrawal from the Paris climate change agreement, stressing that he had saved trillions of dollars by his decision not to join due to not treating the United States fairly. India's social media has topped **“hash tags”** condemning "Trump" statements such as **“Howdy Modi”** to denounce **“Trump”** and confirm their insult^(xxxvi).

4)

Pledges to curb Chinese influence: The candidates' election campaigns were not without pledges to support India in its clash with China, which reached the point of border clashes in the Ladakh border region, where the US Secretary of State pledged to strongly support India and engage in the confrontation. **“Biden”** expressed his readiness to support India in curbing **“Chinese expansion”**, as part of the policy of closer relations with allies, and building confidence that was cracked during the term of **“Trump”**. **“Biden”** has also stressed that Beijing will not get away with it if it threatens its neighbors in Asia.

5)

Confronting common threats: President **“Biden”** pledged to work with Washington's allies in Asia, with India at the top, in the face of common threats, especially those related to **(combating terrorism)**, as he confirmed that he would adopt a **(policy of zero tolerance for supporting terrorism in South Asia)**, in an **“implicit reference to New Delhi's accusations against Pakistan”**. **“Biden”** also appears **“less enthusiastic than Trump regarding the complete withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan”**, which is one of the main points of contention between the **“Trump administration and India”**^(xxxvii).

6)

The influence and influence of the **(Indian Lobby in Washington)** increased after the US President **(Trump)** assumed the presidency, as the Indian Lobby succeeded in inducing Washington to replace Pakistan with India as its main ally in South Asia, and the United States supported the government of India in an attempt to **(nullify Chinese influence in Pakistan and South Asia)**. In 2018, the White House suspended \$ 2 billion in military aid to Pakistan, while at the same time supporting India with economic and military partnerships. At a time when India has become a partner with Washington, Pakistan finds itself paired with its ally China. To disrupt the economic corridor, United States of America continues to create and support discord in the **“Pakistani province of Baluchistan”**, which is at the center of the **“China-Pakistan economic corridor”**.

7)

Many Chinese and Pakistani analysts, politicians, and military officers agreed that the **(influence of the Indian lobby in Washington is mainly aimed at stopping Chinese influence in South Asia)**, as the US-Indian relationship is striving to undermine the **(Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan and the Chinese Economic Corridor)**. Hence, terrorist groups are active in the **(Baluchistan)** region in Pakistan, which mainly aims to strike **(Chinese projects)**, with Chinese and Pakistani accusations of spreading India's activity and financing terrorist groups stationed in Baluchistan, such as the **"Balochistan Liberation Army" (BLA)**, to sabotage Pakistan and the Chinese corridor project, in cooperation between the **"US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Indian Research and Analysis Wing "Indian Intelligence" (RAW)**, take part jointly in the Balochistan project to strike at China's interests and projects in Pakistan^(xxviii).

In conclusion, despite **"Biden's assurances of his intention to rapprochement with India"**, there are clear points of discrepancy between **"Biden"** and Prime Minister **"Modi"** with regard to the latter's national policies, and the BJP's handling of religious minorities issues, in addition to concerns about **"Biden's direction of rapprochement with China"** after a comprehensive deal between the two countries, which later affects the balances in South Asia. *On the other hand*, the differences with the **"Trump administration"** over issues of **(immigration, trade, energy security and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan)**, all of these indications further limit the Indian preferences in the US presidential race, so that they await the outcome of the elections while preparing to deal with the new reality.

2. Different facets of terrorism and fundamentalism tide in India, South and Southeast Asia, and Pakistan: Map of the spread of (terrorist groups)

Fundamentalism Tide means a **"strict adherence to or interpretation of a doctrine, set of principles, etc., as of a social, legal, political, or religious group or system"** ^(xxix). Both **(New Delhi and Islam Abad)** ban dozens of armed groups, and fundamentalists' terrorist militants. Generally, the Indian subcontinent is one of the most turbulent regions in Southeast Asia. As it witnesses a wide and complex spread of violent and terrorist activities that feed on its multiple Ethnic and religious tendencies and components, as well as **(ideological conflicts based on economic and social grievances)**, as this activity is known with its support from other regional powers, and India in turn is experiencing violent activity that traces its roots back to the period after India's independence from Britain in 1947. The atmosphere of great unrest in post-independence India led to wars between New Delhi and some of its neighbors. Where there have been **(three major wars between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and East Pakistan)"Bangladesh"**, while India entered into a military war with China in 1962, a war that fought over the borders between the two countries⁽⁶¹⁾.

During the period, from the 1950s to the end of the 1970s, India witnessed limited activity by local armed groups, which are groups that are motivated by different **(Religious or left-wing)** ideologies, and it seeks to establish separate states from India, but with the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, **(New Delhi witnessed an unusual growth in the number of armed organizations)** that spread throughout India, which resulted in the escalation of sectarian violence in the country in the eighties, and the outbreak of widespread riots. India succeeded in controlling the riots and terrorist operations began to decline since the mid-nineties, until the **“Bombay attacks”** in 2008 were the most prominent in the country's history during the past two decades, a clear message for the continuation of violence in the country, despite the authorities' success in calming the situation, terrorist operations in the country are still frequent and exacerbation, as the number of armed organizations increases as a result of the multiple defections within each organization^(li).

This research paper seeks to identify the **“multiple facets of terrorism: the map of the spread of terrorist groups in India and Pakistan”**, to read the history of banned groups in India, according to the Indian government's lists of up to 40 organizations, while addressing the most prominent references of those organizations, their motives, the reasons for their emergence and their spread, while tracing Map of their spread and their connections; Domestic and overseas. Then we analyze the role of the United States in the **(security alliance with India to combat religious fundamentalism, terrorist movements and extremism)**, while discussing the impact of this on the **“Chinese position and China's interests”** through its **(Belt and Road)** initiative and China's huge project in the Pakistani **(Gwadar Port)**, and China's position on these movements Fundamentalism, especially in Pakistan, and even research and analysis of the position of America and India on the Chinese presence in the region^(lii). **Here, the Egyptian researcher will divide the Map of the spread of (terrorist groups in both India and Pakistan), and their negative impacts on the South and South East Asia to the following:**

2.1 Banned Terrorism Fundamentalism armed groups in Pakistan

Islamabad launched a campaign against **(banned groups)** and arrested dozens. As, there are **(67 banned groups in Pakistan)**, some are **(armed and some charitable)**, which are being accused of **(involvement in financing terrorism)**. In 2002, Islamabad classified the **“Army of Islam”** a terrorist group and banned it in the country.

In the wake of the escalation of tension between India and Pakistan in March 2019, Pakistan is working to tighten the screws on a number of banned armed groups, which are involved in **(terrorist acts in the border region with New Delhi)**^(liii). Here we can observe the most important **(centers of proliferation and groupings of fundamentalist and terrorist groups)** in Pakistan, and their most important leaders and goals, **as follows:**

- Among the most prominent of these banned groups in Pakistan, are:

1- **Lashkar-e-Taiba... the other side of the terrorist group that exercises its duties in Pakistan under the pretext of "charitable work":** it is one of the most dangerous terrorist groups targeting the **(Kashmir region administered by India)**, as this terrorist group and its fighters are active in the northern part of Kashmir. The Lashkar-e-Taiba, known as: **(LeT Group)** was established in 1990 from a former engineering professor at the University of Punjab in Pakistan **(Hafiz Muhammad Saied)**, and was one of the most prominent armed groups operating in Pakistani territory, and it was alleged to send fighters across the Line of Control to the Indian-administered Kashmir region. According to **"Indian security forces' data"**, the group has the **(largest presence of fighters in India-administered Kashmir)**, with 129 active fighters. The danger of **(Lashkar-e-Taiba)** in Pakistan is that it carried out a **(series of attacks against Indian security forces)** when the Kashmiri armed movement began to escalate in the early 1990s, and in 2008, India blamed the **(Taiba group)** for the **"Mumbai attacks"** that It took place on December 7, 2008, which targeted **(195 killing people and wounding 327 Indians)**, when gunmen stormed hotels and a railway station, and India and the United States openly accused **(Hafiz Muhammad Saied)** founder of **(Lashkar-e-Taiba)** in Pakistan of being the **"mastermind of the attack against Indian targets"**. This prompted the **"United States to set a reward of \$ 10 million for his arrest"**, along with his group **(also listed as armed terrorist groups banned by the United Nations)**. After 9 years of violent attacks, the Pakistani authorities released the cleric **(Hafiz Saied)**, although they say that they have taken steps to control **(Lashkar-e-Taiba)**, but the charitable wings of the group - **The Da'awa Group and the Falah Humanitarian Foundation** - accuse it of continuing to work freely in all **(Hafez Saied)** denies the existence of any link between the **(Dawa group he heads and the banned "Lashkar Taiba" group)**, even though he is the head of the **(Da'awa group)**, and **(Hafez Abdul Raouf)** who is the head of the **(Falah Humanitarian Foundation)**, he is also A man is wanted because of his alleged work with the **"Lashkar-e-Taiba" group**^(liv).

2- **"Da'awa group" / Jamaat Al-Da'awa:** The group is led by **"Hafiz Muhammad Saied"**, a former lecturer at the University of Engineering and Technology in Lahore, Pakistan, and one of the most wanted persons in India. This group is classified as the latest version of the **"Lashkar-e-Taiba"** group as we have previously mentioned, which has participated in several attacks on the **"Indian army in Jammu and Kashmir"**.

While the founder of the movement, **"Hafez Saied"**, says that the **"Dawa group cares about the Islamic welfare"**, Washington believes that the **(Da'awa group is nothing but a front for the Lashkar organization)**. Therefore, Pakistan re-imposed the ban on the two Islamic societies linked to **(Hafez Saied)** following the attack against the Indian army forces on February 14, 2019, and **"confiscated the assets and funds of the terrorist preacher wanted by Washington"**, whose house arrest was lifted in 2018^(liv).

Notifying that **"Hafiz Saied"** has been under house arrest since January 2016, claiming that **(The instructions of arresting "Hafiz Saied" came on from US former President "Trump")**.

More recently, The **“Da’awa Group”** participated in the general elections in Pakistan in 2018 under the banner of the **“Melli Islamic League”** and the **(Mamalis Muslim League)**, but it was unable to get any seats, as the group tried to enter the political arena and launch a political party called the **“Islamic Millie League” (MML)**. The party was not allowed to register in the 2018 elections, but its candidates ran as independents across the country, but did not win any seats^(klvi).

3- The “Army of Muhammad group” / Jaish Muhammad / (Muhammad Military) “JeM”: Founded by **“Maulana Masoud Al-Azhar”** in the late 1990s, He is as well a former member of the **“Mujahedeen Movement”** and is **“classified as a “terrorist” from the United States, with international demands to place him on the terrorist list of the United Nations Security Council”**, as they are believing that **“Azhar” has links with “Al-Qaeda” and his group is involved in sending fighters to Afghanistan to fight US-led coalition forces”**. Additionally, this group has been also accused of **“working against Indian forces”** in the disputed Himalayan Valley. The group belongs to the Deobandi School the **(largest Arab religious institute for Hanaf in India)**. In 2000, the Army of Muhammad (JeM) claimed responsibility for most of the **“high-profile attacks in Kashmir and on targets elsewhere in India”**. More recently, the Pakistan-based group that runs a **“network of religious institutes”** there has also been the focus of Indian claims that its neighbor is **“sponsoring attacks on Indian soil”**, although India placed the founder of this militant **“Maulana Masoud Al-Azhar”** on its terrorist list, but today it has not been able to include his name on the international lists^(klvii).

The **“Army of Muhammad group”** has been involved in several high-profile suicide attacks and other attacks against Indian targets since its formation, including the 2001 attack on the **“Indian Parliament in New Delhi and on the Legislative Assembly in India-administered Kashmir”**, as its name was linked to the 2016 **“Uri attack”**, which killed at least **(23 people are at a camp for Indian security forces in Indian-administered Kashmir)**, and the **“Pathankot attack on the Indian air base”** earlier of 2016, killing at least **(8 people in a raid on the Indian Air Force)**^(klviii). On 14 February 2019, the **“Army of Muhammad group”** claimed responsibility for the **“Pulwama attack”**, as an Indian Military Police bus carrying security personnel on the **“Jammu Srinaker highway”** was attacked by a suicide bomber driving a car. This was the **“spark of the last military clash between the two neighboring countries, India and Pakistan”**, which have been fighting over sovereignty over the divided **“Kashmir region”** between them since 1947, and after this attack, the Pakistani government announced that **“it had captured a huge compound of Muhammad’s army in the city of Bahawalpur in the center of the country”**. Days later, the Pakistani foreign minister said that **“The head of the armed group, Masoud Al-Azhar, was locating in the Pakistani lands not existing at all at India as some parts are claiming”**, but he did not provide further details^(klx).

4- Mobilizing the Pakistan Taliban: Founded in 2017 by **“Baitullah Mehsud”**, it is a conglomerate of several militant groups working against the Pakistani security forces, and the

group is currently led by “**Mullah Fadlallah**”, who is reported to be residing in Afghanistan. The Pakistani army launched a “**large-scale offensive against the group**”, disbanding its forces in its stronghold in North Waziristan tribal region⁽ⁱ⁾.

5- Baluchistan Liberation Army: A secular militant Baloch group that has long been fighting for autonomy in the southwestern province of Baluchistan, which the group believes was forcibly integrated into Pakistan in 1947. And “**Pakistan accuses India of sponsoring this group, which New Delhi denies**”⁽ⁱⁱ⁾.

6- The other banned groups in Pakistan , include⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾:

- The “**Sibah Companions**” of Pakistan (known collectively as the Sunnis and the Jamaa)
- The movements of Jafari Pakistan
- The Baluchi Republican Army
- Al-Qaeda and ISIS
- Hizb Al-Tahrir
- The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
- The Work Committee for Shiite Students
- The Jund Allah Group, and
- Al-Rahma Charitable Society Organization
- The Association of Dangers
- The Free and the Al-Ansar Groups

Based on the previous classification of the map of the most important fundamentalist and terrorist groups in Pakistan, and the (overlap between them and India), through a number of these terrorist militias in Pakistan carrying out many terrorist operations against New Delhi, targeting their interests, we can note the following recent developments:

A. In the most recent developments, in March 2019, the (**Pakistani security forces**) launched a massive security campaign against a number of banned groups, within the framework of the (**Pakistani National Action Plan to Combat Terrorism**), with the aim of eradicating militancy from the country⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾.

B. As a result, Pakistani forces arrested dozens of those belonging to those groups, including the brother and son of the leader of the “**Army of Islam**” group, “**Maulana Masoud Azhar**”, whom New Delhi accuses of being involved in the terrorist attack, which targeted in February 2019 the (**Indian security camp in Pulwama district**). The attack, which took place in the Indian-controlled region of the disputed Kashmir region with Pakistan, resulted in the killing of more than (**40 Indian soldiers, and wounding 20 others**).

C. Accordingly, (**Islamabad has frozen the assets of dozens of members of banned groups, and individuals who were listed on the United Nations Security Council sanctions lists**).

D. In February 2019, the Pakistani government took control of a **(religious school in the city of Bahawalpur)**, in the northeast of the country, and it was reported to be used as a **(headquarters for the organization of the Army of Islam)**.

E. In the beginning of February 2019, Islamabad also banned the **“Falah Humanitarian Foundation”**, a charitable organization established by the **“Jamaat Al-Da’awa”**.

F. India accused the **“Pakistan Da’awa Group”** of being behind the terrorist attack which killed **(150 Indians in Mumbai)** in 2009.

G. In June 2018, the **“Financial Action Task Force”**, it’s a **(quasi-governmental organization based in Paris)** placed Pakistan on the **(list of countries believed to finance terrorism)^(iv)**.

2.2 The most prominent armed terrorist groups in “Jammu and Kashmir” and Pakistan and its impact and concentrations in India

India has banned dozens of armed groups, including **(Islamic, Hindus and Sikh groups)**. Both **(New Delhi and Islamabad share a single view of a number of armed groups)**, such as: the **“Army of Islam, Al Qaeda and ISIS”**, which are banned in both countries, but the change here, is that they differ in their perceptions of other groups. *For example*, New Delhi classifies the **“Mujahedeen Party”** as a terrorist group, while Islamabad considers it as a **“fighting group for independence from Indian rule”** in the Himalayan Valley region of Kashmir **(disputed with Pakistan)**. According to the **(Pakistani Ministry of Interior)**, there are **(67 banned groups)** in the country, some of which are already armed groups, while others are classified as **“charitable organizations”** that are involved in financing terrorist groups^(v). Here we can observe the most important **(gathering centers of fundamentalist and terrorist groups in India)**, and the extent of their overlap with the armed Pakistani militias, and their most important leaders and goals, *through the following*:

1- **The Islamic Students Movement in India**: It was established in the state of Uttar Pradesh, northern India, on April 25, 1977, by **“Muhammad Ahmadullah Siddiqui”** who was working as a professor of journalism and public relations at Western Illinois University. The movement was banned in 2001 under the **“Anti-Terrorism Act”(BOTA)** on charges of committing anti-state activities. In 2008, the ban was briefly lifted by a special court, but it was later reimposed. In January of this year, the Indian government banned the movement for five years under the **“Illegal Prevention Act”**, and the Indian officials said that the movement **“engages in acts harmful to the security of the country”^(vi)**.

2- **The Mujahedeen Party**: It is the largest indigenous rebel group in Jammu and Kashmir, and was established in 1989 by **“Muhammad Ahsan Dar”**, a former militant leader. The party, which is more inclined towards the accession of **(Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan)**, affirms that it **“will accept whatever decision the people make when they are given the option to choose the right to self-determination”**. In the past, the Mujahedeen Party has carried out hundreds of attacks against **“Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir”**. The party is currently headed

by the Kashmiri citizen **“Syed Muhammad Yusuf Shah”**, popularly known as **“Syed Salahuddin”**, who is currently residing in **“Muzaffarabad in Azad Jammu and Kashmir”** in the **(Pakistan-controlled part of the region)**^(vii).

3- **Babar Khalsa International Organization:** The organization is the oldest and most prominent Sikh organization in India. Babar Khalsa International calls for the formation of an **“independent Sikh state called Khalistan”**. Both **“Talwinder Singh Parmar and Sukhdev Singh Babar”** are the founding members of this organization. The organization was responsible for several attacks in India, and therefore, in 2018, the **“United States placed the organization on the list of separatist movements that pose a threat to US interests abroad”**^(viii).

4- **The Garo National Liberation Army:** The National Liberation Army was formed in 2009 by an Indian police officer named **“Pakshara Sangma”**, in order to achieve sovereignty for the **“Garuland region”** in the western regions of **“Meghalaya State”**, northeastern India. The **“Garo National Liberation Army”** participated in several cases of killing and kidnapping in the three **“Garo Hills”** districts of the state, and accordingly it was designated a terrorist organization by the Indian government. In February 2018, **“Suhan Shira”**, who was leading the **“Garu army”**, was shot dead. This represented a heavy blow to the group.

5- According to the **(Indian National Investigation Agency)**, other banned terrorist organizations, *include*^(ix):

- Lashkar-e-Taiba
- Muhammad's Army
- Al-Qaeda
- The Indian Communist Army the **(Maist)**
- The Indian Mujahedeen Movement
- The National Socialist Council of Nagaland
- the Mujahedeen Movement, and **ISIS**

Thus, As a result of continuing terrorist operations; India includes about (40 armed groups on the lists of banned organizations) in the country, as a result of their participation in acts of violence. They are historical or new groups of multiple **(religious, ethnic, ideological, and left-wing)** references, some of which are based in India, and some are regional residing in some other cross-border neighboring countries.

3. The impact of (Chinese Silk and Road strategy) to build (Economic Corridor “CPEC” and Gwadar Port) in Pakistan to control the area of (marine lines) on the American influence and Indian policies against the (Pakistani fundamentalist movements tide)

China carried out the construction both of **(Gwadar Port and Economic Corridor “CPEC”)** in an exceptionally sensitive Pakistani site, in order to make the **(Chinese Belt and Road successful Initiative)**, and for China to also gain a foothold in the field of controlling **(maritime lines)** in South and Southeast Asia, and also to be able to subject India to control. Thus, China, with

Pakistani support, succeeded in **(neutralizing India)** by land and sea. In addition, China has assisted the **(State of Pakistan)** and turned it into a **(nuclear-armed country)** to stand against India and protect its interests in the region in the face of **(American influence)**. In addition, China's move to build ports and lay oil pipelines, and to build roads in **(Myanmar)** as well, is no less important. Above all, the **(port of Hambantota)**, which was built with Chinese aid in **(Sri Lanka)**, which is practically a cut-off part of the **(Indian continental bloc)**, is not a carefully thought-out implementation of the **"pearl chain strategy"** for **(China's strategy to encircle India)** across the Indian Ocean, against the **(American penetration)** in the region^(ix)

The Egyptian researcher will divide this section into (three parts), explaining and analyzing the paths of relations between "New Delhi and Washington" on the one hand, and "Beijing's relations with Islamabad" on the other hand, and in particular, analyze the mutual accusations between all regional and international parties with (sponsorship and support the fundamentalist tide in the region of Kashmir and South Asia, and on the Indian-Pakistani borders), and Pakistan's explicit accusation of India's support of some (hard-line fundamentalist groups to strike Chinese interests, the economic corridor and the Chinese port of Gwadar within the framework of its Belt and Road initiative). The researcher will focus on following the following paths:

3.1 The US heading (east expansion towards India to contain China), which known as "China's Containment", and the (Chinese response) in defense of its interests in the (Belt and Road Initiative)

In that atmosphere of the conflict between China and the USA in the Asian region, the documents of the **(ruling Communist Party of China)** classified the **(United States as a "true enemy" of China)**. A Chinese document dating back to 1992 says: **"The United States of America, since its transformation into a single superpower, has been working hard to achieve new hegemony and prevail over power politics - all this in light of its entry into a phase of relative decline and the emergence of the limits of its capabilities"**^(xi).

The researcher will try here to analyze and trace the course of US-Indian policies and plans to curb the **(Chinese-Pakistani influence, the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and its projects in the region)**, focusing on the most important **(current strategies of the Chinese response with the assumption of a new era by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2012)**, *Through the following tracks:*

1- In 1995, the Chinese president **"Jiang Zeming"** declared that **"the hostile forces of the West did not give up a minute from their plans to Westernize and divide our country"**, while

his foreign minister declared, prior to the annual meeting of the (ASEAN alliance) in the same year, saying that: **"The United States must abandon its view of itself as the savior of the East"**. Adding, **"We do not acknowledge the intransigence of the United States to play the role of guarantor of peace and stability in Asia"**.

2- Zi Zhongwan, Director of the **"American Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences"**, confirmed that **"China expressed its doubts and concerns about the US strategy in India and South Asia"**. In her assessment of the US-Chinese relations during the 1990s, which she described as **"fragile relations"**, Zongwan said, **"The main factor here is the US position on the transformation of China into a modern, relatively strong country, although the official statements remain the same. The question that still arises is: To what degree does the American awareness allow China to be strong"**^(xii)?

3- According to Chinese professor **"Zi Zhongwan"**, she analyzed, **"America believes that China is developing by leaps and bounds and is becoming more difficult to control. In other words, the acceleration of Chinese modernization does not always seem in line with US interests"**.

4- Little by little, the Chinese leaders have been repeatedly talking about **"China's active presence in the region of South and Southeast Asia, which is close to Indian interests, Pakistan and the international arena"**, with the Chinese constant assertion that **"China's rise is a peaceful rise"**. In a report presented to the (Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party of China) in November 2002, Chinese President **"Jiang Zemin"** stated that: **"China has faced a 20-year period of strategic opportunities that would allow the country to formulate and adopt a moderate and pragmatic international strategy, focuses on local development"**^(xiii).

5- The jewel of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects is the **(China-Pakistan Economic Corridor for Gwadar Port in Pakistan)**. It is a huge project that includes many **(Chinese economic and infrastructure projects throughout Pakistan)**, and the main points of the corridor include a network of railways and oil and gas pipelines, linking the two countries, with a length of 3000 km, at a cost of \$ 62 billion, in addition to new renewable energy projects. Once the corridor was announced, it began **(transformation in regional alliances)**, as **(India initially opposed the corridor project and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and its extension in Pakistan, as an India's enemy)**, despite China's request for India's participation in the **(Belt and Road Initiative)**, and China repeated its request to India on several occasions^(xiv).

6- Chinese and American calculations also influence the thinking of neighboring countries; for example, China has always taken a **(stand in support of Iran)**. In fact, after Iran was subjected to international sanctions in 2006 over its nuclear program, China was **(Iran's main ally in breaking the sanctions)**. Thus, **(Iran does not view Chinese influence in Pakistan and Afghanistan with suspicion vision as India does as an ally of Washington)**. Here, we can notify the impact of the American planning to disrupt the **(Chinese-Pakistani economic corridor of Gwadar Port)** through the alliance with India on the growing **(tide of fundamentalist and armed terrorist movements)** in the Kashmir region and the Indian border

7- China is currently engaged in unprecedented **(close bilateral cooperation with Pakistan in various fields)**, China is trying to show, from the **(domestic, regional, and international**

political) perspective, its willingness to continue strengthening relations with Pakistan. And some Asian regional powers, such as: **(Iran, Central Asia, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Cambodia)** and others, assuming to take a positive attitude towards **(responsibility for maintaining regional order in Afghanistan and Pakistan)**^(xv).

8- Consequently, Sino-Pakistani relations in the foreseeable future, as well as the **(expansion of Chinese influence in Central and South Asia)** will develop further with China adopting the “one belt, one road” initiative, gradually replacing the United States, which dominates the status quo.

9- After his rise to power in 2012, Chinese President “Xi Jinping” made “**major adjustments to China's international strategy**”. China is no longer ready to play a negative and low-level role, but rather **(China has sought, according to the strategy of Chinese President “Xi Jinping”, to assume a great power position in proportion to its own strength that can affect the international system)**. With the current situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, China is trying to assume responsibility for **(filling the power vacuum in a way that is acceptable to all parties concerned)**^(xvi).

10- China and the United States are aware that Pakistan is trying to have a “**long-term influence on the regime in Afghanistan**”, and are also aware that **(Pakistan seeks to use its influence over the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other Islamic militants to achieve political, military and economic gains from the West)**. However, China and the United States have very different expectations. For this last reason, the **(American withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2019 without threat of Pakistani blackmail, while preserving stability in Central Asia and containing the spread of “Islamic militancy” is an ideal outcome for all parties in the region)**^(xvii).

11- From the Chinese point of view, each of **(Afghanistan and Pakistan is a geographic center between Central and South Asia, which represents a strategic location for the development of “One Belt... One Road”)**, as well as being the road to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea away from India.

12- More importantly, the **(Chinese government can use its influence in Pakistan and Afghanistan to contain the spread of what it deems “Islamic militancy” in “Xinjiang”, which has an Islamic concentration in China)**. This shows that China and the United States have an interest in allowing China to “**participate in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and restrict Pakistan's maneuvers there in order to ensure its interests**”^(xviii).

Through the previous presentation and understanding, the Egyptian researcher concluded that, to understand the vision of China and the United States towards Pakistan from the point of view of international politics, we should highly understand the following aspects:

A. One must take into account the **(intertwining relations between Pakistan and the United States, India and even China itself)**.

B. *From my personal point of view*, according to the findings of the analysis, it is necessary here to **(improve the Chinese role in addition to the American role to prevent the spread of terrorism, extremism and fundamentalism in the surrounding region to Pakistan and India)**.

C. This trend reflects the American concern, because **(if American efforts to rebuild order in Afghanistan are not preserved, there will be a power vacuum in Afghanistan)**, which could lead to the seizure of political power by the **(Taliban, the Islamic State, or even pro-Pakistan militants)**, which may cause **(turmoil and instability in the interests of India and Washington itself)**.

D. Therefore, if **(China can participate effectively in bearing the burden with the United States and exerting pressure on Pakistan)**, then this may be sufficient to achieve **(stabilize the current political situation in Afghanistan and prevent the spread of terrorist movements in Kashmir and prevent Chinese interests in Pakistan from being hit by the Islamic terrorists militants)**.

3.2 The United States' strategy to encircle the **(Chinese rise) in Asia and the State of India and to weaken the (China-Pakistan partnership) and the (Chinese Belt and Road) initiative**

The **(American strategic interest in East Asia and India)** predates the current stage in which there is much talk about this “**shift**” in US foreign policy since the time of **(President Barack Obama)** and it increased in strength during the rule of former President **(Donald Trump)**, because this trend has witnessed greater momentum in custody. When the researcher tries to^{lxix} understand and follow **(Washington's mechanisms to restrict Chinese influence in Pakistan and Southeast Asia and the Chinese response to Washington's attempts)**. We can here understand all the following policies and paths between all the previous parties:

1- The American administration considers the **(South China Sea)** and its surrounding areas of influence allied to Washington, such as **(the State of India)** as a fundamental national interest, has launched the so-called **(Asia axis)**, which **(transforms the US policy towards China from a constructive policy broadly, on common commercial interests, as well as others aimed at containing the rise of China)**^{lxx}.

2- Therefore, **(President Obama and then President Trump)** trips - accompanied by heavy American and India media coverage to Southeast Asia and India - was a good indication of **(Washington's intention to surround and isolate China)** through its regional allies in the region, such as: **(Pakistan and Iran)**, chiefly the “**American alliance with India**”^{lxxi}.

3- Given the enormous “**material and human potential and capabilities**” that China possesses, and its relentless pursuit of “**China's comprehensive and ambitious development plans**”, it has been seen as the potential competitor that will challenge the United States in the new century. With the early years of the third millennium, this “**Chinese challenge**” was no longer just a possibility. Rather, it became a reality in many areas, according to what the facts reveal, as the “**yellow giant**” was able to displace the United States and occupy the top instead in terms of economic growth, production and export figures. And a block of monetary reserves and even in the position of the number one trading partner for a number of traditional Washington allies^{lxxii}

.This prompted the **(American decision-making circles to pay greater attention to Asia in general and southeastern Asia in particular)**, as China aspires to be the “upper hand” there, which was expressed in the United States by the policy of “eastward direction” and “**American attempt to rebalance of East Asia and the Pacific regions against the Chinese expansion**”^(xxiii).

4- According to what was stated by the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan (**Sun Weidong**), in an interview, on June 24, 2016, with (**Xinhua News Agency**); he confirmed that “the current achievements of the cooperation projects between China and Pakistan focus on four areas”: **(energy and infrastructure projects, transportation, Gwadar port, and industrial cooperation)**. Major energy projects include (construction of a solar power plant) by the Chinese company (**Zunergy**); Work has already started on more than **(half of the remaining 16 planned energy projects)**.

5- In terms of transportation infrastructure, the Pakistani Highway (**KKH**) business is being rebuilt and developed inside Pakistan, and in March 2016 construction of the (**Karachi-Lahore highway began with the help of China**). With regard to (**Development of Gwadar Port**), on January 11, 2015, Pakistan handed over more than 280 hectares of (**Pakistani land use rights to a Chinese company for forty-three years**), and construction of new facilities has already begun^(xxiv).

.Chinese enterprises in Pakistan established under the (**China-Pakistan Economic Corridor initiative already employ more than 6000 Pakistani workers**); Evidence that the close relationship between China and Pakistan has already moved from the (**policy announcement to the project implementation phase**); As the amount of money disbursed, the depth of exchange, and the number of participants is unprecedented in the relations of the two countries^(xxv).

6- It is also important to note thatthe (**relationship between China and Pakistan is not without some problems**), such as:

A. **First:** The Chinese government has doubts that what it describes as the “**fundamentalists terrorists of Chinese Uighurs ay Xinjiang**”, they were “**setting off from Pakistan and running training camps for them in the country**”, and that these were directly related to the “**violence incidents**” that occurred in “**Xinjiang**” (East Turkestan).

B. **Second:** Fundamentalism has spread rapidly in recent years in the (**Muslim “Xinjiang” region in northwest China**). Where there were a large number of attacks. As a result, the (**Chinese government is very interested in Pakistan's readiness, ability and determination to combat what it describes as “Islamic terrorism”**).

C. **Third:** China is also concerned about the (**continued failure of the United States to rebuild a successful political system in Afghanistan, especially the ambiguous role that Pakistan played in Afghanistan**); Pakistan was (**supporting ostensibly the political system built by the US-led coalition, but also surreptitiously supporting the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda**).

D. **Fourth:** Therefore, China recently expressed its desire to (**participate in the peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban movement**), and this means that (**due to the strong influence of China on Pakistan, it may be better qualified than the United States to**

play the role of mediator in achieving peace in Afghanistan), This is what the (United States of America and its ally India strongly reject), so as not to (upset the balance in the region in favor of Pakistan and China)^(xxvi).

7- Ostensibly, (India as an ally to the USA in the Asian region to counter the Chinese influence confirms that its "rejection of the Belt and Road project" is due to its passage in the Pakistani regions of Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan), as India confirms its ownership of these areas^(xxvii). In fact, Indian rejection of the project is due to other (four reasons), namely:

A. **First:** The success of the corridor would (strengthen China's position as a regional hegemon, and indeed a great power), and this (harms the standing of the United States, an ally of India).

B. **Second:** If the project is successful, Pakistan - India's historic rival - will become a "stronger and more stable regional and economic actor", and this may harm the Indian benefits and allies in the region.

C. **Third:** This project does not bother India alone, but also America, as the United States considers the Chinese project in Pakistan a great (threat to its hegemony and its status as a great power) in the Asian region.

D. **Fourth:** We find that China's primary goal is to (take advantage of the deep port of Gwadar, strategically located in Pakistan, in order to secure the energy field). Thus, both projects bring a strategic and economic advantage to Pakistan and China, and this may harm the (American existence) in the Asian region and India^(xxviii).

8- *Hence, we conclude that there is, therefore,* competition between two divergent trends, namely: (China's ambition to enhance its regional and international role in proportion to the growth of its capabilities, especially the economic, and the United States' endeavor to preserve its interests and its position as well). And since the (geopolitical field) in which many of the interests of the American and Chinese sides revolve is the same, especially in the areas surrounding the countries of India, Pakistan and South Asia, dealing with the (conflict of interests and their contradiction between China and the United States) between them seems open to various possibilities, such as:

A) Starting with the possibility of (coexistence and an attempt to settle differences) between Washington and Beijing.

B) Through the possibility of (coordination and partnership) between the two parties.

C) And up to the (escalation and direct confrontation) between (China and its allies) in the Asian region, such as: (Pakistan, Iran, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia), the (United States of America and its allies) in the Asian region, on top of them is (India and the surrounding powers)^(xxix).

According to the mentioned analysis, the Egyptian researcher can briefly summarize and conclude this part, though understanding the extent of the (importance of Pakistan to China), because Pakistan has an important role for China in (ensuring a stable regional order in Central and South Asia and preventing the spread of "terrorism" to China), especially in the

Muslim region of “Xinjiang”, which is what Beijing assumes great importance in its relations and its focus in Southeast Asia, despite the concern that this represents to both India and the United States of America.

3.3 Indicators on the growing (tide of fundamentalist and armed terrorist movements) in the Kashmir region and the Indian border: Analyzing of the American plans and policies in partnership with India to weaken Chinese influence and extend the “Belt and Road Initiative” across Pakistan within (Economic Corridor “CPEC” and Gwadar Port)

Recently, especially after (Trump assumed the presidency) in 2016, America replaced Pakistan (the state of India as Washington's main ally in South Asia, and it supported India in an attempt to nullify Chinese influence). In 2018, the White House suspended \$ 2 billion from (military aid to Pakistan), while the (United States simultaneously supported India with economic and military partnerships). At a time when (India and Afghanistan have become a partner with America, Pakistan finds itself paired with its iron ally China)^(xxx). *The American plans to weaken the Chinese influence in Pakistan and India are represented by:*

- 1- To disrupt the economic corridor, Pakistan accuses the United States of continuing to create and (support the dispute in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, which is located at the heart of the Gwadar Corridor) in Pakistan.
- 2- For example, in July 2016, America added the (Liberal Group) to its terrorist list) - which is an armed Islamic faction that has split from the Pakistan Taliban movement, which aims to implement Islamic law in Pakistan - and from time to time adopts attacks against religious minorities and government institutions. This raised the (concern of both China and Pakistan), as the targeting of the White House of (several terrorist organizations along the Afghan-Pakistani borders), led to an “increase in the spread of terrorism in Pakistan”^(xxxi).
- 3- According to the “Chinese and Pakistani vision”, the repetition of this trend and the American move to include terrorist groups on its list of terrorism, led to (many terrorists fleeing to Baluchistan region), due to the ongoing Pakistani military operations in the tribal areas under the neighboring federal administration.
- 4- Once the USA has declared “Al-Ahrar as a terrorist group” in July 2016, the (group's attacks in Baluchistan) spread, killing 135 people, most of them in Quetta region between August and September 2016.
- 5- Here, analysts confirm, that it is not known whether this effort by America to damage the corridor was deliberate or not?, But the result was expected. Here (many Chinese and Pakistani analysts, politicians, and military officers agree with the prominent Pakistani politician “Balwasha Khan”), who said that the “US-Indian relationship is striving to undermine the Chinese initiative and the corridor”^(xxxii).
- 6- Here the Pakistani and Chinese vision confirms that “although the (terrorist groups in Baluchistan) have calmed down, they openly accuse that the spread of India's activity and the financing of terrorist groups stationed in Baluchistan”, such as the “Baluchistan Liberation

Army" (BLA), continue to sabotage Pakistan and the project The Chinese Gwadar Corridor is continuing, in cooperation with the "American Central Intelligence Agency" (CIA) and the "Indian Research and Analysis Wing" (RAW) jointly in the "Baluchistan Project" to strike at Pakistani interests.

7- There are many accusations by the **"Pakistani Intelligence Agency" (ISI)** for both India and Washington of causing the **"spread of terrorist groups to strike the of Pakistan and Chinese interests"**^(xxxiii).

8- In 2016, **"Nizar Baloch"**, who is the **"Chairman of the Baloch Liberation Front supported by the Indian Research and Analysis Wing"**, stated publicly that **"he welcomed all India's aid and promised more attacks on the Chinese Gwadar Corridor in Pakistan"**.

9- Pakistan accused the **"Indian wing, through its agents, of organizing many killings of Chinese engineers in the Baluchistan region"**, and these operations were organized on (Chinese workers in the corridor intentionally to isolate China from Pakistan).

10- Also (Pakistan's accusations against India and the United States of supporting terrorism against China's interests in the Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan) continued. For example, in November 2018, the (Chinese consulate in Karachi was attacked by the Baluchistan Liberation Army), and after the investigation, **"Amir Sheikh"**, the Inspector General of Police, has informed the press and the public that the **"attack in Afghanistan was planned by the mastermind of the terrorist Liberation Army with the support of the Indian Research and Analysis Wing"**^(xxxiv).

11- And there are analysts who confirm that both the (United States and India have sought to strengthen relations with Afghanistan, which is neighboring Baluchistan, and have become close friends at the expense of Pakistan). Perhaps the main reason cited by analysts for this is (New Delhi and Washington continuing to pressure Pakistan between pro-India Afghanistan and India that is already hostile to Pakistan).

12- Moreover, Pakistani side accuses India of using the lands of Afghanistan to finance and train (Baloch dissidents from Pakistan). Here, the American analyst **"Webster Tarpley"** confirms this, pointing out that the **"Indian Research and Analysis Wing is recruiting terrorists from Afghanistan, to help them engage in terrorism inside Pakistan and to strike Chinese influence there in favor of Washington"**^(xxxv).

13- In March 2016, the **"Pakistani Intelligence Agency" (ISI)** revealed the **"arrest of a spy working for the "Indian Research and Analysis Wing", called "Kolboshan Badav", who admitted in a video clip that he was "an agent of the Indian wing and carried out operations to destabilize Pakistan and the Chinese corridor project in Port Gwadar", and informed the Pakistani authorities that "he was stationed in the Iranian port city of Chabahar, under the name "Mubarak Battal". With regard to the "Baloch terrorist groups", the terrorist "Kolboshan Badav" revealed that the meetings that he was organizing were aimed at knowing that the destinations and objectives of the Indian wing to "carry out various terrorist activities within Baluchistan region in order to properly hand over to and support the terrorists of any requirements they needed, under the supervision of the officials of the Indian wing"**^(xxxvi).

14- The most important thing on the Pakistani side is what the terrorist **"Kolboshan Badav"** mentioned, and he said regarding the China-Pakistan corridor project through Gwadar port, that: **"The area between Gwadar and China must be destroyed and disrupted by spreading the rebellion inside Baluchistan and the Crunchy regions"**.

15- From here, we note the **"successive accusations of China and its ally Pakistan of colluding America and India in all these and terrorist crimes and operations"** against Pakistan and China to strike **(Chinese projects for the Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan and South Asia)**. They have accused and mentioned that **"America constantly supports India's plans to cause havoc in Baluchistan and other regions of Pakistan, with the aim of their policy of isolating Pakistan from its ally China, and weakening the economic corridor project for the Chinese port of Gwadar in Pakistan"**.

16- On the other hand, we note the **(Chinese-Pakistani efforts against terrorist groups)**, accusing both India and United States of America of supporting them, as the apparent efforts made by the Pakistani army in cooperation and support of the Chinese side to protect its interests in the **(Belt and Road Chinese initiative)** led to **"striking and encircling terrorist groups in Baluchistan And the tribal areas under the federal administration of Pakistan and the normalization of the security situation"**^(xxxvii).

Hence, the researcher concludes that the successive acts of violence in Pakistan that harm along the lines of Chinese interests in the "port of Gwadar", which is the most important project for the (Belt and Road Chinese Initiative). With the accusations of China and Pakistan against India and Washington, and their responsibility for violence, fundamentalist tide and support for the "Pakistan Taliban Movement", Pakistan's first domestic enemy. But the most important thing is (China's keenness to make the Belt and Road Initiative and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects a success, and make them on the right path, and China's desire to speed up the successful completion of many corridor projects, while work continues on many other projects).

4. Reasons for China's support to Pakistan against India and the United States in (combating terrorism), and the joint Indian-American response strategies against them

Since the mid-1950s, China has endeavored to introduce some modifications to the traditional concept of **(non-interference in internal affairs)** contained in the United Nations Charter. Instead of adopting the concept of "non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries", China has adopted the concept of **"mutual non-interference in internal affairs"**, with the aim of emphasizing the withdrawal of the principle of non-interference on bilateral relations between countries, and giving the principle of non-interference a more reciprocal meaning in international relations. And not only the United Nations interfering in the internal affairs of member states, as indicated in the text of **Article (2), paragraph (7) of the United Nations Charter**. The Chinese commitment to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs has deepened, with the Chinese constitution itself incorporating this principle^(xxxviii).

Despite the increasing relative importance of China within the global system, against the backdrop of its economic and military rise, this did not follow the Chinese declaration of its freedom from commitment to the principle of non-interference, as it still declares its strong adherence to this principle. It uses the issuance of several national documents to confirm its adherence to it. However, this does not negate the preoccupation of **(the Chinese political and academic elites with the feasibility of adhering to this principle)**, not only against the backdrop of the continuing change in the global balance of power structure and the distribution of economic and military capabilities, but also against the background of **(the emergence of an expected strong Chinese need to preserve the Chinese interests that are spreading over a wide range within most regions and within a growing number of Asian and global economies)**, as well as **(the spread of Chinese investments and labor within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative with its land and sea components, especially in the economic corridor of China in Pakistan and the “Pakistani port of Gwadar” with Chinese investments)**, which imposes the need to attend Chinese security and military forces to protect these interests, especially in Pakistan and on the common borders between it and India^(xxxix). *So, the researcher will focus on the “new Chinese security rapprochement” and the main “Chinese principles to intervene for combating terrorism in outside missions”, through the following mechanisms:*

4.1 Principles and Theories of “Chinese regional and global flexibility security responsibility” to protect its growing interests

Although China has not officially announced its abandonment of the principle of **(non-interference)**, but there are many studies that have monitored indications affirming that **(China has actually diverted from this principle in practice. There are also Chinese academics who are still calling strongly for a reconsideration of this principle)**, based on the assumption that it no longer corresponds to China's position within the international system, and that it puts Chinese foreign policy in trouble, especially with the expansion of Chinese interests in the world, and that, in contrast to what adhering to this principle has achieved in sparing China great costs during previous decades, but it will not be appropriate during the coming period. They also argue that this principle is no longer compatible with the **“principle of Chinese responsibility”** as an important international power. Some Chinese academics have proposed what can be called **“creative intervention”** as an alternative to the principle of non-interference^(xc).

And some studies have argued that **(China's continued adherence to the principle of non-interference has become a “dilemma”)**, in light of the contradiction of continued adherence to this principle with a number of considerations, *the most important of which are:*

- I. The relative weight of China within the global system, on the economic and military levels, and the **“rapid growth of Chinese interests in various regions”**. In many of these regions, the **“security environment is fragile and vulnerable like Pakistan”**, so, China is trying to defend its interest in these regions.
- II. The continuous Chinese assertion that **“China is a responsible country”**, as one of the gateways used to reduce Western and regional concerns about the rise of China and respond to the **“Chinese threat theory”**. However, this **“Chinese responsibility may require intervention in some cases”^(kci)**.
- III. China issued for the first time an **“anti-terrorism law in December 2015”**, the Chinese law included an **“explicit provision permitting sending Chinese forces abroad to combat terrorism abroad”**. Article 71 of the Chinese Law stipulates that: **“After the approval of the concerned countries, and after the approval of the State Council of China, the Public Security Department of the State Council and the National Security Department, China can send personnel on counter-terrorism missions outside the country”**. Giving the right to the **“Chinese People's Liberation Army, the People's Police, and the Chinese armed forces”** to send personnel outside the country on anti-terrorism missions after the **“approval of the Central Military Commission”^(kcii)**.
- IV. In fact, **“China is exposed on some occasions to Western criticism for not supporting the policy of international intervention in necessary cases”**, as well as ignoring human rights violations in some developing countries, which contradicts - **according to many Western writings** - with the idea of a **“responsible state”**.
- V. Related to this, **“China is already seeking to play a greater role in providing public security services”**, especially in the areas of combating piracy, drug trafficking, and rescue efforts.
- VI. The increasing need to **“protect Chinese citizens abroad”**, especially with the **(increase in the size of Chinese communities and workers in the areas of work of Chinese companies abroad, and in countries located on the path of the Belt and Road)** like Pakistan^(kciii). *According to this trend*, China's adherence to the **“principle of non-interference will become a “luxury” or a “burden”** for Chinese policy in the near future. In addition, the shift from this principle may bring about a number of gains for China, the most important of which is **(improving its global image as a “responsible country” within the global system)** on the ground of its adherence to the new principles governing this system and global policies. This shift will create **“greater flexibility in China's ability to protect its growing interests”** in the world.

4.2 Approving a new amendment to the “Chinese National Defense Law”, on December 26, 2020 to allow China to play a security role outside its borders

In a remarkable development, the **“Standing Committee of the National People's Congress” (Parliament)** approved, on **(December 26, 2020)**, an important amendment to the **“Chinese National Defense Law”**, allowing China to play a security role outside its borders, to be

implemented on (January 1, 2021)^(kciv). *Here the recent amendment to the (Chinese National Defense Law) and its motives cannot be understood independently of the timing of its promulgation, in terms of:*

- I. **The amended law came after a period of tension in Sino-US relations during the Trump administration:** the latter began to impose successive packages of **(US tariffs against Chinese goods on the US market)**, starting from mid-2018, which turned into a trade war between the two parties. Although China and the United States of America reached an **“interim agreement”** on (January 15, 2020) to end this war, but other aspects of the conflict between the two sides continued.
- II. **The “Covid-19” pandemic came to add another area of conflict between the US and Chinese sides, and US accusations against China, whether about (the nature of the origin of the virus or the extent of Chinese responsibility for it):** in addition to other arenas of contention, most notably (fifth generation **“5G” technology**), and these issues are related. The controversy is in confrontational language, especially on the part of the US President **(Trump)**^(kciv).
- III. **The “Revised China National Defense Law” in December 2020 came a few weeks before the new US administration (the Biden administration) assumed its duties, adding a dangerous dimension to the Chinese approach towards Washington and the new administration:** Therefore, the new revised Chinese law represents **(a clear Chinese message to the new American administration about China's role within the global system, and that it is ready to move forward in any direction that the Biden administration wants).**
- IV. **On the other hand, the amended Chinese National Defense Law can be understood as establishing new rules for Sino-American relations before the Biden administration arrived:** despite the theoretical disagreement that arose during the election period about the nature of these relations in the **(Biden phase)**, as there was a tendency to emphasize **However, these (US-Chinese relations will witness a review by Biden)**, as well as there is consensus about an almost certain change in **(the nature of the American rhetoric towards China)**, but it seems the latter was keen to **(confirm its role within the global system, regardless of the nature of attitudes of the Biden administration towards it)**^(kcvi).
- V. **The most likely trend is that the Chinese assessment of the US policy experience towards it in recent years during the term of “Trump” and the advent of the “Biden administration” expresses a stable structural shift in American orientations:** During the last three years before **“President Joe Biden”** came to power the United States, and during the **“period of Trump”**, the Chinese politicians and analysts concluded that the **“shift in this policy does not express a special, or exceptional, position of President Trump, as much as it represents a stable character of the US policy towards China”**.
- VI. **China's view is that even if the US policy witnessed a relative shift in the “Biden era”, it would remain limited or limited to the nature of “American discourse” without an actual positive change in the “America's approach” to China:** With the Chinese elites believing that issuing this law is important now, because China It does not have the luxury to wait for **“the new direction of the administration in Washington led by Biden”**, and this is supported by

the existence of strategic shifts in the **“Indo-Pacific”** region, behind which other regional powers have stood before the United States itself^{fkevi}).

Perhaps the most prominent worthy observation of our analysis here according to the Egyptian researcher's vision through her reading of the official Chinese sources, is that the Chinese sources did not present nor explain or explain any **(sufficient details about the amended text of the Chinese Defense Law in December 2020)**, whether regarding **(the nature of this new Chinese security role, or the nature of the Chinese security forces or institutions that will assume this role, or the basic conditions that must be fulfilled before this role becomes a duty by virtue of this new defense law in China, or whether there are specific geographical destinations or theaters for Chinese foreign movement to establish Law)**.

Here, we can find that the **“Chinese sources”** were satisfied with stressing that **“the new Chinese defense role will be unique”** in protecting stability and peace across the world, and that the **(Chinese military policy is a defensive policy and stands with peace and against war)**.

5. The strategies of the (Indian lobby) to practice political pressures influence on the American administration to stand with the Indian government against China and Pakistan to fight fundamentalism and terrorist militants

The **“Indian lobby”** pressed the American administration to form a **“counter-alliance or Asian NATO against China and Pakistan in South and Southeast Asia”**, which prompted the American administration and its decision-making centers to draw up the American plan to form a **(new Asian NATO)**, similar to the **“North Atlantic Treaty”** to counter the increasing Chinese influence, by reviving the Quartet, which includes the **(United States of America, Japan, Australia and India)**, which held its first meeting on October 6, 2020 in the Japanese capital Tokyo, at the level of foreign ministers of member states^{keviii}). **The most important features of the (new Asian NATO), which includes four countries, as we mentioned, can be observed, as follows:**

5.1 The pressures of the “Indian Lobby” in Washington to form an “Asian alliance” to confront the Chinese dragon and combating terrorism in Pakistan and the Asian region

This quadruple nucleus for the formation of the **(New Asian Alliance)**, which includes the **(United States of America, Japan, Australia and India)**, is the cornerstone of the US plan to form new alliances after it turned its attention to the **(Asia Pacific region and confronting the phenomenon of terrorism in Pakistan and the Chinese power)**^{kcix}). It began to shake the throne of the United States in dominating the world economically and militarily, **and the most important items and foundations upon which (Asian NATO, led by the United States of America) are based, are:**

A. The **(quadrupartite dialogue)** between the Asian countries of NATO aims to develop a common vision to preserve **(maritime security, electronic and critical technologies, infrastructure, combating terrorism, regional cooperation, confronting Chinese influence and expansion)**, especially **“after the increase of Chinese tension and hostility towards New Delhi after the border dispute in the Himalayas mountains”^(c)**.

B. India was previously reluctant to enter the **(Asian Quartet with Washington)** not to disturb its neighbor China, but India is now under pressure from the **(Indian Lobby in Washington)** to accelerate its steps towards the American camp to enhance its military and security capabilities.

C. The desire of the United States in the recent period the **(formation of the Asian NATO under the USA leadership with India to confront Pakistan and China as its biggest supporter)** has increased is that the **(Trump administration)** has not abandoned the accusation of Beijing of spreading the Coronavirus pandemic and intensified the hostility to China during the election campaign. To the former US President **(Donald Trump)**.

D. As for Washington, the **“main danger is from China”**, According to Washington and its ally India, with mentioning that **“anti-China alliances”** must be created primarily by US interests. As for Japan, which has close commercial and political relations with China, it is confused between the jaws of the American and Chinese pincers, and Tokyo wants American influence to continue in the region to protect **“Washington's traditional allies”^(ci)**.

E. The current political developments, global fluctuations and the imbalance in the **(balance of power)** came to impose itself strongly on Washington to enter into a **(cold war with China)**, after it was with the former Soviet Union, and therefore Washington began to motivate its allies, led by India, to join this new alliance, and it may be Canada The new member, especially after the **(Canadian-Chinese relations)** worsened recently, and the capital, Ottawa, became more aggressive after the arrest of a senior official in **(Chinese Huawei)** in 2018, and **“Canada sent several warships to the Taiwan Strait in September 2020 to arouse Beijing's anger”^(cii)**.

Here, the Egyptian researcher sees that China considers (US moves and alliances in South and Southeast Asia) directed against it, and contributes to fabricating crises with its neighbors to strengthen (hostile alliances against Beijing), and Beijing is trying to downplay this new American alliance, which it considers aims to tighten the screws on it. By blocking the (flow of oil to China through the Strait of Malacca to limit Chinese economic growth). In turn, the economically superior of China seeks to limit US attempts to impede its growth and tighten the screws on it, by going to build (economic alliances through the Belt and Road Initiative) with all Asian countries to put pressures on Washington and its allies in the Asian region. Consequently, (you will not find benefit from Washington's attempts to exert pressure on Beijing and encircle it in the Indian and Pacific Oceans).

5.2 The role of the “Indian Lobby in the United States” to make India as the center of an “effective role in bringing peace and security” to the region in the face of “extremist religious fundamentalisms”

India seeks to expand its political and military influence regionally and internationally, and has become one of the main players in southern Asia. Therefore, the **(Indian Lobby in Washington)** plays a dual role in encouraging the American decision-maker for rapprochement with India as an emerging country and making use of its capabilities in a number of files of importance to The United States, especially with the coming of the **(Indian Bharatiya Janata Party)** to power, is a party with Hindu nationalist tendencies that represents the rich in India, and therefore tends towards the West and is seen as **(China and Pakistan as a formidable enemies)**, and it also has problems with Muslims in the “**Jammu and Kashmir**” region And all this increases the rapprochement of the Indian government through the **(influence of the Indian lobby formed by the Bharatiya Janata Party from Washington)^(ciii)**. *Here we can identify the most important roles of the “Indian Lobby” in bringing about (rapprochement in the security file between India and Washington), as follows:*

- A. The **(Indian Lobby)** pressured on the “**US State Department for security rapprochement with India against China and Pakistan**”. In a visit by the US Secretary of State to India in 2018, he expressed his vision of the nature of the role that America wants from India by saying: “**India needs a reliable partner in international forums like the USA, and I would like to I say it frankly that the United States of America is this reliable partner, due to our common values and our identical vision of security and stability in the world, and China challenges and violates international laws through provocations in the South China Sea**”.
- B. Washington, then **(does not want to lose positions in the war of influence against Beijing in the region, and sees India as a powerful agent)** that can help it **(increase its military and political influence at China's expense from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific)**. The United States is also seeking to develop its political relations with India, which is evident in **(Washington's involvement of New Delhi in the ongoing peace process in Afghanistan)^(civ)**.
- C. With regard to the military relations between the United States and India, the American envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan **(Alice Wells)** said that the “**United States considers India a great strategic partner, and wishes that New Delhi adopt an effective role in bringing peace and security to the region**”.
- D. For emphasizing the importance of **(security rapprochement between India and Washington)**, “**Mrs. Wells**” the US envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan said that: “**Washington has offered New Delhi to provide it with sensitive military equipment suitable for multiple uses. Washington has provided only a few of its allies with such equipment, so giving sensitive weapons to New Delhi means that Washington pays great attention to its military relations with India, to create a strong element in the region through which it can obstruct Chinese hegemony^(cv)**”.

E. The United States is working to develop its relations with India, during the past years; Washington sold weapons to New Delhi for 15 billion dollars, and plans to launch **(military projects in India)** during the next years with 30 billion dollars.

F. In July 2018 **(India launched massive naval maneuvers with the United States and Japan, off its southern coasts, with the aim of strengthening its military relations, in the face of the growing Chinese influence in the region)**. These maneuvers took place in conjunction with the escalation of confrontations between Indian and Chinese forces, in a remote and strategically sensitive area in the **"Himalayas"**, where the borders of India, China and Bhutan meet^(vi).

Hence, the Egyptian researcher concluded that the strategic objectives of the United States have converged with the growth of its relations with India, through (three axes):

A. The completion of the **(encirclement of Pakistan and Afghanistan from southeastern Asia)**.

B. The **(containment of China)**, the candidate force to compete with the United States in the current century.

C. The **(suppression of radical fundamentalist movements in the Asian region)**.

5.3 Alliances of the **(Indian Lobby with Christian fundamentalists in the USA)** to support India's policies in confronting religious fundamentalism and extremism in Pakistan and Asia: Focusing on **(Indian proxy war in Afghanistan against Pakistan)** with Washington's help

After **(Donald Trump)** took office, President **(Trump)** appointed many **(Christian fundamentalists)** within his administration, which made **(conservatives and the Indian Lobby in Washington)** see him as a **"savior"** for Washington's support for India's policies against terrorist militias in Pakistan and Asia^(vii). **We can look at the impact of this alliance between the (Indian lobby in Washington and Christian fundamentalists) on (the American administration), through:**

A. This alliance between the **(Indian lobby and the conservative Christian fundamentalist in Washington)**, is relying on the dominant position of the United States, sought to strengthen the country's security policies as a necessity to preserve its international position, including conducting precautionary attacks against countries that pose a threat to the vision and goals of the United States, on top of it is **(China and its support for Pakistan and the fundamentalist movements in South Asia)**, according to their vision^(viii).

B. The previous alliance works at the same time **(promoting the spread of American values in India, Asia and around the world)**, monitoring the adoption of those values, and exerting pressure against countries, especially **(China and Pakistan)** in a manner consistent with the level of their implementation of American values.

C. The attempt to encircle China is not the only importance of the American rapprochement with India, as there are many other files, such as: **(the Afghan file)** is strongly

present, as Afghanistan is a country in which **(an Indian proxy war against Pakistan has been going on, and the United States has been involved in the Afghan quagmire)** for nearly 15 years, and **(President Trump's administration)** bears responsibility for all of this on Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism, according to the viewpoint of the American administration, under the **(direction and pressure of the Indian lobby in Washington)**.

D. And now the **(Indian Lobby with the fundamentalist Christians)** is pressing for the **(Indian and American interests converge in Afghanistan against Pakistan and China)**, as the United States seeks to **(include India in its new strategy on the war on terror in Afghanistan and against Pakistan)**, which is evidence Tangible on the growing alliance between them^(ix).

E. The US President **(Donald Trump)** announced, shortly after his ascension to the leadership of the White House, **(new changes in Washington's policies that included Afghanistan, Pakistan and India)**. President **(Trump)** said, "The new change in his country's policy towards Afghanistan will be based on" circumstances, rather than time, "indicating that" the US military's mission in Afghanistan will end with the improvement of security conditions in it, and it is not linked to a specific date".

F. We can notify that **(Trump)** in his converging strategy with India, under the pressures of both the **(Indian Lobby, which cooperates with the Christian fundamentalists)** accused of the **(state of Pakistan of giving sanctuary to terrorists)**, which **(Islamabad rejected and called on him to abandon this rhetoric)**^(x).

G. It is considered the **(Indian-American rapprochement in the Afghan affairs, under pressure from the Indian lobby)** comes categorically at the expense of India's neighboring country, which is Pakistan, which is **(what called Pakistan to reject any role for India in resolving the Afghan crisis)**.

H. What prompted the Pakistani Prime Minister **(Shahid Khaqan Abbasi)** to warn before the **(United Nations General Assembly)**, saying, "India cannot make any contribution to achieving peace in Afghanistan".

I. The statement of the Prime Minister of Pakistan **(Abbasi)** is the strongest message that Pakistan sends to America, in response to the **(efforts to rapprochement between Washington and New Delhi under the pretext of fighting terrorism against Pakistan)**, as it appeared to Pakistan and its Chinese protector that the **(United States is also biased towards the Indian position on the issue of Indian-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan claims sovereignty over it)**, and the final result that the U.S. suspended at least \$900 million in security aid to Pakistan^(xi).

*Through the previous analysis, the Egyptian researcher concluded that the **(Indian lobby in Washington, in cooperation with the ruling "Bharatiya Janata Party" in India)**, was able to form alliances in the United States, especially with the **"Christian Right"** in order to **(exert pressures on Washington for "security rapprochement" with India's government to combat terrorism and fundamentalism in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to form a parallel and anti-China-Pakistan alliance)**, which led to strong objections from the Chinese-backed Pakistani side in the United Nations. This led to the emergence of **(power balances and proxy wars)***

between both (India's proxy war against terrorism in Afghanistan in favor of Washington, and Pakistan's war against the penetration and expansion of Indian pro-Washington influence in the region with the support of its Chinese ally).

6. The future expected political and security risks and scenarios for Chinese security involvement in Pakistan to defense of its interests in its relationship with the West and the United States

Regardless of the extent of the Chinese commitment to the principle of **“non-interference”**, there are indications that China has practically turned away from this principle. Therefore, a **(distinction must be made here between the theoretical commitment to this principle, and the Chinese policies on the ground)**. This intervention took different appearances or patterns, the most prominent of which was **“China sending its envoys to different countries to urge these countries to adopt / refrain from certain behaviors”**, this happened in the case of North Korea, Sudan, and Myanmar, or to intervene with the aim of **“influencing the course of internal conflicts or interactions”**, specific intervention in **“Zimbabwe”** in 2008 to support the **“Robert Mugabe regime”** by providing military support, as well as the **“extensive Chinese integration into the activities of peacekeeping operations”** supported and supervised by the United Nations. China in 2019 became the **“largest contributor”** to those operations among the permanent members in the Security Council, ranked eleventh in the world, and Chinese support for many international military intervention operations through the passage of Security Council resolutions, whether through **“explicit approval of these decisions or abstaining from exercising the right of veto against them”^(xii)**. *In the following sections, the Egyptian researcher will try to explain and analyze (the future results of the Chinese intervention in Pakistan to protect its interests in the Belt and Road Initiative) on its overall relations with Washington, India and the West, through the following axes:*

6.1 The expected potential implications on Chinese interests for its support to Pakistani strategy in fighting “fundamentalism and terrorism” and the results of the Chinese shift from the principle of “non-interference” in the Pakistani case on India and the USA

The Chinese shift from the principle of **“non-interference”** in the Pakistani case will entail a set of expected political and material burdens and costs on China, *the most important of which are the following:*

I. The expected political and security risks in the relationship with the West and the United States: a shift from this principle does not necessarily guarantee an expansion of the size and scope of the Sino-American consensus, given that the principle of intervention by the United States and Western powers is not really related to spreading democracy or imposing respect for

human rights or Protection of civilians, as it is related to **“building and protecting areas of global influence”**.

II. There is a difference in the relative weight of the political and economic components in the concept of “responsibility” for both China and the Western powers: while the West attaches more importance to the political component in the concept of responsibility, China still pays **“greater attention to the economic component of this responsibility”**, whether in its relationship to the global economic system or in relation to developing countries^(xiii).

III. The damage that could be caused to the positive global image of China, especially within developing and emerging countries: an image that was based in part on China's adherence to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and political unconditional ties. Even if we assume that China's shift from the principle of non-interference may lead to an improvement in Sino-Western relations, this may come at the **“expense of China's relations with developing and emerging countries”**. Also, this shift may enhance the spread of the **“Chinese threat theory”**.

IV. For the first time, China implemented a multilateral formula to deal with security challenges in a number of neighboring countries: This mechanism, in addition to China, included (Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan) within the framework of what is known as the **“Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism”(QCCM)**, which was launched in August 2016. Under this formula, two important agreements were signed in August 2017, namely: the (Agreement on the Coordination Mechanism in Counterterrorism) by (Afghanistan-China-Pakistan-Tajikistan) Armed Forces, and the (Protocol Concerning the Information Coordination Center for Combating Terrorism by the Armed Forces) of the Four Countries **“Armed Forces”**, which are: (Afghanistan-China-Pakistan-Tajikistan)^(xiv).

V. Although there are no details about the content of these above mentioned two agreements, important and significant developments followed them: the most important of which is the deployment of Chinese forces in Tajikistan near the Afghan **“Wakhan Corridor”**, and near the **“Chinese Xinjiang region”**. The mode of cooperation with **“Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan”** was aimed primarily at (confronting terrorist organizations within the borders of fragile states, in addition to their important location on the Chinese Belt and Road tracks).

Hence, the researcher concluded that the Chinese support to Pakistan in the face of (Indian and American pressure on its support for terrorism) has led to the (increased directed accusations against China of its external interference in the Indian issue by supporting Pakistan), and in fact, China is hardly trying to (protect its interests and the projects of the Belt and road Chinese Initiative in Pakistan), and what increased the size of Western and international pressure on China is the exposure of its ally Pakistan to international pressures regarding the growth of armed fundamentalist movements and militias, and the threat of the interests of India, as an ally of Washington in the region. This led to an increase in the (complexities and security networks in South and Southeast Asia).

6.2 The future impacts of the “American withdrawal from fighting terrorism in Afghanistan” on the growing of the “fundamentalism tide in South and Southeast Asia: Indian and Pakistani cases”: Analyzing the effects on the Chinese security internal strategy at “Xinjiang Province”

There is a conviction in India that Pakistan is keeping its bleeding in the (Jammu Kashmir region, the Indian side) through Pakistan's support for the armed movements and providing security protection for the armed groups hostile to India, and facilitating the (infiltration of foreign mercenaries to the Indian side of Kashmir to launch armed operations against the Indian army and security forces there), which led to the severity of the (crisis of the growing fundamentalism and terrorism between India and Pakistan is the American withdrawal from Afghanistan), which resulted in the (increase in China's fear of terrorists and al-Qaeda entering the Chinese territories, especially the “Xinjiang” region with a Muslim majority), and these fundamentalist and terrorist armed groups are trying to exploit the state of tension. Security is a result of (Washington's withdrawal from Afghanistan) and penetration into the Kashmiri region from India, the recruitment of more local Kashmiri Indians, and the arrival of several Muslim minorities in several Asian countries, especially the (Chinese Muslim minorities in Xinjiang^(xv)). So, the researcher will try to analyze a number of negative influences, resulting from the US withdrawal from Afghanistan on the “internal security” of China, Pakistan and India, as follows:

I. India and China have tried to reduce tension between them and to take (steps to build confidence and maintain calm and security along the borders between them after the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan in order to preserve regional stability), but the (Sino-Pakistani rapprochement) causes concern to decision-makers in India, especially China's projects in the (Economic Corridor and the Pakistani port of Gwadar), as well as (Beijing's failure to support an Indian decision in the “Security Council” to consider the founder of the Army of Muhammad movement as a “global terrorist leader”), which led to tension in security relations between China and India and its ally Washington in South Asia^(xvi).

II. In this context, (Chinese security relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan) have witnessed important developments in recent years: reflecting (China's tendency to review its security approach in the Central and South Asian regions), starting from 2014. *This trend has been reinforced by a number of variables, most notably*^(xvii):

A. The United States “reduced the size of its military presence in Afghanistan”.

B. But the most important variable is related to the (expected increase in the Chinese openness of Xinjiang to South and Central Asia within the framework of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects), which increases (opportunities for terrorist elements from Pakistan, Afghanistan and other surrounding regions to penetrate into Xinjiang).

C. Chinese fear of **(increasing opportunities for communication between religious organizations in Xinjiang and their counterparts in South and Central Asia and Pakistan)**. This has given Tajikistan a great importance as a buffer zone on the Chinese borders^(xviii).

III. The American withdrawal from Afghanistan led to the **(growing phenomenon of armed violence in the Kashmiri region from India and China's fear of negative extensions to the "Muslim Xinjiang" region)**, and the escalation began between the **(Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party in India and the government of Pakistan backed by China and the exchange of accusations between them)**. The Indian government refused to negotiate with the **(Pakistani-backed Kashmiri separatist leaders)**, according to the Indian and American accusations against them, and killed many more local Indian militants than foreigners, which is a new phenomenon and not as it was in the past^(xix).

IV. According to Indian and Chinese security sources and reports. Some security intentions attributed to the **(political vacuum in the region after the American withdrawal from Afghanistan)**, which led to the **(deterioration of the security situation, and the continuous armed confrontations increased, especially between the Indian security forces and the Kashmiri militants)**, which increased the rate of extremism in the state of Kashmir, and the tendency towards arms by the people, besides the high tensions along the line of contact in the disputed region **between (India and Pakistan and the mutual accusations between them of violating the ceasefire truce signed between the two parties)**, and each party rejected the mediation of China and the United States to calm and each side interfered to support its ally^(xx).

V. What increased the pressure on China was the exposure of its ally Pakistan to international pressure, which prompted the government of Pakistan to **(ban the activities of the armed group and put its leader under house arrest)**, but the Pakistani armed group carried out its operations and practiced its activities under other names. India tried to place the leader of **(Pakistan's Frozen Army Movement)** under the list of international terrorism in the United Nations, but China opposed the resolution, which led to an **"increase in security tensions between China and India for its support for Pakistan in the UN Security Council, and India's refusal to cooperate with Pakistan after the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan"**, which led to the increase of the tensions in the region, and China's fear has been increased of the **(terrorism tide from South Asia across the mountains in Afghanistan and its borders with the Chinese Muslim province of "Xinjiang" and the negative impact of China internal security)**^(xxi).

According to the previous presentation, the Egyptian researcher concluded that these previous mechanisms (do not reflect Chinese interference in the internal affairs of neighboring countries, but clearly express a review of Chinese approaches in dealing with international and regional security challenges), especially in the most important regions and countries to Chinese interests, such as (Pakistan, Afghanistan).

7. Conclude Remarks

The Egyptian researcher has reached a number of conclusions, *as follows*:

I. There are (two important reasons) that make the (Indian lobby in the United States of America exert pressures for rapprochement between the American administration and the government of India, especially in the era of “Trump” and during the current American president, “Joe Biden”): which is what the Prime Minister of India (Narendra Modi) tried to benefit through his rapprochement with the (Indian Lobby in Washington), the most important of these reasons:

A. The first reason: The United States, under pressure from the (Indian lobby in Washington), is relying too much on India to (confront the Chinese rise): Therefore, it is concerned that whoever rules India is a strong government that can efficiently manage the state, and has a right-wing orientation that can rally the people behind it under national claims, and this is something that is not available with any government other than **(Modi's government)**, whether it is formed by the Congress Party, which is historically considered an anti-colonial party despite its dispute with China, or a coalition government that will be weak and unable to take decisive decisions on an issue of this size.

B. The second reason: The great consensus between the President of the United States (Donald Trump) with a right-wing background and the Prime Minister (Narendra Modi), which is expected to extend during the current US President (Joe Biden) era: President “Trump” will not find someone who integrates with him in policies and trends like “Modi”, especially since he has a very strong relationship with the “Indian lobby”, which is very important in this context.

II. Beijing supports (Pakistan's diplomacy in its 70-year-old conflict with India over the Himalayan region): As China has a **(major infrastructure project in Pakistani Kashmir)** that New Delhi claims, So, China is trying to protect its interests in the region by supporting its ally of Pakistan.

III. The occurrence of a Chinese review of some of its constants in security intervention, especially in South Asia and Pakistan, to “combat terrorism in defense of its interests”: There were a set of factors that explain China's adherence during the past decades to the principle of non-interference and the reduction of the security and military size outside its borders. However, the current stage in the development of the world order, including the widespread spread of Chinese interests in a number of regions, especially in **(important regions for China such as Pakistan)**, the change in the global balance of power, as well as the changes in the nature of Sino-American relations in recent years. All of them impose **(a Chinese review of some of its foreign policy constants in the security intervention to combat terrorism in defense of its interests)**, and this explains **(the Chinese rapprochement with Pakistan to protect the interests of China's Belt and Road initiative in the economic corridor with Pakistan and the Pakistani port of Gwadar with Chinese investments).**

IV. Chinese intervention in Pakistan to combat terrorism for targeting the interests of China's projects in the Belt and Road Initiative to emphasize “China's rejection of imperialist and Western and American colonial policies” in South Asia and Pakistan: Many Chinese writings claim that the principle of its intervention to protect its economic interests with Pakistan is a

form of confirmation of China's rejection of imperial policies And Western colonialism, and to confirm independence and the **(differentiation of the Chinese path in political and developmental development)**, or in other words, as a kind of **(Chinese defense policy in the face of potential Western interference in Chinese internal affairs)**. Hence, the **(reality of Chinese interests and the world order)** did not both justify continuing to adhere to this principle in its traditional form.

V. In general, there are a group of areas that are expected to be areas of using and employing “Chinese military power” in Pakistan and South Asia:

A. The first area: representing in the **(war on terrorism)**, an area confirmed by the indicators that we have referred to in the research study on the shift away from the principle of non-intervention.

B. The second area: is **(protecting Chinese infrastructure)**. Although protecting it is the responsibility of the state whose territory lies within that structure, but in the event that the latter is unable to protect it or exposes it to a danger that exceeds its capabilities, China is not expected to remain far from intervening, for reasons related to the **(interregional character of the Chinese Belt and Road structure)**.

C. The third area: is the **(protection of Chinese maritime trade routes)**. This possibility is confirmed in the light of the **(numerous concessions that China has obtained in a number of sea ports, especially Gwadar port in Pakistan)**.

VI. It is clear that Pakistan today is not interested in confrontations with India that will drain its deteriorating economic situation, especially since the new Pakistani Prime Minister (Imran Khan) made his declared mission to reform the economy and raise the standard of living of the people, and he shares this trend with China: This was reflected in the recent short confrontation With India, which the Prime Minister of Pakistan **(Imran Khan)** worked to end in the shortest possible time while employing the propaganda aspects in his favor, and who has openly declared his belief that **(a strong right-wing Indian government led by the current Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi)**, alone is able to settle the problems between the two countries, especially in **(Kashmir)**, which is confirmed by the stability of the relationship between India and Pakistan under the rule of the Indian right led by **(Modi)**, so despite the ideological and political incompatibility between the two parties, Pakistanis today may be willing to support a government headed by **(Modi)** more than others to solve the problems between Pakistan and India.

VII. Finally, the Egyptian researcher believes, as a future outlook, that the alliance between the United States of America and its regional allies in South and Southeast Asia, such as India and others, to abort the Chinese rise, and the (Chinese Belt and road initiative) in the Asian continent harms everyone's interests: Therefore, it is likely that all parties should intent to and pursue a more **“pragmatic policy”** that can guarantee stability In the region and not exhausting it through confrontations, either with China or its close ally Pakistan, which is consistent with **(China's policy)**, which is based on **(establishing stability as an inevitable ground for economic growth)**.

8.Study Proposed Recommendations:

The Egyptian researcher recommends a number of the following measures, in order to protect the interests of all parties in South and Southeast Asia **(China, Pakistan, India)** from **(terrorist intervention, jihadist tide and the spread of terrorist militias),through:**

- I.The Egyptian researcher may have understood that the main role of the **(Indian Lobby in Washington is promoting the policies of Indian power and influence in South and Southeast Asia against China and its ally Pakistan, and focusing on the anti-terror discourse coming from Pakistan against India)**, but the researcher suggests another solution that the**(Indian Lobby in Washington)**can achieve and lead stability in India and the Asian continent, which is the **(Indian Lobby proposes the idea of equality between India and Pakistan in the region, and the failure to understand that this could limit India's ambition in South Asia)**, and the Indian Lobby could change its rhetoric by shifting focus the international and American interest in raising **(regional cooperation on issues of peace and security in South Asia)**, and completely moving away from the Indian rhetoric that is in line with Washington and desiring **(isolating Pakistan and China politically and diplomatically and containing their strategies)**.
- II.The researcher recommends the necessity of **(cooperation between China and India in the field of combating terrorism in South and Southeast Asia, and the search for common aspects of cooperation and managing differences in the region)**,and this is what actually happened between the two countries, Where the**(Chinese Ministry of Public Security and the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs pledged to improve cooperation in combating terrorism between the two countries)**. Both The Indian and Chinese mentioned ministries in fighting terrorism confirmed that they **“will enhance high-level exchanges and implement a high-level meeting mechanism to deal with security and counter-terrorism”** between the Chinese and Indian sides in the Asian region.
- III.The Egyptian researcher recommends the necessity of **(cooperation between the Pakistani and Indian governments in the field of combating fundamentalism and extremist terrorist organizations on the borders between them and in Afghanistan)**. Hence, coordination between India and China in the field of **(joint exercises in the field of combating terrorism, developing strategies to combat extremism among Indian and Pakistan youth)**, especially those who are attracted to the **“Islamic State”**.
- IV.What must be emphasized here is that any Chinese review of the principle of **(non-interference)** and approval of the**(policy of Chinese security intervention in South Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan to combat terrorist organizations and their linkages with the Chinese province of Xinjiang)** must be done with great caution not to provoke international and regional parties such as the United States and India: As the researcher think that it is likely that there should be a **(pattern or “Chinese version” of the policy of security intervention in Pakistan and on the borders with India)**, which takes into account the burdens and costs that we have referred to in the study represented by the risks of Chinese relations with the West, the United States and India, And it also takes into consideration the **(basic concepts that formed the basis of the Chinese role in the global economic system and the Chinese relations with developing and emerging countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan)**, especially **“political**

unconditionalism", as well as the importance of the **(economic component of "international responsibility" according to the Chinese concept)**. And that China will take into account the **(rejection of the developing countries of the Western and American experience in interfering in internal affairs)**, especially the military intervention.

V. The Egyptian researcher views that if India wants to play a **(regional policing role in fighting the so-called Islamic extremism and the fundamentalist tide)**, then **(India should cooperate with the Arab countries and the Islamic world instead of relying heavily on Washington and provoking China regionally in Asia)**. Therefore, India needs to **(change the political rhetoric vis-à-vis its Muslim-majority neighbor Pakistan)**, and to move towards a different discourse that converges more with Arab and Muslim countries, to solve the issue of **(Indian Muslim minorities in Kashmir)**, and to stop the expansion of **(terrorist militias in Asia and their cooperation with the Islamic State "ISIS" in the Middle East region, specifically in Syria and Iraq)**.

VI. Hence, the Egyptian researcher proposes to the current US administration led by **(Joe Biden)** to encourage **(economic pluralism in the Asian continent)** and to stop Washington temporarily coaxing the Indian government towards **(blocking the Chinese "Belt and Road" project)** to return stability to the Asian region and the world, as the United States is always confirming that **(China's maritime expansion poses a threat to Indian maritime routes in the Indian and Pacific oceans)**, and according to the perspective of the American administration in cooperation with the current Indian government led by **(Narendra Modi)**, the progress of Sino-Pakistani relations since 2013, which started **(with the Chinese-Pakistani Economic Corridor Agreement)** worries the US and Indian sides. *Therefore, the researcher recommends the necessity of (economic, trade and investment cooperation between India and China and non-US intervention),* for the sake of strategic and economic political stability in the Asian continent.

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(4) JAPAN and Contemporary US-INDIA Relations

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The world's two prime democracies are the United States of America (USA, U. S. A., or US) and the Republic of India. The east Asian democracy of Japan joins them to form a group of three heavily interlinked powers of the world at large. These powers are busy chasing a host of political, economic, military, and many other diverse interests in the international domain. This Article first throws light upon the present state of US-India relations (two differently-devised but like-minded democratic nation-states across several key areas of understanding, cooperation, collaboration, and pursuance, such as in the diplomatic and military areas). It then proceeds to explain how Japan figures as an actor of geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geostrategic significance in catering to the interests of the two countries in the US and India.

In conclusion, the author aims to clarify that Japan is indeed an external entity in terms of its unique position as Asia's foremost power and also because of cultural, geographical, and historical differences. However, this has not held Japan back from cultivating a long-term friendship, partnership, and even an alliance-style togetherness with the US and India. It must be mentioned that even the United States and India are external to each other in terms of their historical existences. India has been a democracy since only the post World War world, while the US has existed through freedom-emphasising means, methods, and processes for over two centuries.

Relations between UNITED STATES and INDIA – A BRIEF LOOK

The US and India are completing 75 years of a mutually complementary relationship this year.

The fallout of World War Two, with India emerging as a distinct secular nation-state having freed itself from colonial Britain and America having helped trounce the Axis powers, led to the US-India bonhomie and shaped it to what it has become today. Since then, several ups and downs characterised their relationship to then assume the character that it is today. A mutually-beneficial, highly-prioritised, and a relationship reflective of a coming-together of two alike powers with immense potential and promise like no other, is taking concrete shape. The United States and India have been long-term stakeholders in each other's progress for the most part of the ongoing century (and even in the prior one).

Directed AREA of COOPERATION	Notable Points	Future Improvements	Notes
Formal Cooperation	US-India '2+2' Ministers' Meeting (first held in 2018); <u>Notable Deals</u> : Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (2018), Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (2016), Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (2020), Working Group on Counterterrorism (2000), Civil Nuclear Deal (2006), Defence Policy Group, several other dialogues dealing with specific issues such as energy and cyber security.	More dialogues on the lines of focussed and formalised cooperation leading to regular summits at the top levels (Track 1, 1.5, 2). Specific topics can be dealt with or groups can be upgraded such as the Counterterrorism group (two decades old).	-

<p>Instituted Multilateral Cooperation featuring the United States and India</p>	<p>Group of Twenty, ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting Plus, Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (2019), etc.</p>	<p>The elevation of the QUAD to include other like-minded democracies within its structural framework has been suggested by a number of scholars owing to the QUAD's rising prominence; More Asian multilateral summits require American participation and this should be facilitated by India using its geopolitical influence, reach, and weight in Asia. The Japan-America-India (JAI) dialogue of 2018 has been expanded (in 2019) in scope to cater to a number of new-generation security areas which helps facilitate deeper cooperation between the three countries.</p>	<p>The US and India should seek to expand their involvement in multilateral forums to any multilateral forum that suits and caters to their interests. Moreover, they should be encouraged to devise new forums that will deal with specific issues.</p>
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Bilateral Trade	<p><u>From the US to India (goods, 2019):</u> US\$ 34.3 billion</p> <p><u>From India to the US (goods, 2019):</u> US\$ 57.7 billion</p> <p><u>Total Trade (goods and services, 2019):</u> US\$ 149 billion (as per US Department of State)</p> <p><u>Total Trade (goods, 2019):</u> US\$ 92 billion</p>	<p>Free trade deals with convenient parameters for all parties involved are fast becoming the norm. Such deals could witness Indian and American participation on a common platform. This will likely add a new dimension to trade between the two democracies.</p>	<p>India retains a trade surplus with the USA despite the COVID19 pandemic and is focussed on improving trade parameters to emerge as a trading titan. The US had a trade deficit of US\$23.4 billion with India in 2019.</p>
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Military Domain (Land-based Armed Forces)	<p><u>YUDH ABHYAS</u>: An exercise meant to improve war preparedness; <i>Tiger Triumph</i> with the US, which includes all three traditional domains.</p> <p><u>SHATRUJEET</u>: This was held in India's western coast in late 2013 (following previous iterations), and was meant to improve amphibious war maneuvering. It witnessed participation of the US Marine Corps and an Indian Army unit.</p>	<p>Land-based exercises can strengthen the resolve, intent, honour, pride, strength, and many such factors of participating forces. Moreover, they can assess specific aspects such as conflict possibilities and ensure a mutual upkeep between their forces.</p>	<p>India is a 'Major Defence Partner' of the United States.</p> <p>The US has prioritised military sales to India to encourage its improving militarisation. New Delhi also remains the go-to entity for Washington as far as defence expeditions are concerned.</p>
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Maritime Domain	<p><u>MALABAR</u>: The US-India MALABAR, originally conceived in 1992, has now been expanded to involve all the four countries of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. However, the MALABAR is not the QUAD's official exercise. It remains individual and may yet see an increment/decrement in the upcoming years as per fluctuating maritime scenarios.</p>	<p>The US and India are well posited to claim (in India's case, 'reclaim', due to its historical voyages across most of maritime Asia in erstwhile eras) the Asian maritime domain and deter the acts, actions, and activities of a forward-looking China.</p>	<p>The Indian Ocean, the Indian Ocean region, and the Indo-Pacific region (as also the Asia-Pacific region for India) can witness sustained and long-term strategising and involvement by the US and India. This can also include solicitation of new partners to curb an encroaching and diffident China.</p>
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<p>Military-Air Domain</p>	<p>Trade between India and the US is largely focussed on the military-air domain i. e. Indian purchases of the US' transport aircraft in C130J Super Hercules and . India, notably, refused the US' offer to purchase F-16 aircrafts and make them the main arrow in its quiver. However, off late, India appears to be more considerate about purchase of US assault fighter aircrafts to supplement its present inventory.</p>	<p>Technology understanding, absorption, trade, and agreements remain central to this domain. India has sought technological know-how from the US and continues to engage with the Americans on a prioritised basis, while filippingthe design and development of new technologies from its own human and material resources.</p> <p>As far as this is concerned, the US is a clearly a pioneering leader inair and aerospace technologies (especially aircrafts of newer generations) and has much to offer to India.</p>	<p>The United States retains skepticism about India owing to Indian reluctance to purchase fighter aircrafts that have been offered by the US to India. India's concerns rise from the US having historically strengthened the Pakistani Air Force with strike aircrafts.</p> <p>Going ahead, India's governing leaders have staunchly indicated that India is better poised to manufacture its own strike aircrafts and related matter such as air-to-air missiles, stealth technologies, etc. In this scenario, India may yet steer far and clear from taking up American offers in the military-air domain whileharnessing its indigenous militarycapabilities.</p>
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Non-conventional/Alternative Military Domains (Cyber, Space, Electromagnetic Spectrum,CBRN, etc.)	India has identified the cyber and space domains fairly recently, while the US is a historical and technological pioneer of advanced warfare paradigms and mechanisms such as these.	India is best placed, as a trusted partner, to utilise the US' immense expertise and know-how in such domains. Moreover, the US remains an evident leader in new fields bearing the possibility of new-agewarfare in the future.	-
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Historical Affiliation	<p>The US and India, while divergent during the Cold War's haranguing era, have always maintained a certain amicability since at least the end of World War II. The twenty-first century, in particular, is characterised by increasing American attention to India and the recognition of the rising power as bearing immense strategic value to the US due to numerous convergences such as democratic entwinedness and common security perceptions.</p>	<p>Historical differences can be transitioned into historical affiliation, and this should be long-lasting in the best interests of the parties involved.</p>	-
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Culture	<p>While culturally poles apart as conceptual entities, the United States and India are increasingly viewing each other as 'cultural partners'. The diversity and differences notwithstanding, increased cultural interactions and exchanges (establishment of cultural centres in each other's countries) have been a marker for cooperation and mutual affability.</p>	<p>The potential for increased cultural interactions and engagements to improve knowledge areas of a much neglected domain that is also a wide-ranging one. Culture, as of today, is no longer being viewed from the narrow prism of a society, religion, festivals, languages, etc. but includes several other areas such as religious secularism, peace as a means of the culture of peoples, cultural unity and friendships, modernity, etc.</p>	<p>Cultural differences can be narrowed to further the norms of friendship in even other areas that may be aligned with or independent of culture as a determinant of the roustness of ties.</p>
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Environment, Climate Change, and other non-traditional considerations	The US and India are two of the world's major carbon emmitters. However, as responsible democracies, they are committed to the global goal of emancipating climatical ills. Both sides are party to the Paris Agreement (Climate Action).	Cooperation in this domain remains most likely with the United States having returned to the Paris Agreement under President Joe Biden. It is worth assuming that the climate expediences are the most suitable in being addressed owing to them being the most easily negotiable of all the global commons given the immediate and apparent collective interests of the negotiating parties.	-
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Fig. 1 A depiction of bilateralism (alongwith tenets of multilateralism) between India and the United States

Source: Author's Compendium, from a number of different sources.

While it is necessary to attribute the wide range of differences between the two countries even in terms of the historical context, the present level of cooperation is vital to their shared interests and priorities. As far as history is concerned, there remains a bad taste in the mouth for India vis-à-vis the deep American alignments with Indian antagonists such as Pakistan (especially in the abrasive strategic environment of the 1970s). The US has extended large amounts of financial aid, military assistance, and emotional support to Pakistan in the wake of its conflicts

against India for a long time now, and India continues to remain wary of this despite elevated India-US ties.

Considering bilateral trade between the US and India, the US bears a rare distinction of being one of the few countries that are importing more from India than exporting to it, hence affording India a healthy trade surplus ([US\\$ 23.4 billion, as in 2019](#)). During the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic in India, the United States affirmed the Western nation's assistance to help India combat the human disaster. The United States also [benefited from Indian assistance](#) in the form of emergency shipments of the drug, hydroxychloroquine, which preceded the plethora of COVID-19 vaccines as a potential cure for the virus.

In the realm of defence, the US has identified India as a major defence partner. Military dealings from Washington to New Delhi have included transport and assistance aircraft, missile systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and radar systems. India's dire defence industry, while focussed on uplifting military development through campaigns such as *atmanirbharta* and indigenisation, is conspicuous through the lack of a world-class inventory and home base to meet its defence obligations. India ranks amongst the top countries in the world as far as military imports are concerned, and the country aims to not deny this in the wake of having sounded the bugle of *atmanirbharta*.

It must be noted that the US has also encouraged Indian nuclearism through the landmark 2008 US-India Nuclear Deal. While this has been restricted to the utility of nuclear energy for peaceful reasons, the US remains suspicious of increased Indian nuclearisation from its lofty and principled stand. India is one of the main nuclear-inclined countries as far as their use in the security domain is concerned, despite a stated and pronounced no-first-strike rule. Very recently, India upped its nuclear arsenal by adding [ten deployable warheads](#) while having asserted its no-first-use rule.

In summary, despite the extraordinary disparities that remain unresolved despite the rise of a general friendliness, the United States and India are more approachable to each other than they have ever been previously. As compared to the past, the two countries are now incessantly identifying and streamlining cooperation in a number of diverse avenues with a tacit acknowledgement of their respective potentiality. Step in a third major player, in Japan, into this equation and an immensely useful triumvirate is taking shape in the strategic universes of the world at large.

.JAPAN IN THE CONTEXT OF US-INDIA RELATIONS

Japan is an East Asian island-nation that comprises over 6,800 islands of which four (Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu) mould its major geography. To the south, Japan is chained by the Ryukyu set of islands, while the Sakhalin/Northern territories are located in the north. For the United States and India, Japan is key to their nuanced strategic involvement in Asia owing to geopolitical compulsions arising from security-disturbing occurrences. Japan's liberal democracy and everlasting (and yet-evolving) pacifism helps enable an accomodating philosophy of approach to international relations which holds immense benefit to both America and India.

In the present circumstances and scenarios, any move by the United States and India to improve and improvise upon their state of relations is welcomed first by Japan ahead of even other US-India well-wishers. Despite historical variances, Japan views both the US and India highly favourably in spite of the large-scale and long-sustained militarisation, modernisation, and nuclearisation of the two countries. In respect of the emerging security threats in the terrestrial, maritime, and alternative domains such as the cyber and space worlds, the US is an indispensable security partner to India and Japan, and the latter two have also reverted in kind. India officially seeks no American oversight of its security affairs since India is militarily competitive, despite an obvious difference in technological supremacy. Unlike Japan, India maintains its own nuclear shadow as far as potential military emergencies are concerned.

Assessing the contrarian argumentation, as per a renowned scholar, Japan views India with caution when the United States is considered in the equation of the Japan-US-India triumvirate. It is believed that India prefers its strategic autonomy above any other contemporary determinant of a nation-state's strategic behaviour making it still appear non-aligned despite having indicated a willingness to reign in joint militarity. This may prove to be a dampener in expanding the scope of the US-India-Japan (institutionalised in fundamental terms through the Japan-America-India summit-level dialogue; first held in 2018 and [then expanded in scope in 2019](#)) get-along. Another issue is the unalterable historical cultural gaps leading to a contentious distance that needs to be narrowed. Differences have also persisted in the approach to the realm of defence, with the United States and Japan known to not explicitly endorse Indian militarisation. Historical perceptions of each other have also laid bare their relations with all three countries vastly different in their character and composition for as long as they have existed.

The United States is nurturing a fast-growing shadow and influence in India's military affairs through trade of military assets and technology. It has designated India as a 'major defence

partner'. While this appears antithetical to India's strategic autonomy, it recognises India's military capability and provides India with a welcome option and an assurance in procuring its military stores. The US may yet seek to utilise India's friendship and commitment to the improved US-India bonhomie, incomparable to any other phase in the two countries' post-1945 history. This reason can be aptly used to hedge against China through a large and militarily-dominant country such as India, as opposed to the US' other smaller allies. Washington will obtain critical stakes in the Asian security construct with New Delhi's ascension to and facilitation of American security desires in constraining ideological opponents such as China. This seems to be a preferable scenario for all parties involved.

A favourable dynamic for this triumvirate is that the United States and India also view Japan highly positively owing to a number of synonymous and symmetric areas. This helps strengthen an existing dialogue such as JAI and helps enable newer ones. The areas of note are security, political, economic, environmental, human, social, and many other domains of interaction between alike states such as the three close democracies. The United States is the sole official ally of Japan while for India, the partnership with Japan is not just of high value but the outstanding one among India's other partners and those with important stakes in the South Asian country's long-heralded twenty-first century promise of a genuine rise.

CONCLUSION – TOWARDS STRONGER TWO-WAY AND THREE-WAY TIES

Within the ambit of the international relations being pursued by the three countries, all of the following five permutations of their relationships bear an seemingly contributive outlook to the criticality of the innumerable domains in Asia:

- 1.US-India
- 2.US-Japan
- 3.India-Japan
- 4.US-India-Japan (Japan-America-India, or JAI Dialogue)
- 5.Polygonal compositions that are witness to a limited (owing to the primacy of individualised state-leaning compulsions such as Indian strategic autonomy) but meaningful involvement of all three countries, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (US-India-Japan-Australia) and the Group of Twenty (G20).

All of the above are Asia-centric, Asia-Pacific-centric, and even Indo-Pacific-centric. The three geographies of these regions have all witnessed extensive Indian, Japanese, and American involvement in shaping their historical prevalence or emergence in the case of the Indo-Pacific

(the JAI is exceedingly an Indo-Pacific-focussed dialogue). The emboldening and strengthening of each of these distinct and necessary relations is all but mandated. In the framework of the rise of Asia as a continent, the exclusive rise of China as a superpower competitor to America owing to it possessing an outstanding acumen and ability to compete with America. The US and Japan are vital to the interests of Asian countries, not least India as far as economic, security and other dimensions of cooperation are concerned.

Going ahead, the below points are merited in the forging of a policy 'combine' can be forged to stimulate the rise of Asia (especially China and India given that Japan has been a vastly superior country for a long time):

1. Deeper bilateral and trilateral cooperation to strengthen already-established working mechanisms such as 2+2 meetings :

- Such meetings can be expanded in their scope to include other areas such as trade, commerce and cooperation in exigent health crises.
- A three-way scenario can also be visualised and implemented to address defence and foreign policy issues owing to increasing convergence of interests in these areas.
- The Indian Ocean region, alongside the Indo-Pacific, has been repeatedly endorsed by the United States and Japan with India geographically well suited to improve the participation of friends such as the Americans and the Japanese.

2. Mutually-beneficial and accommodating cooperative paradigms devised on the basis of short, medium, and long-term needs, goals, and geopolitical and geostrategic imperatives:

- Formal and informal cooperation is fast becoming a staple between the three countries. This is evident from a number of platforms and forums that are listed above, including the JAI dialogue.
- In this aspect in particular, they are well poised to work together to devise ways, means, and norms to achieve the prevalent and emerging political, economic, and strategic goals, and address them jointly.
- It has helped that the three sides broke ahead and realised the need for the above very early on. This has enshrined established norms, means, and ways of maneuvering cooperation and the experience gained from them will only productively enable future platforms and nascent ones such as the JAI.

3.The solicitation of new allies bearing a common outlook on events pertaining to politics, economics, security, conflict, etc. :

- India, Japan, and the United States are best described by their common democratic ideals and preferences, and a longing for a free and open world to facilitate liberal economic cooperation.
- This helps them forge new links with like-minded countries since the basis of cooperation between themselves would be in a free flow owing to the evident convergence of aims and goals (a reference to the Democratic Peace Theory can be made here as the US, India, and Japan have faced negligible conflictual issues in the recent era).

4.A sustained and mutually-abiding commitment (by all three sides) in theory, in reality, and in principle to elevate each other's foreign policy for the betterment of continuing present relations:

- A solid, yielding commitment on the above lines needs to be made to ensure that none of the three sides leave each other in distress. This will prove to be of consequence when dealing with issues such as adamant and uncompromising Chinese foreign policy devised to cater to the vested interests of the Peoples' Republic across a number of domains.
- In summation, the matter-of-factly principled configuration of India, Japan, and the United States in their being relatively open, free, fair, and transparent democracies with a responsibility towards the world (as opposed to oppressive and discriminatory regimes) leaves them better stationed to forge a requisite commitment on the lines of the above.

Intern's Corner

(1) INDIA- US COOPERATION IN SPACE SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

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ABSTRACT:

India-US relations are on an upward trajectory. The commitment of the two nations towards building upon the values of freedom, equality, and democratic principles underscores the mutual interests shared among them. Space, an avenue of cooperation between the two nations share a long thread of history among them. The recent synergy showcased by Washington and Delhi towards recognizing each other as partners through the promotion of various missions and in fostering technological advances by the means of strategic partnerships marks a tectonic shift from the cold stance of the bygone era to a mature understanding towards recognizing each other as equal partners. In this article, we examine India- US space cooperation through the ages and touch upon the key milestones, understand the critical issues that impeded growth and analyze the policies and initiatives that brought in the resurgence of the new era.

Keywords: NASA, ISRO, INCOPSAR, ASAT, BECA, CSLA, NPT, MTCR, SITE, NSSP, HTCG

Introduction:

India- US space cooperation has come a long way. There is a long thread of history that binds and connects the two nations. NASA or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the foremost Civilian Space agency of the USA had its inception in the year 1958¹ while India's Space program had its early origins as INCOPSAR² or (Indian Committee on Space Research) in the year 1962. It was later on Independence Day, 1969 that INCOSPAR was reorganized and rechristened to the now ubiquitous ISRO or the Indian Space Research Organization.

Both the space agencies are governed by a set of policies with a focus on the civilian aspect of space science. Since the beginning, the two agencies have always worked together and forged ahead towards cooperation and understanding. However technological progress and advances

of the East have often been misrepresented and misquoted in the earlier days, largely as a matter of suspicion by the West. The formation of export control regimes such as MTCR and NSG which prevented the transfer and trade of critical technologies has always been an impediment towards sustaining long-term cooperation. The indigenous development of advanced technologies within India and the credibility showcased by India towards the stance of being a responsible and mature state has led to the US taking a softer stance³.

The Beginnings: 1960- 1980

India in 1962 was one of the early partners of NASA. During this era, high-altitude atmospheric studies were the main area of research. At a time before India even had a launchpad, it was American expertise that was made available towards the setting up of TERLS (Thumba Equatorial Launch Station) or Thumba. NASA had handsomely loaned its Nike-Apache rockets which paved the way for India gaining valuable experience towards understanding the nuances of the space program and in building expertise towards launching of rockets and in setting up of the facility⁴.

While the *Nike-Apache* program helped kick start the Indian space program, it wasn't until the inception of the SITE or Satellite Instructional Television Experiment⁵(1972-1976) that helped galvanize and fuel India's ambitions towards having a dedicated series of communication satellites and in utilizing space assets for fulfilling civilian aspirations.

The vision of Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, founder of the Indian Space Program in envisaging the role of advanced technologies pertaining to space for the development of society set the track forwards for the Indian space program.

SITE:

During the 1960s, NASA as part of its applications technology satellites program had sought to test the direct broadcast of television programs to terrestrial receivers via satellite. The project had an objective to make available quality informational television content to the backward regions of the country towards educating the illiterate, promote academic learning, showcase cultural diversity and inculcate the technical aspects of setting up satellite-based terrestrial systems.

India was shortlisted as one of the three countries alongside China and Brazil to test out the program owing to the large size of its population and its proximity to the equator. These were some of the technical prerequisites that were to be fulfilled towards the awarding of the project. Eventually due to the political will, and in satisfying the technical feasibility in hosting the project, India was chosen by NASA to take up the project. India initially approached the United

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for assistance and in the wake of a feasibility study conducted by Indian engineers, it was concluded that India could satisfy all the technical requirements for the project.

As per the recommendation, the Indian government setup the National **Satellite communications** Group **SATCOM** in 1968 consisting of representatives from various cabinet ministries, AIR, Doordarshan, and ISRO. The main agenda of the group was to study and look into the possible uses of a synchronous communication satellite. On 18th September 1969, an *MOU* was inked between the Government of India and the Government of the United States of America regarding the India- US satellite experiment project.

The project was launched on 1st August 1975 and ran for a year. The US had repositioned its ATS-6 satellite towards the transmission and broadcast of the VHF signals. Over the course of the following year, over 2400 Indian Villages received quality content with an audience of about 200 – 600 people per TV set at its peak. The British science writer Arthur C. Clarke touted SITE as the “*greatest communications experiment in history*”. This revolution in learning, the spread of cultural programs, and the impact towards uplifting mass sections of the society eventually led to India setting up the nationwide Indian National Satellite system in 1982.

1980-the 2000s: NPT and the Cryogenics Affair

While there was extensive cooperation and goodwill among the two nations during the initial years, things began to sour. The testing of the Indian nuclear device in 1974 at Pokhran did not go well with the West and it was strongly condemned by Washington⁶.

The main factor which led to the deteriorating relationship and distrust was the issue of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)⁷. India being a non-signatory, and being critical of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was found estranged in a disputed and frictional relationship with the Western bloc. India's closeness to the communist-led Soviet Regime did not elevate its stance. India- US cooperation suffered in a core strategic sector in the area of civilian nuclear energy and following the launch of India's first space launch vehicle (SLV-3) in 1980, space cooperation became the next casualty. India's rapid strides in the development of launch vehicle technologies were keenly observed by the West and suspicions started to arise over its purported intent. India's foreign policy, despite being nonaligned to any major power and yet its dependence on the Soviets for military hardware fueled apprehensions and built discord within the western bloc towards India's commitment and ambitions in the international arena.

The main impediment towards the growth of the Indian space program is the stance on items of dual-use. Dual-use technologies⁸ refer to those which can be used for civilian and military applications. As per the classification of dual-use, Rocket technologies such as propulsion come

under the same banner as that of Missile technology and is met with derision. A repurposed Rocket with a functioning navigational system can be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction. In the wake of India's response to the NPT, the MTCR or **Missile Technology Control Regime**, an export control group of which both Moscow and Washington are a part was formed in 1987.

MTCR⁹ prohibited the transfer of dual-use technologies and this led to a stall in the development of crucial space technologies. While India had mastered the art of solid rocket motors, liquid or cryogenic based propulsion was an elusive affair. During the late 1980's ISRO initiated the development of a 1-ton cryogenic engine to be used on its planned future launch vehicle the GSLV. The Americans, French, and the Russians offered their engines to be sold with the fine print being the prohibition of technology transfer. However, in 1989, a Soviet company Glavkosmos offered the sale of two cryogenic engines, technology transfer, and training of ISRO personnel at a deal encompassing (\$132 Million). While this deal was initially taken up by the two nations, The US government, 15 months later demanded that the deal be called off since it violated the terms of the MTCR.

The deal between Glavkosmos and ISRO wasn't called off, and India continued the ensuing development of the program. Following this, The US imposed a two-year sanctions¹¹ from 1992 that voided all contracts between ISRO and the US and the transfer of any goods or services between them.

In 1993, following a change of regime in Russia, Glavkosmos also renegotiated the cryogenics deal and India eventually had to contend with just the sale of engines and no technology transfer from Russia¹². While these developments eventually led to the indigenization of the critical components of the GSLV program, the negative approach by the US to the whole ordeal led to skepticism and distrust among the Indian Scientists. The Nuclear tests of 1998 at Pokhran by India were the final nail in the coffin which eventually led to all relationships being curtailed and the imposition of sanctions on a wide range of areas.

2000-2020: Resurgence

While the period from 1980 to the early 2000s can be considered as a rocky and dark phase in India – US relations, the arrival of the new millennia saw an upward trajectory in terms of the relations between the two countries. The Bush administration since 2004 was liberal in terms of the approach towards dealing with India. The change in the dynamics of the Geopolitics post

9/11 and the rise of India as an emerging power can be attributed as one of the reasons towards this stance. The administration reached out by the means of constituting a committee.

The Bush administration envisaged for better strategic ties between the two nations and authorized the India-US High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG)¹³. The Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)¹⁴, under the ambit of the HTCG, launched in 2004 identified areas of strategic cooperation with India. Space was identified as one of the areas of strategic cooperation

An outcome of the NSSP, The India-US Joint Working Group on Civil Space (CSJWG)¹⁵ established in 2005 is a significant mechanism and tool to ensure both the states expand their cooperation in civilian space programs and to explore a broad range of possibilities to facilitate cooperation towards joint satellite missions and activities. Since 2005, there have been a total of 7 meetings¹⁶ between the CSJWG where delegations from both nations. The meetings of the CSJWG are now a biennial event¹⁷.

One of the first developments in space cooperation following the setup of the NSSP was the development of the Indian Lunar program aptly named Chandrayaan or Moon Craft in Sanskrit. Under the aegis of these initiatives, the first agreement between the two nations in 2006 was reached when India allowed the USA to host two of its payloads on its first Moon Mission.

The Chandrayaan-1¹⁸ mission launched in 2008 was a technological marvel. Not only did the mission cement India's place on the Moon with the Indian flag imprinted on the lunar surface with the Moon Impactor Probe (MIP), being one of the few nations in the world to achieve so, but the Moon Minerology Mapper or the M3 instrument (Provided by the USA) on the Chandrayaan orbiter detected for the first time the presence of water ice on the lunar surface. The data sharing among the countries also highlights the keenness of the United States to involve India as a close ally in its foreign policy.

The launch of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) between the United States and India was a key milestone in history that set the bilateral relations back on track. Another positive outcome of the NSSP was the Technical Safeguards Agreement (TSA) which was inked in 2009. The TSA¹⁹ was a landmark reform that would *"facilitate the launch of US satellite components on Indian space launch vehicles"*. It was also during this time that negotiations were on for the CSLA or the Commercial Satellite Launch Agreement which would allow for the launch of American commercial satellites onboard Indian launch vehicles.

CSLA, A thorn on the road?

One of the clauses of the CSLA²⁰ which was to include satellite services in the agreement was strongly refuted by the Indian government because it was felt all other CSLAs that the US had

inked with other countries towards space cooperation didn't include the section on satellite services.

In 2016, following the launch of 4 American satellites by the PSLV²¹, the US watchdog, FAA, or the Federal Aviation Administration reiterated its stance that the *“Commercial satellites shouldn't be launched aboard ISRO rockets until India had signed the CSLA”*²². Later that year in April, private spaceflight companies in the US called for a ban on using the PSLV for launching commercial satellites because they suspected the Indian government was subsidizing launches. Industry experts²³ in India argue that while the CSLA may open up the Indian space industry towards the launch of more American commercial satellites, it may also lead to the imposition of certain limits on the pricing at which the PSLV operates. This may lead to Indian launches being priced higher, and losing their flexibility in terms of their operations.

However, While India is yet a signatory to the CSLA, India continues to attract low-cost launch services from the US and has launched several satellites built by the American private sector. India has been consistently launching American satellites since 2010²⁴ and both the nations have MOU's signed for cooperation towards exploration towards the peaceful uses of outer space. The launch of foreign satellites has bolstered the pride and prestige of the Indian space program and has brought in hundreds of millions of dollars in terms of foreign exchange. India with its PSLV holds a high-water mark for being able to deliver the satellites to Orbit at a much lower cost in comparison with other launch vehicles.

India's cooperation in space with the US goes beyond just launches and missions. The biennial India-U.S. Civil Space Joint Working Group²⁵ discusses possibilities and issues across a wide spectrum that spans cutting-edge Earth observation capabilities to interplanetary exploration and supported new opportunities for collaboration, including in the areas of human space flight and exploration.

ASAT, SSA, and BECA:

In recent times, conferences and dialogues are held highlighting space as a fundamental area of cooperation among the framework of the partnership between India and the USA. The India US 2+2 Strategic dialogue^{26,27} is a significant development in terms of cooperation among the two nations. These dialogues first initiated in the year 2018 is the second-highest meeting that is conducted in the ministerial dialogue format between foreign and defense secretaries and ministers of the two countries. These dialogues held towards enhancing the defense, power, economic aspect of the two nations in mind have been incorporating an element of space cooperation in the theme.

The four foundational Military agreements signed namely :

1. General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)
2. Logistics Support Agreement (LSA)
3. Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA)
4. Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA)

touch upon aspects of space towards civilian purposes and in the strengthening of defense capabilities. Of these four agreements, the last one, BECA is a significant step forward as BECA will allow India to access US military satellites, confidential geospatial information, sensitive satellite and sensor data, and topographical images. It will help India carry out more accurate airstrikes and missile attacks on its enemies and track Chinese warship movements in the Indian Ocean. In terms of maintaining India's credibility as a region of power and influence within the North-Eastern Hemisphere, India must get access to satellite data and telemetry which will enhance its projection of power and deployment of assets.

The support and recognition extended by the US towards the conduction of India's recent ASA T or Anti- Satellite Test, Mission SHAKTI²⁸ in 2019 is a matter of significant interest. The test marks India's presence of being the 4th nation in the world to achieve this feat and also to demonstrate its capability of taking out enemy space assets. India having deployed in orbit multiple space assets and satellite systems is slowly moving from its sole civilian aspirations in space towards a defense posture. The opening of the Defense Space Agency²⁹ in 2019 marks this strategic shift. Both India and the USA have expressed keenness towards cooperating in the aspect of Space warfare and defense.

A point of specific interest to this author that was noted was during the second and the third 2+2 strategic dialogues is the sharing of bilateral Space Situational Awareness information³⁰. This is an unprecedented step in the right direction not just for India and the USA, but also for the welfare of other players in the domain of space. The cooperation towards creating the conditions for a safe, stable, and sustainable space environment is a paradigm shift towards ensuring the sustainability of space in the long term. Space is cluttered with objects and debris, this debris which includes the remnants of satellites, launch vehicles, and other artificial space junk is increasing at an alarming rate in the low earth orbit. With an increase of more than 10-fold the present number of satellites to be launched, and the expected commercialization of LEO³¹ set to be the agenda for many states and private enterprises in the upcoming years, debris must be tracked to minimize and mitigate the threat posed to satellites.

Previously, ISRO had relied on NORAD data which is released by the US govt. towards debris tracking. The data set available to ISRO was however not real-time and of a specific format. In recent times ISRO has established an office specifically towards space situational awareness. The Government of India has roped in astronomical facilities and institutions towards utilizing this purpose. Agreements on data sharing between India and the USA towards SSA will greatly build trust among the two nations and the synergy towards this initiative will help transform the commercial and defense landscape for the greater good of mankind in space.

Another key milestone and approval of Indian capabilities in space is the recent recognition of India's NAVIC by the US as a component of an allied system. This recognition is significant uptick in terms of development towards boosting confidence and cooperation among the two nations. The upcoming NASA-ISRO "NISAR" mission purported to be launched in 2022³², is the world's most advanced earth observation satellite and plans of future cooperation for exploration of deep space crystalizes the multi-faceted areas of interest and cooperation that these two countries would go about in the future.

It is clear that slowly but steadily India's space prowess is not just an expression of its technological capabilities, but a testament to how India has yielded its advances in the domain of space towards securing gains in its diplomatic pursuits. The initial cooperation between the two great nations following by the brief hiatus in the '80s and the '90s and a rocketing growth in the new millennia is a testament to the energy, innovation, and trust shared by the two nations in terms of being a part of a role maker for the rest of the world. The future for both India and the USA is both looking skywards.

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(2) US withdrawal from Afghanistan: Implications for India

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“Mr. Sullivan also made clear the United States’ intention to review the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, including to assess whether the Taliban was living upto its commitments to cut ties with the terrorist groups, to reduce violence in Afghanistan, and to engage in meaningful negotiations with the afghan government and other stakeholders”, said newly appointed National Security Council spokesperson Emily Horne in a press briefing¹. However this does not negate the fact that USA has been highly parochial in its engagement with Afghanistan that rendered it unsuccessful in stabilizing the region. This article tries to explore a brief history of US involvement in Afghanistan, emergence of Taliban and American response towards Taliban over a period of time. It also tries to demystify the reason behind US retrenchment from Afghanistan and finally its implications for India.

Historical Analysis-

Historically, Afghanistan is known as the ‘Graveyard of Empires’. A society flourished along the Hindu Kush mountain range which is also the westernmost extension of the Pamir Mountains, the Karakoram and the Himalayas. It gained enormous significance because of its strategic geographical location as a gateway to a great ancient civilisation ie Indus Valley Civilisation. The nomenclature mentioned earlier is bestowed to this region of the globe because empire after empire and nation after nation have failed to maintain their stranglehold even after initial successes. The mighty British Empire² of 19th century lost the first Anglo- Afghan war 1839-1842. Britain learnt from this event that it is often easier to do business with the local rulers with popular support than to support a leader backed by foreign power. The next theatre of ‘Afghanistan Quagmire’ occurred after more than a century when the country was caught in cold war bipolar rivalry. First USSR and then USA has failed miserably to continue their dominant influence in Afghanistan. There are three broad factors responsible for such a precarious situation of the empires at different point of time in history. First, the strategic location of Afghanistan which is at intersection of main land route between Iran, Central Asia and India. Over thousands of years, this land has witnessed number of invasions that led to

settlement of plethora of tribes, often hostile to each other. Second, the invasive character of the region have profound impact on the general mind set of indigenous population. Suspicious of any eventuality, villages in the region is built resembling fortress. Third, difficult terrains with extreme temperature juxtaposed with rough mountain landscape, makes it extremely difficult to conquer and rule.

As mentioned earlier, cold war rivalry led to the involvement of two superpowers into Afghanistan quagmire. First, Soviets intervened militarily in order to save the nascent communist regime of Afghanistan and to broaden its sphere of influence with reference to the ideological proselytizing competition going on between US and Soviets. Soviet invasion of 1979 led to fierce opposition by local armed guerrilla insurgent groups. Financial, military and sympathetic support poured in from all over the world, especially by the Islamic countries and Muslim population who saw the modernising efforts the communist regime as an assault on the religious identity of Afghan society. Soviet backed puppet regime of Afghanistan had to face the combined strength of various local armed militia. To take advantage of this fragile situation and to secure the strategic location, USA started investing heavily to reinforce these enchanted local groups. It was supported in its endeavour by Saudi's finance and Pakistan's intelligence. Afghan insurgents began to receive massive amount of support through aid, finance and military training in neighbouring Pakistan with significant help from United States. The combined insurgents, known by the name 'Mujahideen', thrived and guided by Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) OF United States to pose a severe challenge for Soviets backed Afghan government. The Haqqani network coordinated by a prominent Mujahideens became the prominent instrument of this foreign assistance. Throughout 1980s, costly Afghan invasion and ensuing arms race, drained Soviet's economy which eventually culminated into soviets withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. Soon after the withdrawal of Soviet Union, fissures started emerging among Afghan Mujahideens. Constant infighting resulted in the rise of one faction 'Taliban' (Pasto for 'students') and an opposing coalition 'northern alliance'. Eventually, after several years of protracted civil war, Taliban seized power at Kabul in 1996 under Mullah Mohammed Omar and declared Afghanistan an Islamic emirate. It kept ruling it until 2001 when a US-led invasion toppled ³ the regime for providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda and Osama bin laden. 20 years down the line, scholars suggest that Taliban is currently stronger than at any time since their inception. Since last five years itself, this quagmire in Afghanistan has killed 2400 Americans, 1100 NATO troops, more than 43000 civilians and an estimated 45000 Afghan troops and police officers

American response to Taliban

U.S. costly and longest war in Afghanistan can be seen as a price paid by the sole superpower to maintain its global hegemony. It started with cold war rivalry during which Mujahideen and United states worked in tandem against a common enemy. But after withdrawal of Soviets, USA refused to anchor the establishment of a responsible government in Afghanistan. Volatile situation under a regime of predominantly Pashtun, Islamic fundamentalist group, Taliban, became a breeding ground for thriving of terrorist outfits. Extreme involvement of United States in Saudi Arabia's political and defence architecture led to a disenchanted Islamic intellectual, Osama Bin laden, to go down to the path of terrorism, not the ideological one but an antagonistic one against United States of America for their undue and unrestrained presence in Saudi Arabia. Having orchestrated bombing of US embassies in East Africa, al-Qaeda operatives under Osama-bin laden attacked World Trade Centre in the United States on September 11, 2001 killing more than 3000 people. This led United States to declare a global 'war on terror.' As mentioned earlier, Taliban government was overthrown by United States in 2001 and the prominent Taliban fighters escaped to frontier territories of Pakistan. Since then, for almost 20 years now, Taliban has conducted insurgency in US backed Afghan government targeting higher officials, politicians, local leaders and US interests from their base in Pakistan. Currently, there are 2500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan along with 6346 contractors.⁴ The US troops in Afghanistan which peaked to 100000 in 2011, has to be reduced to nil by May 1 under a withdrawal agreement signed by former president Donald Trump and the Taliban in February 2020. The United States provide critical 4.8 billion in assistance per year which amounts to almost 80% of Afghans security expenditures.

United States-Taliban Agreement

Title of the agreement itself reveals the inherent contradiction and thereby put its implementation in doubt. Title on US State Department's website is "Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized⁵ by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America." Part one of the agreement says The United States is committed to withdraw from Afghanistan all military forces of the United States, its allies, and Coalition partners, including all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting services personnel within fourteen (14) months following announcement of this agreement. Part two lays down the commitment by Afghanistan that their soil would not be used by any group or individual which threatens the security of United States or its allies anywhere in the world.

Third part details United States economic and strategic support to the post-settlement Afghan government to rebuild the nation. The United States and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban seek positive relations with each other and expect that the relations between the United States and the new post-settlement Afghan Islamic government as determined by the intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations will be positive.⁸ The United States will seek economic cooperation for reconstruction with the new post-settlement Afghan Islamic government as determined by the intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations, and will not intervene in its internal affairs. Also, The United States will request the recognition and endorsement of the United Nations Security Council for this agreement. After the US election and removal of Donald Trump, President Joe Biden has recognised the fact that violence in Afghanistan has not stooped which was considered a pre- condition for the implementation. Hence US administration has called for the review of this agreement.

India navigating the 'Quagmire':

India has its principled stand on Afghan settlement as "an Afghan owned, Afghan led and Afghan controlled process for enduring peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan."⁶ but the Taliban deal is neither Afghan owned, nor Afghan led, but US controlled. India and Afghanistan signed Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2011 that strengthened the bilateral relationship. India has been playing a major developmental role in Afghanistan. Since almost 20 years now, India has invested more than 3 billion dollars in Afghanistan in various infrastructure projects to enhance their capacity. These include Afghan- India Friendship Dam ⁷ (also known as Salma Dam), building Afghan Parliament, helped in restoration of Stor Palace in Kabul, helped in training and capacity building of Afghan national police personnel in various field in addition to India's ongoing assistance for the Afghan national defence and security forces. In 2017, India agreed to implement new projects, under 'New Development Partnership', such as the Shahtoot Dam and drinking water and irrigation projects in Kabul, road connectivity to Band-e-Amir in Bamyán province that would promote tourism, housing resettlement for refugees in Nangarhar province, gypsum board manufacturing plant in Kabul etc. Commercially, bilateral trade between two countries is around 1.5 billion dollars with immense potential to enhance trade which face difficulty in transit via Pakistan. Chabahar Port has a demonstrated feasibility as a transit point for Afghanistan and eventually Central Asia. Operationalized in 2017, the port has so far handled over 5000 containers ferrying over 110000 tons of wheat and 2000 tons of pulses sent by India as assistant to Afghanistan. At cultural dimension of the relationship, India and Afghanistan has immense historical and cultural

linkages which get its manifestation in various India- Afghan cultural exchanges such as “India-Afghanistan Cultural week” held in 2017 in collaboration with India- Afghanistan Foundation (IAF) and ICCR etc. This multi- faceted relationship was made possible because of growing strategic convergence and bonhomie between the Government in Afghanistan and India. Northern Alliance which is a part of the Afghan government has played an important role in transitional government after 2001 US raid and thereafter. During Taliban regime, India provided extensive assistance⁸ to the Northern Alliance in the form of uniforms, ordnance, mortars, small armaments, combat and winter cloths, packaged food, medicines etc. Whereas Taliban is being supported both in military and intelligence by Pakistan and its intelligence agency Inter Service Intelligence (ISI). During the Taliban regime of 1996-2001, when it was recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and UAE, Taliban was not recognised by India which was the reason why Taliban did not provide any assistance when IC814 hijacking episode took place in 1999. As Arun Singh, the former Indian ambassador to the United States, recollects, during the hijacking, “it was painfully revealed to us that India had no outreach to the structures dominating Afghanistan then.”⁹ Several other initiatives by Taliban government like destruction of Bamiyan Buddha monuments, policy in 2001 requiring Afghan Hindus to wear identification patches similar to Nazi policy etc led India to further its stand against Taliban.

New reality and India’s strategic conundrum-

India was able to make such an extensive inroads into Afghanistan’s political, economic and cultural life due to firm presence of United States and friendly political establishment in Afghanistan. The recent Taliban deal, formally known as ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan’, proves antithetical to India on both these fronts. First, the agreement clearly details the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan within fourteen months which can potentially leave India perplexed with lack of powerful advocate for Indian presence. Second, Taliban, which is being funded and nurtured by Pakistan’s ISI and has an established link with the Haqqani group, is going to share legitimate political power in Afghanistan as per the agreement. There is also an apprehension that China, colluding with Pakistan, can potentially play a bigger role which may not please India, either with larger strategic aim of keeping eye on Pakistan or making inroads through various strategic infrastructural projects.¹⁰ Considering these nuances of Afghanistan’s past political endgame, present political reality and involvement of foreign powers, Strategic response by India to this altered equation, especially after the ‘Taliban deal’ (notwithstanding Biden administration’s approach to Afghanistan), need recalibration. At the outset there are potential risks involved after the implementation of

Taliban deal. Firstly, India is one of the few countries that has been a victim of high profile terrorist attacks both across the borders and in big cities like Mumbai, Delhi etc. Use of Pakistan's territory, both as a sanctuary for the perpetrators of these attacks and as a sponsoring state is well known. When Taliban enters Afghan legitimate political circle, Pakistan's involvement in day to day affairs of Afghanistan would enhance immensely which will boost Haqqani group to further its activities in India. Most probably, Jammu and Kashmir region may seem to be in frontline. On this front, recent revocation of article 370 of Indian Constitution and extension of central government's control over newly created Union territories may see a change in approach towards these cross border influences. Islamic state- Khorasan (IS-K), a branch of self-proclaimed Islamic state operating in South Asia and Central Asia can prove to be breeding ground for disenchanted youth in the region and military personnel from Pakistan army. Recent attack on gurudwara, in Kabul is the most telling example of very real security risk to India's footprint in Afghanistan. Second, Considering Pakistan's huge influence over the conduct of Taliban, a recent development can be seen as a significant development from India's perspective. In a meeting hosted by Foreign Ministry of Turkmenistan ¹¹ along with delegation of Taliban from Afghanistan headed by leader Molla Abdul Ghani Baradar, Taliban expressed full support for the implementation of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. Many other infrastructure projects that have been financed and built by India are subjected to similar kind of roadblocks if not guaranteed by Taliban.

Way forward ?

Although the terms and conditions of the 'Taliban Deal' cannot be presumed to be final because of the change in US administration, India has to adjust its strategy to accommodate itself into this new reality. Security concerns cannot be ignored because, as mentioned earlier, 'Haqqani network', a faction of Taliban, have in past targeted Indian assets and installations in Afghanistan. Unlike Russia and China, India has not employed any special envoys¹² to Afghanistan. This is true that India sent diplomats and officials to the 2018 Russia-sponsored peace conference with the Taliban and to the signing of the peace agreement between the United States and the Taliban, they were restricted in their interactions. India needs to be pragmatic in its approach and prepare itself to at least talk to some section of Taliban because if India choose otherwise, it will isolate itself from an important negotiation in which almost all the great powers are involved. Furthermore, India needs to broaden its Political and diplomatic engagement within Afghanistan. This can be done potentially through leveraging India's relationship with Iran and Russia which are involved in facilitating intra-Afghan talks. Concurring with the general demand of Afghans, a US official ¹³, who happens to be the first

official to resign resign in protest over the war in Afghanistan told Washington Post : “upon arriving in Afghanistan and serving in both the east and south, I found that the majority of those who were fighting us were fighting us because they felt occupied.”

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(3) Expectations under Biden's Presidency: India and Indian Americans

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Joe Biden, the 46th President of the United States, and Kamala Harris, the 49th Vice-President of the United States, were sworn into office on 20th January 2021. The Vice-President's Indian American roots has incessantly brought up the question of what Biden's Presidency means to Indians Americans.

To begin with, the issue of immigration, which is central to the substantial number of non-citizen Indians in the US, is likely to improve. The current immigration policy has a 7% cap per country on issuing green cards. The policy has severely restrained Indian professionals, especially in the IT sector, seeking permanent residency in the US for decades (Chothani and Phophalia 2021). Unlike Donald Trump who saw the Indian-American community as vital to India-US relations, Biden takes a more inward-looking perspective where he sees the community, which largely consists of professionals, as a significant contributor to USA's economic growth.

This was demonstrated by Biden when he reversed one of Trump's key anti-immigrant policies. During the pandemic, Trump froze four categories of immigration visa and permanent residency application. Additionally, citing excess labour supply during the pandemic, he issued a policy that blocked Green Card applicants who had been working in the US on a H1B visa from entering the country (Krishnankutty 2021). Biden revoked the policy stating the counterproductive nature of the act, which conflicts with US economic interests by blocking significant contributors and reopened the country for green card applicants (Lakshman 2021).

It is also possible that he will eventually relax the country-wise cap on green card approvals, which will benefit the predominantly middle class Indian Americans, when the economic situation improves in the US. On these lines, it is certain that Biden will further enhance immigration policies, by simplifying and accelerating H1B processes and green card approval rates with the added interests of Vice-President Harris. Regardless simply modernizing the system will help the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the US, more than 500,000 of whom are from India (Passel and Cohn 2019). This will be in accordance with 64% Indian Americans who strongly believe should have the opportunity to eventually become US citizens, according to the 2020 Asian American Voter Survey.

The effects of the move will spill-over to benefit Indian students as well, of whom the US saw lesser applicants under Trump's rule of tighter visa and immigration policies (Anderson 2020). As welcoming as it is, the benefit of the immigration policy reversals is doubled by the Biden administration's enhancement of education investments, which will be favourable for Indian

engineers who power the US economy and focus on measures increasing visa quotas for STEM graduates.

However, the complete realisation of Biden's promises remains precarious. Using filibuster, Republicans can simply turn down bills proposed by Biden that do not align with their party's interests. A filibuster is when the minority in the senate (41 senators) does not agree to vote on a proposal, effectively blocking the bill. Although filibusters were rare in the past, more recently, almost every major bill is filibustered (Chang 2019). Although the Biden administration's promises to immigrant communities seem beneficial, it cannot be said with certainty that they will or can be implemented. On that account, passage of bills regarding immigration issues will heavily depend on the country's recovery from the economic recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. A lot of senators will reasonably not be in favour of relaxing immigration policies when jobs are scarce. An executive order is always on the cards, but they will be as easy to reverse as Trump's policies that Biden is revoking at the moment. This area will particularly be key in testing Biden's commitment to the promises made to the Indian American community through the strategies he is willing to deploy and the extent he is willing to go to fulfill them.

While the execution of direct promises remains variable, Indian Americans, who largely belong to the middle class in the US, will significantly benefit from Biden increasing access to public-private investments for small businesses hit hard during the pandemic. Although there are existing Public Private Partnership programs to help small businesses, Biden's administration aims to further increase the flow of capital particularly towards the 98% of the small firms that have less than 20 employees. He has also eliminated restrictions that prevent funding for individuals with prior non-fraud felony convictions and student loan defaulters. Most importantly, he has opened the way for non-citizen business owners who are US residents to apply for PPP funding and access low interest business loans (Arora 2021). This will open more opportunities for Indian Americans in the US and help them realise the *American Dream*.

In contrast to Donald Trump's "I love Hindus" sentiment and persistence on the Muslim Ban, Biden is more likely to be inclusive of all Indian-Americans regardless of their religion because of the vitality of Indian Americans' in his cabinet, in addition to the community's economic contribution. He issued a memorandum that directs the department of justice to particularly tackle hate crimes and xenophobic harassment that the previous administration passively promoted, and that Indian Americans of all backgrounds have been subject to. The justice department will particularly focus their additional resources on religion-based hate crimes in light of recent white nationalist terrorist acts (Chamlee 2021). The move may not be substantial, but it can be seen as the first step towards assuring the non-whites of a safer country.

Given that Biden's presidency is bound to increase Indian engagement with American politics because of the prominent position Kamala Harris holds, it is convenient to assume that the United States' engagement with Indian issues may change. But it is pertinent to remember that

Harris and the other key Indian officials in the Biden administration are American citizens first. Their presence may enhance India-U.S. relations, but they are primarily individuals with their own political perspectives surrounding their loyalty to the American constitution.

On that account, it is important to understand that Indian Americans are more than just individuals with Indian roots. As much as they are of Indian origin and would like good India-US relations, they do not specifically form their political inclinations based on a party's India policy. In fact, only 52% of Indian Americans follow political developments in India (Badrinathan et al 2020, 18). Nearly 75% of Indian Americans identify with the democratic party despite Biden and Harris condemning Modi's CAA (Badrinathan et al 2020, 17). On the other hand, according to the Asian American Voter Survey, less than 30% identify with the republican party, when Trump remained mute about Modi's arguably discriminatory policies, such as BJP's proposal of an all-India National Register of Citizens, the passage of the Citizenship Amendment Act, police brutality against protestors and the revocation of Kashmir's autonomous status. In fact, in early 2020, 40% of Indian Americans believed that the level of US support for India at the moment was just about the right amount and 24% believed it should in fact be more (Badrinathan et al 2020, 40).

While Americans, including the Indian American community, are fighting for equality and the elimination of discrimination on any basis, the community as a whole tends to be more conservative about issues affecting India than the US (Badrinathan et al 2020, 31). The defeat of democrat Preston Kulkarni who is allegedly linked to Hindu right wing groups does not particularly correspond to this finding (Purushothaman 2020). However, the recent email campaign urging Harris to act against a rape in Uttar Pradesh in October 2020 also deviates from the finding by pointing towards the Indian American community expecting liberal action from the US (Kambhampaty and Perrigo 2020). The Indian Americans' relation to India-US relations, therefore, is not as direct as one assumes it to be.

For India, USA's re-entry into the Paris climate agreement, which US and India worked closely on in the past, will be beneficial with regards to the funding flow from US to India for sustainable development. USA strengthening ties with India to stand against China is also likely to be favourable for India, however, depending on the extent to which the USA is willing to push China. But a special emphasis on friendly India-US relations may not be prioritized by the Biden Administration so much for delivering to the Indian Americans than for delivering to the American population's conviction about human rights and liberties. The Biden Administration is likely to stay sensitive and subtle about issues in India to make sure that it neither alienates a key part of the US demographic nor interferes into India's internal affairs unwarrantedly. Stability-wise, this will be favourable for Indian Americans, but socio-politically we are yet to discover how this might fold out. In an attempt to balance both sides, a right mix of confrontation and camaraderie that maintains the rapport between India and the USA is probable.

On that note, Biden might seem to be devoted to delivering to the Indian American community, but the promises need to be taken with a pinch of salt. Beyond filibusters and executive orders and beyond Biden's commitment to enhancing the lives of Indian Americans, at the end of the day, America comes first before its individual communities and the Biden administration will cater to these communities specifically only as long as it is a part of the process of prioritizing America in the midst of this global pandemic. The Biden administration, with its Indian Americans, will have a better understanding of the community in the US. But this particular factor will not drive India-US relations to all its glory.

The next four years of Biden's rule might not substantially enhance the lives of Indian Americans, simply owing to Biden's promises or the dynamics of his cabinet. But it will definitely give them a reassuring government that will build from scratch the lost faith that the US will be consciously inclusive of them.

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(4) US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-TRUMP ERA : PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

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ABSTRACT

The 2020 US Presidential Election is one of the most controversial elections in recent years, even resulting in countrywide riots and violent protests. The 4-year tenure of President Donald Trump is also shown to have a detrimental effect on the USA's position in the global arena and its leadership role to the liberal world. Trump's disregard for multilateral institutions and its dealing with the pandemic, allies and enemy countries have raised questions on the presidency's efficacy. With the new Democratic President-elect, Joe Biden set to enter office on January 20th; it is strongly speculated that the government's foreign policy will consistently align with traditional western liberal order.

Key Words: United States of America, Foreign Policy, Presidency, Multilateralism, Isolationism, Conservatism, Alliance, Policy-Formulation, Hegemony, COVID-19

After the end of US isolation from international affairs in the 20th century, its foreign policy was fundamentally framed to fulfil the objective of building and maintaining global supremacy. Based on its economy and military, US hegemony was established shortly after the Second World War. The hegemony also enabled her to create the liberal world order and institutions, based on its political and economic ideals that further increased the US economy. US engagements with other sovereign states and multilateral institutions and practices like containment and alliance building were all aimed at furthering this objective. Even when presidents with conflicting political views ascended the leadership role, there was little to no instrumental alteration to this primary focus. However, under Donald Trump's presidency and his adherence to the 'America First Policy', the US foreign policy was used to further its domestic interests. 'Making America Great Again' doctrine has arguably discarded the broader vision of development for appeasing the internal vote bank (McTague, 2020). In 2016, Donald Trump's election campaign was focussed on bringing back the jobs lost to outsourcing and

concentrating on improving the domestic affairs by reducing its footprints globally. This situation showcases a contradiction to the neo-liberal world order that the US were in the forefront to create. The US focus on global affairs was initially supposed to improve US economic prospects, but later created domestic discontent which was capitalised by the Trump administration.

The government took many controversial decisions under his presidency, which side-tracked American commitments to the liberal rules-based order and ended up hurting its relations with its allies. However, with the conclusion of the Presidential election of 2020 and Trump failing to win a popular mandate, it is certain that the US will forgo its neo-isolationism and engage with its allies to protect the common interests.

The credibility of transatlantic partnership has been the lowest point in the post-second world war era with just the four years of Trump's presidency. There were instances of public disagreements between Trump and other leaders of US allies and differences in policy decision, especially on matters relating to issues of global importance. This situation was perilous during the initial wave of COVID 19 pandemic. It was the only time after the Pearl Harbour incident when America did not take the central role in deescalating a global threat. Trump's decision to withdraw from the World Health Organisation and hesitation to work closely with allies during the pandemic has proven to have grave consequences for themselves and the rest of the world (Coronavirus: Trump moves to pull the US out of World Health Organization, 2020). The other significant change during the Trump presidency was his indifference towards climate change which ultimately led the US to back out from the Paris Peace Treaty.

In many cases, the vacuum created on the top position was filled mainly by Chinese influence. China has concluded that specialised international organizations like WHO would have an advantage over traditional nation-states for controlling the pandemic. Likewise, the Trump government's only successful engagement was the mediating and normalising Israel relations through Abraham Accords with some of the other West Asian countries (Johny, 2020).

However, this was overshadowed by Trump's handling of Iran where there was an almost war-like situation following the murder of Iranian major general Qasem Soleimani.

The US confrontation with China on Trade regulations is understood to affect itself more than China in the long run as China is swiftly trying to shift their market focus on less developed third world countries. However, with the US becoming closer to Asian countries, especially those with tensions with like India and Australia, China perceives these actions as threats to contain its credibility as a regional hegemon.

Trump had been a non-conventional President, not just with his communication style with world leaders but also for his inclination to conduct international business in any way he sees fit, without being bound by moral obligations. His engagement and handling of Twitter diplomacy have led to tensions with nation-states like Iran as there were several contradictions within the Presidents tweets and press releases (LAINE, 2020).

As Joe Biden is set to become the US President on January 20th, the world hopes for a more mature leader with his foot firmly planted on American ideals. The restoration of NATO's might and strengthening the liberal international order is stated to be the upcoming President's primary goals.

Throughout America's modern history when there is a transition of power to a new president, even between presidents from different political backing, there had always been some common ground on how America conducts its international affairs. However, Joe Biden has to make a full turn around and adhere to the morally backed policies from when he was the Vice-President of the nation. First and foremost is the need to win back its allies' trust and reduce the level of tensions with China. There are many foreign policy challenges which Mr Biden inherits from the Trump government. America may still need to contain both the conventional and non-conventional threats from China but still might be willing to cooperate with the nation on the common concerns like nuclear proliferation and climate change. However, he should choose whether or not to continue its improved relations with countries with which they had a long history of ideological troubles. Additionally, there are questions regarding whether or not to

orchestrate an anti-Chinese block in Asia and encourage countries like India to fully integrate into the liberal order, further diversifying and strengthening the overarching structure. President Trumps' rhetoric of enhanced relationship with countries like India was mostly due to China's threats. Maintaining a group of stable allies in the Indo-Pacific region would be a key concern for all the future US presidents.

Trump was also widely criticised for fostering friendly personal relations with strongmen and moving America closer to some nations that stand against fundamental American ideologies, like Russia and other West Asian rulers. An essential task for the new Democratic President would be to devise a political strategy for these world leaders and decide whether to continue its relationship. The new President will also have to continue brokering the deals Trump introduced to bring stability in the West Asian region. Imposing travel ban for some Muslim majority countries by the Trump administration is widely criticised to be islamophobic, and these decisions are most likely to be reverted under the upcoming administration.

The liberal international order is indeed facing severe and novel challenges in these unprecedented times. Their main proponent countries' economy are hit, and with international institutions' role reduced, there is lack of overarching authority to control the system. Growing lack of trust with other nation-states, China's rise, and above all anti-internationalist policies Presidency Trump's America are all seen as contributing factors that may pose a threat to the rules-based order. In addition to that the US military actions in the Middle East and Afghanistan, 2008 global financial crisis etc. had already showcased the limitations and shortcoming of the working of the liberal order (Guillén, 2019). However, the present period of crisis created by the pandemic has highlighted the need for global institutions and shown its effectiveness in mediating between nations. As a Presidential Candidate, Joe Biden was critical of how President Donald Trump has handled the pandemic domestically and its leadership role in curbing the spread globally. Under the presidency of Joe Biden, it is speculated that the US Government will try to mend its estranged relationship with multilateral institutions such as the World Health Organisation. The year 2021 will see massive vaccination drives across the

globe and it is hopeful that the world will get back to some normalcy. The USA was one of the worst-hit countries due to the pandemic and domestic economy, and its global influence again got negatively affected. Apart from the initial slowdown China's economy has shown positive trends. It is widely speculated that the hard power gap between the superpowers would become further reduced after the virus's effects slowly wear out. The US infrastructure and communication links would have to be deployed internationally to vaccinate the less-developed nation-states effectively. The other key reason as to why the liberal world order will remain as the dominant, overarching structure is the lack of no viable replacement. Challenges to an existing system always highlight its weak points. The redefined structure should consider the individual aspirations of states and focus its attention on the nations that are frequently at a disadvantage. This can be sorted out using collective action under the US's strong leadership under the presidency of Joe Biden. However, the question remains whether or not the new President can materialise his goals of rebuilding and renewing the US-dominated Western liberal order while tackling domestic instabilities and getting the necessary backing from the Republican-led Senate.

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**(5) Indo – US Trade Ties:
Issues and Reconciliation between “Atma Nirbhar Bharat” and “America First”**

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In times of global uncertainty and fast changing dynamics, one thing that remains certain is that India and United States are and in fact, likely to remain strategic partners. This partnership is rooted in converging interests that the two countries share on several fronts, ranging from geopolitics to security, defence, trade and economics.

Failure to Negotiate a Trade Deal

US was India's largest trading partner until recently, when it was dethroned by China. Regardless of the numbers, it is an undisputed fact that US – India share a key trading relationship with total goods and services trade amounting to appx. \$146.1 billion (as in 2019)¹. But in spite of this remarkable trade and closely intertwined multi-dimensional partnership, the two countries have time and again failed to produce a landmark trade deal.

The reason remains the core underlying issues that the two countries have been unable to resolve. For starters, India's Tariff and non-Tariff Barriers imposed to protect its domestic agricultural producers and select manufacturing industries like medical devices, is seen as troublesome to the US. On the other hand, US' decision to impose tariffs on aluminium and steel industry of which India is a main exporter, along with withdrawal of Generalised System Preference (GSP) Status were rather hard hitting to the Indian side². Moreover, US has consistently demanded reforms in India's Intellectual Property Regime and Data Localisation practices. In recent times, when data and digital platforms have gained newfound importance, India's enactment of Digital Services Tax has become a new thorn in the relationship as US launched investigations against it under its Section 301³. This provision is used by US to investigate and respond to a foreign country's action which may be unfair or discriminatory as well as negatively affect US commerce⁴.

US – India trade relationship continues to grapple with several issues which often culminate into market access disputes in the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is for this reason that both the countries have been keen on pushing to negotiate at least a “mini trade deal” as a way to address a litany of market access disputes that have arisen in recent years⁵. It is to be noted that, in the end, aim of both the countries is to gain better market access in each other’s economy. This must be kept in mind while negotiating the said deal.

This mini trade deal was much anticipated during the last visit of Donald Trump but ultimately, it fell through because both the countries were unable to iron out their core differences. One reason for this was seen to be Trump Administration’s transactionalism particularly in trade issues⁶. With President Biden taking over the office, trade deal once again comes under the spotlight as both the countries reiterate their commitment towards deeper and more meaningful co-operation. The Biden Administration will reportedly give fresh review to the impending trade deal. ⁷ This might slow down the process but hope is definitely on the horizon that the two countries will finally iron out their differences and reach a conclusive deal that will allow them both to have more equitable and reasonable access to each other’s market.

How will “Atma Nirbhar Bharat” and “America First” Reconcile

At the same time, it is indeed imperative to not lose oneself in optimism and take account of the existing realities. In a world where globalisation seems to be on retreat and countries are looking more and more inward, slogans like “Atma Nirbhar Bharat” and “America First” are often seen to be taking the centre stage. It is often a concern as to how “Atma Nirbhar Bharat” and “America First” would reconcile going forward.

While it is true that the COVID experience only accentuated this feeling of looking inward and made the world realise the importance of self-reliance, but it is also true that the world has come too far to ignore the consequentiality of global co-operation and dependence. 21st century is said to be devoted to Internet Technology which has only reduced the distance between the countries and brought the world much closer. This is why, now, it is almost impossible to go back to the days of complete isolation. Therefore, even when conversations revolve around

“Atma Nirbhar Bharat”, it must be understood that emphasis is on self-reliance and not self-isolation⁸. Intent is to integrate and not isolate India.

Similarly, when we talk about “America First”, even though the term was coined by President Trump, it is a policy approach that is going to be inevitably present even in the term of President Biden, even if not in letter, then at least in spirit. But it is safe to say that the meaning of Biden’s “America First” may undergo some modification as compared to Trump’s “America First”. It can only be hoped that this “America First” will not focus on isolation but on integration because ultimately, in a world that is already so deeply connected, benefit of an individual lies in the benefit of all. Sooner the policy makers all over the world understand this, the better it is. That in order to be self-reliant and self-sufficient, Countries need to come together for co-operation and co-ordination on different facets so exchange can take place of technology, goods and services which one lacks and the other possesses. And this is why, “Atma Nirbhar Bharat” and “America First” need not reconcile with each other, instead they need to co-exist with each other, co-operate with each other, co-ordinate with each other, simply for the benefit of their own.

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(6) INDO-US STRATEGIC COOPERATION: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE TRAJECTORY

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The fundamentals of the bilateral relationship between India and US are based on strong bipartisan consensus, both the parties understand the significance that this relationship holds and as Biden's Secretary of State, Antony Blinken had made significantly clear, "India will be very high priority for the new administration", New Delhi can be assured of the continuing, deepening and strengthening ties with the United States of America. The President of the United States, Biden has always been bullish about the India-US ties and as he has evidently pointed out a number of times he is extremely confident on the strategic relationship that India and US share based on the journey that both the countries in question have undertaken in the past and continue to do so in the present. As the head of the Senate foreign relations committee, he in 2006 expressed hope that the Indo-US ties will be extremely strengthened by 2020 and these nations will be the closest in the world.

As stated by Ambassador Lalit Mansingh, for a strategic partnership to blossom three factors are extremely significant: long-term vision, volume of exchange and defence and security understanding, the Indo-US relationship goes beyond friendly gestures and are based on convergence of interests. The broader variables that drive the Indo-US relationship are the economic ties that the countries share, share democratic values and convergence of bilateral regional and global issues, the growing threat of the Dragon and its belligerent activities, Counterterrorism and cooperation with respect to Pakistan, amongst other things. At present, the Indo-US relationship is multi-sectoral and broad, based on a number of factors that include defence and security, trade and investment, education, Cyber security and space technology, civil and nuclear energy, Ecology, science and technology, agriculture and health. New Delhi and Washington DC are enduring global partners that have a relationship based on vibrant people-to-people interaction and a heterogeneous political spectrum that nurtures their engagement.

VARIABLES INVOLVED AND THE EVOLVING TRAJECTORY OF THE PARTNERSHIP:

Historically, since India's independence in 1947, its ties with the US have seen an evolution of the trajectory, beginning with estrangement and distrust during the Cold War Era, with India as

one of the founding leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement and India's nuclear program, the recent years have seen the warming up of this relationship with defence, political, economic and strategic cooperation. As pointed out by India's Prime Minister, Modi, this relationship has overcome the "hesitations of history" and there is an ever-growing convergence between these two democracies who have backed by the strength of shared values and engagements between people and institutions that have remarkably and steadfastly engaged democratic practices in an increasingly uncertain global political and economic landscape. The Indo-US engagement has grown with success and an aim towards mutual progress. The partnership is getting stronger and deeper in ways unimaginable and Washington and Delhi are developing a relationship that extends way beyond the diplomatic Beltway and the Raisina Hill strategic partnership.

At present, the robust strategic partnership is mostly based on the threat that China poses, given the fact that under Xi Jinping, the Dragon has become extremely authoritarian at home and hostile and aggressive abroad. As the Sino-Indian relations plummet further, given the Chinese stealth encroachments in the Indian territory, New Delhi hopes that the Biden administration will be able to cobble together an alliance to tackle the threat posed by China in the region as well as globally; the current US administration with the help of India and other Quad members needs to engage a strong China policy to deal with rogue state. The US has to be proactive enough and engage its allies and partners to deal with China's aggression in the Himalayas and for that, Washington today is extremely close to achieving India's engagement in a 'soft alliance' and as a consequential partner in its overall design as New Delhi has signed the last of the four 'foundational agreements' that the US maintains with its closest defence partners and India is certainly a valuable, democratic ally committed to thwarting China's intensifying efforts to dominate the South Asian region and establishing its hegemony in the world. As pointed out by India scholar Ashley Tellis, Mr. Modi's "daring decision to collaborate wholeheartedly" with America shows he recognises that "the U.S. holds the most important keys for India's long-term success." The Indo-Pacific region has seen greater collaboration between the two as there are ever increasing concerns about China's economic and diplomatic expansionism here, and India has turned to the U.S for support. Also, Pakistan's increasingly pro-Chinese policies have also brought the two into a closer embrace.

The bilateral trade between India and US has also significantly grown from \$60 billion in 2013 to \$90 billion in 2019. Unlike the Cold War era, the present relationship that the two share is no longer based on the patron-client system that was functional at that time where the US acted as the hub and its allies as the weaker pawns. The US has helped New Delhi by providing it with satellite maps, protective gear and geospatial data in its stand-off with China and the defence ties between the two have improved. There are regular military exercises, the 2+2 dialogue has been institutionalised and has flourished; and India, US, Japan and Australia are tied together by bilateral and trilateral security alliances apart from the Quad that makes India extremely and

evidently pivotal for establishing an Indo-Pacific strategy and resurrecting the dormant institutions in the region along with the other members of the Quad- the US military's Pacific Command being renamed as the Indo-Pacific Command being a significant pointer in the direction. There are ever increasing geostrategic ties among these two strong countries and both look towards the development of an organic partnership based along the lines of shared security and geopolitical goals converging interests and similar values. PM Modi's relationship with the former US President, Donald Trump served India's interests well and this partnership is being viewed as a great diplomatic asset for both the countries. America implicitly supported India in its 2019 Balakot airstrike and also cut off security aid to Pakistan for its engagement with terrorist groups; moreover, the Trump administration also refrained from criticising India's actions with regard to the abrogation of Article 370 and the reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir and the highly controversial 'Citizenship Amendment Act'.

As much as India banks upon the US for an extraordinary and productive relationship to counter the threats posed by its two adversaries that also are the "iron brothers", the US is also keen on having a strong, powerful, wealthy democratic India that would serve its interests in the 'New Cold War' era against their common adversary, China. The US hopes that such an arrangement will facilitate its aim of offsetting the Chinese influence in South-East Asia, South Asia, Africa and Central Asia while also emerging victorious against the ever burgeoning Chinese hegemonic designs. In such a scenario, the US will not have to exhaust all its resources trying to balance a coalition against China and the symbiotic relationship will serve the interests of both New Delhi and Washington. As pointed out by security analysts, America when the Cold War by contributing to the wealth and prosperity of its allies and supporting them in ways that in turn helped to secure its own vested interests and further its ideology and ambitions, and that there is no better place to start than India that is its natural ally in the present New Cold War scenario. The Quad members are working together in order to counter the Chinese Communist Party's question exploitation and corruption in the South China Sea, South Asian region as well as the Indo-Pacific. The expansionist ambitions of the Dragon have to be countered by a robust partnership and the Indo-US relationship is based on the premise that they have similar ideals whether it is individual human rights, countering disinformation, common values and interests, Market-based economies and building greater resilience into a supply chains and is shared hope for the future that rests on an open free and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.

The ice in the relationship between India and US was broken by the visit of President Bill Clinton in 2000 and the partnership, henceforth was propelled forward by the successive Presidents of the US. President George W. Bush came to India and offered the civilian nuclear deal, Barack Obama came twice first in 2010 and then in 2015, Donald Trump made visits to India and termed his last visit that was a stand-alone trip as "unforgettable, extraordinary and productive." He is remembered for his famous words at Ahmedabad, Modi's home city –

“America loves India, America respects India, and America will always be faithful and loyal friends to the Indian people.” Under Biden, the fundamental relationship that India and US share is expected to be positive, however while Biden has a long history of friendship with India and has been vocal about it being an important partner to the US, he could reset ties with China, given the fact that his son, Hunter Biden has been engaging with Beijing in the economic sphere. Ms Kamala Harris who is the first Indian-American and African-American to be elected as the Vice President of the United States is a true representative of the American multiculturalism and is expected to be the trailblazer for the betterment of the Indo-US ties. Joe Biden and Kamala Harris released a video on August 15, 2020 to commemorate the Indian Independence Day and promised to “confront the threats that New Delhi faces in its own region and along the border”.

Analysts believe that Biden is a more predictable and a conventional leader for the US who is also favourable to India in terms of building a stable partnership especially in the context of the emerging Sino-US Cold War as well as the Indo-China issues that have become persistent in the regional as well as the global security architecture. India's bettering relations with US is a tactical bargaining chip in order to counterbalance China and thus, the need for Washington and Delhi, at the moment is to strike a balance and work together in a manner that is fruitful for both, given the nature of the contemporary challenges. The military pact between India and the US will be extremely significant as it gives access to advanced satellite imagery and mapping, access to geospatial intelligence, and drones, missiles and automated weapons which are extremely crucial in order to deal with the growing Chinese Aggression. New Delhi's efforts and strengthening its ties with the US as well as the other Quad members is an extremely significant step and the fact that Washington is also keen on spending diplomatic capital and enhancing security engagement shows the maturity of this relationship, both democracies have grown closer over time. The legitimisation of India's nuclear arsenal, USA's supplies of arms and ammunition and aerospace and aviation intelligence, apart from the economic opportunities have been important pointers to the bettering relationship. The countries have signed an agreement that allow them to share encrypted military intelligence and also signed the Logistics Exchange memorandum of agreement that permits their military is to replenish fuel and material from each other's bases. India has always had an important place in the American foreign policy, especially given their common and overlapping moot point for the last two decades or more, in Washington has tried to work closely with New Delhi, more so during the Trump regime who also shared a strong rapport with Prime Minister Modi. Under the administration of the former president, the relationship grew dramatically stronger with New Delhi signing long pending defence agreements with the US while also increasing their reliance on American suppliers for arms, maintaining strong distance from the One Belt, One Road initiative of the Dragon and also being vocal about rights and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Pentagon said that the Biden administration will remain committed to a strong bilateral relationship with India, and US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin spoke for the first time with Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh emphasizing the same. More recently, the newly appointed US Secretary of State, Blinken and India's External Affairs Minister, S Jaishankar discussed issues of mutual interest and concern, including the Covid 19 vaccination, steps for expanding bilateral ties and the regional developments in a telephonic conversation. US is keen to have India as a pre-eminent partner in the Indo-Pacific, and in terms of global developments and the U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin is likely to visit India by mid-March, 2021 and would also meet Rajnath Singh, according to an Indian government source as the two allies seek to deepen military ties to counter the growing power of China in the Asia-Pacific region. Significantly, it should be noted that Axios recently reported that US President Biden plans to meet with his QUAD counterparts - Japan, Australia and India in March and seeks to transform the alignments in the Indo-Pacific region, most importantly to counter China's hegemonic designs. The Quad (the four-party summit) is bound to take place on March 12th, with Biden holding this as his first summit. Two senior Indian officials also stated recently that said that the "Quad Security Dialogue" composed of the United States, Japan, Australia and India is stepping up the expansion of global vaccination coverage to counter Beijing's growing soft power, which is sure step towards deepening Indo-US relations. This Quad summit might even take place before a meeting with the United States' closest allies in Europe.

Another important development that shows India's importance Washington's endeavours is that recently U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken proposed a United Nations-led peace conference on the Afghan issue in a letter to Afghan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, "to discuss a unified approach to supporting peace in Afghanistan wherein envoys from US, China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and India would be in attendance. New Delhi also plans to buy 30 armed drones from the US to boost its land and sea defences as its nuclear armed neighbours China and Pakistan always present a state of hostility and tension. The US\$3 billion purchase of 30 MQ-9B Predator drones manufactured by San Diego-based General Atomics, would greatly add to India's military capabilities and would be beneficial for surveillance and reconnaissance.

THE UNCERTAINTIES PERVAIDING THE RELATIONSHIP

While the strategic engagement between Washington and New Delhi increased during the Trump administration, in 2019 US scrapped duty – free access for India under the Generalised System of Preference. Due to the COVID uncertainties, P.M. Modi turned to the rhetoric of *Aatmanirbhar Bharat* which the US considers to be protectionist; also, 60% of the defence inventory for India is Russian which greatly complicates the relationship that New Delhi shares with Washington. Additionally, an anticipated trade deal failed to take shape and these factors led to the alarm bells ringing for this partnership. At present, India needs to engage with the Biden administration in a strategic manner and be prepared for whatever is there to come.

While the overall contours of the relationship will continue on the positive lines, the new administration is yet to reveal its China policy which might be comparatively lenient given the Democrat leader's interest in toning down the tensions between Beijing and Washington and engaging in cooperation and collaboration in areas where there is a convergence of interests.

Although both the Democrats and Republicans view India as a key strategic ally and an important instrument to the realisation of their foreign policy goals, the Democrats, unlike their Republican predecessors could prove to be harder on the issue of human rights especially, in terms of the Kashmir Issue and other sensitive subjects that India does not like foreign interference and meddling with and it is being ascertained that free trade is likely to be a big issue in the Biden Presidency. Washington has also warned India that it could face sanctions and that the Indian Air Force is unlikely to get a waiver over USA's 'Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act' (CAATSA) for acquiring five Russian Almaz -Antei S-400 Triumf self-propelled surface-to-air (SAM) systems for \$5.5 billion.

Moreover, New Delhi has to also keenly look at Biden's Pakistan policy, which is still in the nascent stage and full of uncertainties and given the China-Pakistan axis, any shift in the American policy positively towards Beijing and Islamabad might embolden the adversaries to up their ante against India. Biden will have a much more calculated approach than the former POTUS and his moves will surely be based on well analysed strategic and geopolitical interests and objectives. However, the January 2020 Pakistan Supreme Court's decision of acquittal of those involved in the sensational kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, a Wall Street Journal US journalist in 2002, has invited the ire of Washington and the White House expressed grave "outrage" over it, hence, that is one pointer towards waning Pakistan and US relations in terms of Islamabad's support and engagement with terrorism and terrorist groups. While India has always been viewed a strong partner for the US, at present, there is huge sense of ambiguity in terms of US foreign policy under Biden and New Delhi has to tread cautiously in order to not open the Pandora box.

At present, the engagement between the two states is taking positive overtones, however, significantly, given the political situation and the economic uncertainties due to the pandemic, Washington will prioritise the domestic issues first, and thus, New Delhi has to remain open to whatever is in store and act in a tactical manner while it tries to garner the larger strategic goals and approaches that the Biden presidency seat to take recourse to and how it is going to align with India's strategic interest and propel the trajectory of the Indo-US relationship in a positive manner so that it is a mutually beneficial relationship.

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(7) INDIA-US RELATIONS UNDER BIDEN: The Pakistan Factor

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In November 2020 US presidential elections were held, and Mr. Joseph R. Biden of Democratic party was elected as the 46th president. The turn from Trump administration to the Biden administration have been the topic of discussion and speculation ever since, not just in terms of domestic policy changes, but also international policies of the United States. Accordingly, the experts in India have been anticipating the changes and continuations in the US's South Asian policy, including its relations with India and Pakistan.

The International Affairs policy of a nation is influenced by certain constants and variables. These include political interests, economic interests, geo-political location, security interests, human rights, etc. This article will analyse the changes and continuations that can be foreseen in the US's South Asian policy with the change of government. The major focus will be on relations between India and the US, with respect to the variables affecting their diplomatic relations, especially Pakistan.

India and the United States have come together in recent years on the issues of security, including the QUAD, an alliance made for the securing the Indo-Pacific and ensuring free trade in the region. However, there are various points of divergence in the relations of the two regions as well, such as India's closeness to Russia and its multi-source inventory in terms of Arms acquisition. India is also concerned about the softening stance of the US with respect to Pakistan, as the latter has gained geo-political significance to the US in light of American withdrawal from Afghanistan. The process of withdrawal began under Trump administration, and is most likely to continue during Biden's term, causing a shift in power dynamics in the near future.

U.S.- India Relations founded on shared commitments

The relations between the United States of America and India are founded on a shared commitment to freedom, democratic principles, equal treatment of all citizens, human rights, and the rule of law. The two countries have shared interests in promoting global security, stability, and economic prosperity through trade, investment, and connectivity. The vital people-to-people ties between the two countries is reflected in the four million-strong Indian American diaspora, who are a tremendous source of strength for the partnership. In December

2019, the U.S. hosted the second 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in Washington, where both sides reaffirmed each other's status as Major Defence Partners and the importance of the deepened cooperation on maritime security, interoperability, and information sharing. Besides the 2+2 dialogue mechanism, there are more than thirty bilateral dialogues and working groups operating between the United States and India, which span all aspects of human endeavor, from space and health cooperation to energy and high technology trade. These partnerships include the U.S.-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group, which was established in 2000, as well as the Strategic Energy Partnership, Cyber Dialogue, Civil Space Working Group, Trade Policy Forum, Defence Policy Group, etc.

Furthermore, India and the United States also cooperate closely at multilateral organizations, including the United Nations, G-20, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization, etc. The U.S. joined India's Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure in 2019, in order to expand cooperation on sustainable infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region.

In recent times, the desire to counter China's role in the Indo-Pacific is an area of increasing strategic convergence for India and the United States. India's concern over China's growing presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and the U.S. seeking to counter China's growing global influence, have become the basis for an increasing level of strategic convergence. This building of partnership has been most apparent in the area of defence and security, particularly under the governments of Narendra Modi and Donald Trump.

Then U.S. President Donald Trump's visit in 2020 has been considered as a landmark occasion in India-U.S. ties. Addressing a huge crowd at the Motera Stadium in Ahmedabad, Trump minced no words in praising India's democratic traditions and values, and reaffirmed a commitment to fight terror together.

Interestingly, Trump also chose this occasion to indicate towards the improving ties between the United States and Pakistan. This renewal of relations with Pakistan came in light of America's decision to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Since Trump had maintained the image of a leader who takes into account the cost and benefit- a leader with a diverse background of business, real estate and media- the most important issue for him had been to wind up the costly and longest American wars overseas.

Trump Administration and reframing of relations with Pakistan

The reaffirmation of developing of U.S.- Pakistan relations followed after the sustained efforts made by the Trump administration and Islamabad to improve bilateral ties, despite India's earnest attempts to isolate Pakistan over its support for terrorist groups operating from its soil.

Trump's visit to India came at a time when the United States was engaged in peace talks with the Taliban over the reduction of violence in Afghanistan. Here, Pakistan plays an important role as the host of leadership of the Afghan Taliban as well as the Haqqani Network which is a key constituent of the Taliban. Therefore, Pakistan played a critical role in facilitating direct talks between the insurgents and the Americans.

Furthermore, after the Pulwama attack in February 2019, Prime Minister Imran Khan visited Washington in July where Mr. Trump offered to mediate between India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir crisis. In doing so, he practically endorsed the Pakistani position as India has always maintained that Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. In December 2019, the U.S. decided to resume a military training programme for Pakistan- The International Military Education and Training Programme (IMET), which had been a central pillar of the U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation for years. In the light of such events it has become apparent that the U.S. has started to change its approach towards Pakistan.

The Trump administration signed a peace deal with Taliban in February last year in Doha. The agreement consisted of plans for withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in exchange for security guarantees from the insurgent group. Accordingly, the US committed to withdraw its 12,000 troops within 14 months. Currently, there are only 2500 American troops left in the country.

However, according to a Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S., Husain Haqqani, the agreement between the United States and Taliban has no element of peace and is basically a withdrawal pact for American troops from the war-torn Afghanistan. He explained that the Taliban were made to commit to only one thing, that they would enter intra-Afghan talks, not that they would agree to peace.

Javid Ahamd, Afghanistan's Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, noted that there is a need for clarity in purpose, policy, and approach- not just for Afghanistan's future, but also America's future in Afghanistan. He has further expressed that Pakistan has traditionally treated Afghanistan as a half state, and has been pushing for a direct say in Afghanistan's foreign and security policy.

Any deviations from the past under Biden Administration ?

According to the announcements from Washington, the objective of the incoming Joe Biden administration is to continue elevating US's defence partnership with India. This objective will be achieved through the Quad security dialogue and other regional multilateral engagements. While the Biden administration is likely to continue viewing the security alliance with India in the Indo-Pacific as significant, it has raised questions over the Modi government's approach to

various matters, such as the situation in Kashmir, and the infamous Citizenship law, on humanitarian basis.

The Trump administration, had chosen to ignore the domestic developments of India, given the Modi-Trump nationalistic credential. The Democrats, on the other hand, have been strong advocates of human rights and liberties in the past. Accordingly, the Vice-president-elect Kamala Harris has spoken against the Modi government's anti-Muslim policies and human rights violations in Kashmir and elsewhere.

In his election campaign, Mr. Biden had urged the Indian government to take all necessary steps to restore rights for all the people in Kashmir. While, a group of seven US lawmakers (six Democrats and one Republican) wrote to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo expressing serious concern on the farmer's unrest and urged raising the issue with S Jaishankar, the Indian External Affairs Minister.

However, there are no signs of any drastic deviations in the present US South Asia policy, given the persistent constants and variables of the Indo-US relations. The common threat of China is likely to be the main driver of Indo-US ties under the Biden presidency, with India serving as a regional balancer against China.

As for the bilateral variables, the Indian analysts are of the view that Biden administration may be less critical of Pakistan, due to Pakistan's geo-strategic relevance and her role in assisting US military's draw-down from Afghanistan.

Retired General Lloyd Austin, who has been nominated by President-elect Joe Biden as his defence secretary, also mentioned that Pakistan had taken constructive steps to meet US requests in support of the Afghanistan peace process. He said that Pakistan has also taken steps against anti-Indian groups, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, although this progress is still incomplete.

Conclusion

Relations between America and India are likely to grow stably under the Biden administration, in terms of ensuring security in the Indo-Pacific, as signaled by the recent Quad meeting. The first ever leadership summit of the Quad grouping of countries ensued on 13th March 2021. In this meeting, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, President Joe Biden of the United States, Japanese Premier Yoshihide Suga and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison emphasized cooperation among the member countries to beat the COVID-19 pandemic with joint partnership on vaccines, and the need for an "open" and "free" Indo-Pacific region.

However, there are signs of the continued soft stand of the US towards Pakistan. In the arena of international relations, nations respond and build diplomatic ties according to the interests of their country. For this purpose, different nations weave narratives that are most appropriate for

justification of their actions. The turn in US's stance towards Pakistan can be seen this light. While in the early years of his term, Trump administration had been hostile towards Pakistan, the latter years witnessed the change in this attitude. This behavior was instigated by America's decision to withdraw her troops from Afghanistan, where Pakistan played a significant role of the host to the peace talks between US and the insurgent group, Taliban. While, Pakistan needs US's support for recovery from its deep financial crisis. These tightening relations are likely to affect India's attempts in isolating Pakistan in terms of its support to terrorism.

As of now, the Biden administration is likely to continue Trump's work in Afghanistan. It is yet to be seen how the power dynamics plays out in South Asia with the US's withdrawal from Afghanistan, and its impact on the positions of India and Pakistan.

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(8) Indian-Americans in Biden Administration: Implications for India

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The recent American Elections have been the talk of the town for almost a year now, due to former President Donald Trump's eccentric foreign and domestic policies, his failure to accept the election outcome, followed by the heinous attack on the US Capitol building largely by a Pro-Trump mob. American Democracy, post a failed peaceful transfer of power due to recent regime change, was the most talked-about issue in the newly sworn-in President Joseph Biden's inaugural speech, hailing American democracy, integrity, and hoping for more peace and cooperation among its humongous racially and culturally diverse population. While the Biden administration marks a new era and fuels more optimism in American domestic and foreign policies, so does it bring a new ray of hope for the Indian diaspora in the United States. Before his swearing-in ceremony, President Biden managed to appoint 20 people of Indian origin, including 13 women, with 17 Indian-American on key posts in Biden Administration. This sets a new record for the ethnic community which constitutes a mere 1% of the total US population.

Topping the list is Neera Tanden, nominated as the Director of the White House Office of Management and Budget, and Dr. Vivek Murthy nominated as the US Surgeon General. Vanita Gupta as Associate Attorney General, Department of Justice, Biden's former Foreign Service officials, Uzra Zeya as the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights; Mala Adiga as the Policy Director to the first lady Dr. Jill Biden; Garima Verma as the Digital Director to the First lady Dr. Jill Biden, and Sabrina Singh as the Deputy Press Secretary, etc.

Mr. Biden had earlier promised to rope in a large number of Indian-Americans into his administration, if he is elected as a President saying, "I'll continue to rely on the Indian-American diaspora, that keeps our two nations together.", he said while addressing the Indian American community during the virtual celebrations of Indian Independence day in August 2020.

The election was also historic as it marks Kamala Devi Harris, the first woman, the first woman of Indian Origin, and the first African-American to be sworn in as the Vice-President. With immense Indian connection in the contemporary American Politics, one is bound to analyze the future of the US-India ties under the Biden administration.

Steadiness in the Future Relations:

With President Biden accusing former President Donald Trump of "Abdicating American Leadership" and promising to bring the "US back as the head of the table", Mr. Biden already has a lot on his plate to mend. He will be the third US President to deal with Mr. Narendra Modi. He is also seen as a Veteran in Foreign Affairs, previously chairing the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during the 2008 US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, under the Obama-Biden Administration.

Biden has earlier expressed that India and the US are natural partners, and that he will continue to strengthen the India-US ties. Biden has also expressed to work with India "to support a rule-based and open Indo-Pacific, in which no country including China, can threaten its neighbors with impunity." New Delhi was also given the designation of Major Defense Partner (MDP) under the Obama-Biden Administration, which ensured the transfer of highly advanced and crucial military technology to India. The crucial visit of the former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to India in October 2020, and the 2+2 dialogues held, led to the signing of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), the last of the four foundational agreement for strategic ties, which will allow India to expand its geospatial information sharing between the armed forces. The Defense agreements like the Communications, Compatibility and the Security Agreements (COMCASA), the Industrial Security Annex (ISA), joint military exercises like Malabar, the rapid increase in the Arms trade highlighted the growing proximity between the two nations. The Biden administration is unlikely to reverse the above-mentioned policies and lose away the gains made under the Trump Administration.

Another major development has been the initiation of the formalization of the Quadrilateral initiative (QUAD), consisting of India, the US, Japan, and Australia. Although QUAD is not completely an alternative to China in the Indo-Pacific, it will definitely help to supervise the rising Chinese expansion in the region.

The Biden administration is also expected to accept the recommendations of the US-India Business Council (USIBC), which focuses on improving the US-India ties by reconstituting the Business relations and creating a new digital partnership. It not only highlights business relations but also cooperation in handling the COVID-19 pandemic and healthcare and restructure the India-US Health dialogue and expand the participation of the Private sector; Energy and Climate Change which suggested the creation of US-India Scholars Endowment which would support students wishing to study abroad; Science and

Technology creating a US-India Global Digital Partnership (USIGDP), which would discuss critical stakeholders across the government and industry to be headed by Vice President Kamala Harris; and also reduce the trade impediments to boost the bilateral trade by \$500 billion by 2024.

President Biden earlier also highlighted his will to reform the H-1B visa systems and withdraw the Trump-era rule that limited the work opportunities for the spouses for H4 visa and is expected to largely benefit the large Indian working IT professionals in the US.

Obstacles in the journey ahead:

However, several analysts have highlighted the changing concern of the Biden administration, due to Democrats' heightened focus on defending the values for which the United States firmly stands for.

In October 2019, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, hearing on the South Asian Affairs, highlighted and stated their objections against the "Abrogation of Art.370", which gave special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir in India. The strict internet lockdown and numerous punitive and preventive detentions by the police were also condemned. President Biden, as a Democratic Presidential nominee, has earlier expressed his disappointment over the implementation of the Citizenship Amendment Act and National Register for Citizens in 2019, in his policy paper "Joe Biden's agenda for the American Muslim Community." He also highlighted that the Acts are against the inherent values of Secularism and the multi-ethnic democracy of India.

Apprehensions could also be raised over India's ties with Russia. Democrats had highlighted their disappointment over Moscow's interference in the US elections earlier, and New Delhi could also face certain retaliation under the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act, under the Biden administration. Howsoever feeble the possibility of strict sanctions under Section 231 of the above-mentioned legislation, it cannot be denied that India and Russia are bound to be on the radar. Even if Biden administration were to initiate the good relations with Russia and by extending the New START Treaty, a key policy initiated under the Obama-Biden Administration, which is expected to lapse in 2021, the Democrat-dominated US Congress, is generally expected to be harsh on the Putin Administration.

President Biden's decision over Iran's sanctions and willingness to rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) could also play a significant role in India's oil

imports from Iran. While he has expressed his willingness to rejoin JCPOA earlier, and contain Iran's regional ambitions through diplomacy and not sanctions, and fortunately, Tehran too has expressed to honor the agreement, if the US reverses its sanctions on Iran. US's involvement in the region would also help in Balancing the Power (BOP) in the region, by checking on the rising Chinese presence in the region.

Biden's Afghanistan policy will also play a significant part in reshaping India's interest in Afghanistan. The new regime must now deal with patience and determination to push the country towards a sustainable agreement that will end the long war. If he succeeds, it will bolster US Security interests in Afghanistan and the neighboring region. With the gradual withdrawal of the US troops from the region, the US is likely to depend on Pakistan to maintain the balance of power and negotiate with the Taliban forces, which is sure to raise some eyebrows in New Delhi. In the ongoing private talks with the Taliban in Doha, the US should make clear that the level of cooperation to be expected by the US depends upon the Taliban and the Afghan government taking credible steps towards reducing the violence and Human Rights violation in the nation. It should also include India, a major stakeholder in the region, to be involved in the negotiations, and rebuild trust and understanding after the mess created by the Trump administration's decision to suddenly withdraw the US troops.

The reassertion of the American values by the new administration in the region aligns with New Delhi's strategy of peaceful Afghanistan and Iran, which will eventually act as its gateway to Central Asia. India, the largest democracy in the world, can definitely play a significant part in ensuring a peaceful Afghanistan.

Conclusion:

The swearing-in of Mr. Joseph Biden and Kamala Harris as the President and Vice-President respectively, definitely marks the new era in the US-India ties. The relationship is expected to reach new heights under the Biden administration, ranging from Defence, science and technology, energy and environment, to strategic and cultural field. There are bound to be major obstacles in the journey ahead, but the renewed enthusiasm supersedes the potholes in the journey, and the large infusion of the Indian-Americans is a step forward in the right direction.

(9) INDIA'S INTERESTS IN INDO-PACIFIC CAN US COOPERATION HELP IN SERVING INDIA'S INTERESTS ?

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Throughout history, the maritime domain has played a crucial role in establishing new and emerging powers shaping regional dynamics and security architecture. The Indo-Pacific region is now viewed as a global center of gravity because of the economic and demographic potential, and at the same time, security challenges can frustrate those possibilities. For India, the Indo-Pacific region is crucial as the region is world's major power pivot. With its principle of openness and free Indo-Pacific, India has initiated to engage with partners in the region and with like-minded, powerful countries like United States, Japan, South Korea and Australia. It aims to ensure security and stability in the region. The Indo-US partnership has created hope for both countries to serve their interest in the region.

India's Interest in Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific has given significant importance to India by spotlighting the country as a key player in the twenty-first century. Countries like United States, Japan, and Australia started to define the Indo-Pacific region as a new theatre for strategic competition and India came to assume a central role in their policies. The rise of China in the Indo-Pacific region has challenged the security of nations, including India. However, despite India's presence in the Indian Ocean, maritime security has remained outside India's strategic interest and concerns due to the continental threat. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific is a new sphere in India's foreign policy. The countries - US, Japan and Australia, continue to support and promote to build a stronger India in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Indo-Pacific region provides a more significant opportunity for India to expand its footprint across the region while facing significant capacity and constraints. It also places partnership as a core of India's Indo-Pacific interest. India has a great opportunity to collaborate with powerful countries such as United States, Japan, and Australia, which helps India extend its diplomatic footprint and its relation with the island nation to boost India's role in the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific region provides a new opportunity for India to become a great power in the region, and also India's priority and significant investment in the Indian Ocean will remain the same.

In the post-cold war era, India was not much concerned about the Indian Ocean because of the absence of strategic completions. But later, the emergence of China has created security issues for India, and then India was compelled to review its foreign policy under the Narendra Modi government. Later, India is always concerned about the Indo-Pacific region. The visit of

Indian Prime Minister to the United States and other member countries of ASEAN has effectively increased US interest in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2015, India showed its interest in collaborating with the US for future activities. Also, in 2018, Narendra Modi, through his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue has stated that the perspective of the India's foreign policy on the Indo-Pacific region is purely based on openness, inclusiveness and ASEAN centrality and not against any particular country. Therefore, India has introduced the concept of Security and Growth for All the Regions (SAGAR) and it was based on open, free, inclusive and built on cooperative and collaborative rule-based order. In 2019, the second edition of the Indo-Pacific regional dialogue discussed about attaining solidarity in the region through maritime connectivity, steps to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region and there is a transition of the region from brown to blue economy with more opportunity and challenges.

India's shift from Look East Policy to Act East Policy makes it essential for India to access the south and East China seas. For India, the maritime route has a vital role in connecting and strengthening the relationship between Russia and India. The route between Chennai and Vladivostok could open a new door of opportunities for both country's trade, especially in the areas of oil, minerals, energy, etc. energy security is always a key pillar in Indo-Russian relations. This energy bond between India and Russia will alleviate India's inflation on energy prices and maintain price stability. This will also help India to navigate freely in the South China sea, which is highly influenced by China. At the same time, United States considered India, a significant geostrategic partner in its Asia rebalancing strategy. Greater cooperation between both the countries can be seen in the area of defence and socio-economics.

Indo-US Partnership in Indo-Pacific

India and the US are having a common interest in promoting peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. In the Obama administration period, the US has shifted its strategic policy to focus Indo-Pacific due to the power shift from the west to the east. At that period of time, China emerged as a competitive nation for the US, and in order to counter this US needs a strong partnership. India also has a bitter relationship with China after the Sino war in the 1960s. As China's aggressive expansion policy and its power in Indo-Pacific threatened both the US and India and therefore, they started to build a strong partnership between them. The collaboration of India and the US will have a positive impact in effectively addressing problems and challenges at both regional and global levels. Recently the outgoing Trump administration, in a declassified document, states that a strong India in cooperation with like minded countries would act as a 'counterbalance' to China in the strategic Indo-Pacific region. The US aims to counter the China's rise in the international arena and therefore, India is key to US plan in the Indo-Pacific. The US staying by India's side will help India to achieve its interests. In order to accelerate India's, rise and capacity as a net provider of security and significant defence partner, the US will always take necessary action on different areas, including diplomatic, military and intelligence and the US will also support India to address the challenges from China including the continental challenges such as border dispute.

Energy

As the region is the crucial transit point for the energy trade for both the US and India, this became a mutual interest that brought both the countries together. In 2018, the joint statement on India-US Strategic Energy Partnership has become a milestone in the Indo-US relation during the Trump administration. It also helps in improving bilateral trade and investments. The Indo-Pacific has a growing energy demand and has already become the hub of energy trade and commerce. The Asian developing countries' energy profile like India has risen and created a great opportunity for giant energy countries like the US for better growth and investments. On the other hand, India's overall energy demand has shown rapid development and is expected to be doubled by 2040.

Defence trade and technology

India assigned as a major defensive partner of the US has provided an ambitious bilateral trade platform for defence trade and technology at a faster pace. India has taken an extensive defence initiative; US defence companies can cooperate with India in its USD 150 billion military modernisation project. They can both jointly work together to identify the gaps and equip Indian forces in the short run; it will also help to build up the country's defence manufacturing base for the long term.

Maritime Security

The Indo-US maritime cooperation is crucial for both the countries because of its supports and efforts that prioritise the joint stewardship for ensuring freedom of navigation and trade across the maritime common, which is the center for commercial and energy supplies and rich in natural resources. The US and India are also fully committed to resisting Chinese aggression in both the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific region. The Indo-US cooperation will also ensure the principle of freedom of navigation and peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. An extended bilateral maritime partnership between the Indo-US that involves the transfer of technology to build India's capacity in the Indian Ocean Region will create a more stable and balanced security architecture.

Connectivity

Today, most of the Indo-Pacific region states need funds and proficiency to improve their infrastructure and regional connectivity. China has already introduced its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) across Eurasia and Indo-Pacific by investing in infrastructure initiatives. The project's ultimate aim is connectivity and through which China seeks to expand its influence in the region. To prevent the emergence of an Asian order detrimental to the rule-based order, the states must work together and creating an inclusive approach towards the emerging one.

In respect to this, the Indo-US partnership has played a vital role. The Indo-Pacific cooperation has supplement India's Act East Policy and also its cooperation in physical and soft infrastructure can link cross-border transport and facilitate regional energy connections and

people-to-people interaction. Both the countries can also play an important role as 'global partners' with the US's investment in India's project in Africa. The US can also nurture the partnership between the major power like Japan, India, South Korea and Australia and they all together can build a consultative and collective Asian Framework.

Conclusion

There are certain hurdles in contrasting traditions between India and the US; sometimes their national interest and foreign policy can be at stake. However, these all lie in a fact that both the countries have a common interest in the Indo-Pacific region which includes the rule of law, global security, stability and economic prosperity through trade, investment and connectivity. The main challenge to both India and the US is the rise of China in the region. Therefore, both countries must strengthen their bilateral relation and cooperation. It is important for India to cooperate with like-minded countries like the US to counter China and ensure its regional position. The US-India cooperation helps India to address problems and challenges in both regional and global levels. There are some hurdles in the Indo-US relation, but if both countries try to strengthen their partnership, it will benefit them and easily counter the Chinese rise in the region.

(10) INDIA –US RELATIONS UNDER THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

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2020 will forever be remembered as the year when the pandemic gripped the entire world, a year where the world witnessed a change in leadership in one of the strongest yet most fractured democracies of the world, a year where Britain divorced the European Union. At 78, Joe Biden is the oldest president in American history to bear office. He has come to power at a time when the entire country was deeply divided between the Democrats and the Republicans, one-third of the Americans felt that Biden had stolen the vote, a fortnight before the inauguration ceremony swathes of hooligans and insurrectionists attempted to storm the Capitol to overturn the results of the election and the country had witnessed a summer of vociferous racial protests when the public outrage was roaring. Joe Biden assumes office with the promise to heal the wounds that were inflicted by the hawkish Trump administration. He assures to unfurl a fresh chapter of optimism, hope and a resolute commitment to bring back the Americans together as one nation. Such noisy promises and reassurances heard aloud through the massive buildings of the Capitol on the inauguration day (where only a few lucky Americans were permitted to witness the peaceful transition of power in the hands of a civil president) thereby, putting an end to the four tumultuous years of Trump presidency. In his inauguration speech, Biden called for a moment of national healing "Without healing unity, there is no peace, only bitterness and fury". It signalled the start of a new beginning. What America needed was a trouble-shooter, a force strong enough to unify the country together. It was not only yearning for civility at a time when the twin shocks of corona virus and the economic fallout had completely jolted the American economy but also a man with adult competence. The virus alone had claimed more than four lakh American lives and thousands of others are vulnerable due to its grave impacts. The bumpy roads in the economy have led the Senate to announce a fiscal package of 1.90 trillion USD in the wake to relieve people of the hardships at home.

WHAT DOES A BIDEN PRESIDENCY MEAN FOR INDIA ?

All eyes are set on Biden now. The Biden administration represents to embark on a path to become the champion of change and stabilize the foundations of the nation. He promises to deliver the Asian capitals hopes of re-engagement and deepen the webs of interdependence. One of the biggest re-modelling of his administration would be to do away with the past legacies of his predecessor and fashion the foreign policy in a manner that would serve the interests of the larger Americans without latching the voices of the partisans. Such a paradigm

shift in his foreign policy considerations is characterized by re-calibrating the globalist outlook concerning India. Washington's plan to join the Paris climate agreement, consider re-joining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) only if Iran pledges to follow the protocols of the agreement and a host of other international multilateral agreements with other nations. During the election campaign trails, the Biden administration had repeatedly spoken about America gearing up to be back in the international scene like never before.

The Biden administration has a lot to offer for New Delhi. The Chinese territorial aggression in the Himalayas has created a significant opening for Washington to bring India alone. China's assertive rise as a political actor and an economic provider in the South Asian region has shaken the pillars of America's hegemonic position as a world power in the international setting. China's expansionist tendencies along the Indian border and its attempts to encroach upon the Indian Territory have brought India closer to the USA in an attempt to countervail the balance of power in the region. However, what appears evident is that, like always, India is committed to maintaining its strategic autonomy. Recently, President-elect Joe Biden and the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke over the phone where they committed to working closely together on a bunch of issues ranging from drawing out a path to recovery from the pandemic, to ensuring timely distribution of the vaccines, bolstering efforts to tackle the climate change crisis and lastly, standing together as one strong international community to eliminate all threats from terrorism. As the pandemic has completely devastated the economies and forced governments across the globe to converge on common matters. The Biden administration has underpinned a desire to work with India in setting an example that democracy and the power of democratic institutions always outweigh the wounds that inflict the nation. The diplomatic bandwidth between the USA and India encompasses much wider considerations. Apart from securing a more networked security-defence partnership, the statesmanship of both countries will further strengthen the walls of the QUAD alliance to negate China's big bullying attitude. However, the momentum towards a deeper USA-India engagement could slow down if the Biden administration undermines India's position as an important partner to the collaboration. Biden is yet to spill out his foreign policy initiatives targeting India and the Indo-Pacific region. However, the biggest threat that remains for the USA is the unparalleled rise of China and a potent threat it poses to its Asian neighbours. Biden assumed office when the two superpowers locked horns over the trade deals. The Trump administration had accused China of forcibly transferring foreign technology, developing the 5G network by making consumers dependent on cheap technology that would aid the Chinese companies in spying and subsequent slapping of high tariffs on commodities. A host of foreign policy priorities of the Biden administration will revolve around China occupying the centre stage and the kind of multilateral approach that Washington will champion upon along with India. Today, the USA is getting closer to achieve its dream of getting India under the grip of its "soft alliance". Any foreign policy process of the present is a product of its past lessons learnt, some sweet, some bitter. The Biden administration is making tremendous efforts in re-vamping the ties visa-a-vis the foreign policy priorities of the Trump administration. During Trump's visit to India, the personal rapport shared between the

leaders of both nations went very well for India. It also showcased how the USA was leaping towards expanding deeper connections with India. The mega-rally event which was organised in Modi's home city, Ahmedabad thrived on the promise to embark on a path to greater security engagement and actively working towards enlarging the scope of the QUAD in pulling down China's rising head. However, the Chinese administration has criticised the QUAD alliance on several platforms, viewing it as an "Asian version" of NATO which do not fall in line with the party's interests at home. It is no exaggeration to say that under the Biden administration, America's China policy might undergo some considerable changes.

Biden during his election campaign coined the phrase "secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific". One of the key sticking areas for the Biden administration would remain to recognise India's growing bonhomie with Washington. The administrators of Biden are unlikely to walk back on the path to disregard the cosy ties between them. One tangent would see how Washington responds to China's assertive rise. China is the world's most longest-surviving autocracies. Xi's dictatorship makes it impossible to pierce in the autocratic fog. The Biden administration has repeatedly reiterated that China continues to be America's formidable competitor. One pressing question that emerges is Will Washington's embark on a different strategy to re-engineer its approach towards China or Will it been complacent with the past legacies of his predecessors. China's expansionist policies and its use of heavy-handed military and economic worth will have a severe impact on the Asian capitals. Some close to the US administration argues that China is greatly integrated into the world economy and efforts alone from the USA will not succeed in containing it. As the Chinese factor continues to loom over the South Asian region, a potential strategy to contain this threat would be to see how Washington will collaborate with New Delhi to contain China.

The exponential threat from China will remain a strategic glue holding India-USA close together.

CHALLENGES IN THEIR RELATIONS

But there could be some hiccups in their relationship too. At home, India's stand on certain issues such as the nationwide implementation of the Citizenship Amendment Act, the abrogation of Article 370 and the polarized policies of the government can result in a steep slide in their partnership. By large, India is looking forward to a considerable amount of stability and predictability. However, this stability will come to serve India with a dash of criticism for its domestic policies. The Democrats are particularly hostile to the ideas of human rights violation and the divisive centralistic policies targeting the Muslim community in India. The Vice-President, Kamala Harris has criticised the Modi government on concerns over human rights violation in Kashmir and the subsequent snapping off internet services in the state. The inner diplomatic circle of the Biden administration hint out that Washington could collaborate with China on a host of issues such as cutting down the carbon emissions, engaging on international forums to address the climate change issue. However, on a bunch of other policies such as China's crackdown on Hong Kong, unleashing of cultural genocide in Xinjiang, horrific stories

about the ruthless treatment of the Uighur Muslims Washington will not step back in putting pressure on the Chinese administration. These areas would leave no room for negotiation. Another tangent, in the relations between the two, could come in the form of economic comfort. As experts and policymakers suggest, there could be a shift in the foreign policy priorities of the Biden administration. The Trump administration had stressed too much on pursuing "America First Nationalism" that constantly had put the democratic institutions under stress, but the Biden administration is set to steer the wheels in the opposite direction. The US economy is crippling due to the immediate impact of the virus. With a more aggressive China striving to consolidate its position in the world economy, it would become more difficult for Washington to return to the pre-pandemic output levels.

WAY FORWARD

The President-elect faces a new set of challenges in the international order. But, India has great potential to become the world's largest manufacturer of vaccines at affordable costs. If the administration of both countries collaborates, a lot can be done to eliminate the threat from the aftermath of the virus. The supply-chain networks can be strengthened to tackle the global health crisis effectively. This could be made possible by ensuring the timely availability of vaccines and moving towards a more constructive engagement. The bilateral trade in goods and services has risen from \$16 billion in 1999 to \$149 billion in 2019.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, the momentum towards a deeper strategic-security partnership can be strengthened by mutual convergences on both sides. The partnership between the two can further be expanded by addressing any outstanding bottlenecks that exist. With continuous efforts and confidence-building measures, both nations can build channels of cooperation and create a massive international force to countervail China's aggressive big bullying attitude. On 25th January, the President-elect delivered its promises to revoke the H-1B visa ban which was sweepingly imposed by the Trump administration to reduce the influx of low-cost labour from India and China to the United States. In the pursuit to protect the interests of fellow Americans, the ban had done much harm than good. The decision of the Biden administration has come as a huge sigh of relief for the international community, who lived with uncertainty for 4 miserable years. The need of the hour is to build a more fierce strategic equilibrium pivoted on a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. The gathering of an army of like-minded leaders across the globe has become the new foreign policy statement of building such equilibrium. The current international landscape offers enough opportunity for both nations to engage in constructive meaningful collaboration.

(11) Evolution of the Indo-US Dynamics with special emphasis on the COVID-19 era

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The relations of India and the US have grown exponentially keeping the changing circumstances in mind. Over the years the casual Cold-War mistrust and estrangement over each other's nuclear policies have weathered giving way to cooperation across a range of economic and political areas. When the US enacted the Non-proliferation Treaty in 1978 requiring countries not included in the Nonproliferation Treaty, like India to allow inspections of all nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency, to which, India refused to lead to ending all ties with Washington. However, fast forward to 2000 when President Clinton visited India for the first time since 1978, was the first massive step towards easing ties with India. This trip subsequently led to major reforms in the near future such as, signing of the New Defense Framework and Landmark Civil Nuclear Deal in 2005, launching Economic Partnership in 2010, to hosting the first strategic dialogue between the two nations, which most recently has completed its third level in 2020.

Thus, gradually, Washington and Delhi have shared a common commitment to freedom, democratic principles, equality, human rights, and rule of law. These values with time have strengthened the value-based relationship of India and the USA. Both countries have now shown a shared interest in global security and economic prosperity in the past few years.

The visit of Donald Trump in February 2020, for the "Namaste Trump" event, was a milestone in establishing a global strategic partnership between the two nations. Across the stands of the world's biggest cricket stadium, a sea made up of a 1,25,000-strong crowd had gathered to welcome to US president on his first visit to India alongside the Indian prime minister.

What followed this grand visit was the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue held in October 2020. This dialogue was a new headstart for the India-US partnership to ensure that the Indo-Pacific is a region of peace, stability, and growing prosperity. The outcome of this meeting was threefold. Firstly, it was to enhance maritime communication by signing the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA). This enabled the exchange of geospatial data and information between the two countries and will improve the accuracy of India's missiles in precision strikes.

Secondly, they established a collective conscience on the South China issue. Both countries emphasized that the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea should not prejudice the legitimate rights and interests of any nation in accordance with international law. And lastly, signed and reiterated a couple of MoU's establishing stronger relations in the space and the pharmaceutical industry.

This dialogue has proven to be extremely beneficial to India's stance in the international arena. India-USA's national security convergences have grown closer in a multipolar world and this dialogue not only advanced their individual interests but also ensured that the cooperation between them makes a decisive contribution in the world arena.

However, with the rise of the COVID-19 Pandemic, the definition of diplomacy also changed for both India and the US. This was reflected in the Joint Statement released by the two countries, post the 2+2 dialogue. India expressed gratitude for the 200 ventilators provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to the Indian Red Cross Society, while the U.S. expressed admiration for India's export of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), essential medicines, and therapeutics to the United States. In the same statement, there was also an emphasis on strengthening cooperation in the field of vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostics, ventilators, and other essential medical equipment. Owing to their resolve to encourage research in the medical sector they welcomed the upcoming call for applications for clinical research fellowships for Indian and American scientists to help expand the cohort of physician-scientists that will advance clinical practice and benefit public health in both countries.

Gradually, there has been a strong resolve between the two countries to work for their collective benefit. Especially in the year 2021, the relations have been strengthened in the defense sector where the two nations have collectively resolved to better security. For instance, the visit of the US Defense Secretary that is scheduled for 19 to 21 March is expected to a massive turning point in their ties. As rightly pointed out by Admiral Philips Davidson, Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command that this is a "Historic opportunity to deepen ties and solidify India-US relationship". He also added that by the end of this visit they are expecting, "substantial progress on interoperability and information sharing, service-level and joint military-to-military cooperation and exercises like the MALABAR".

The US has also shown solidarity towards the recent terrorist attacks on the LoC by publicly condemning it. In addition to this, the US has recently established a stronghold in the weapons market of India by selling armed drones to India for the purpose of countering China and Pakistan.

Besides the strong allegiance on the military front, there is also another aspect that is a dominating factor in US-India relations and that is the Indian Diaspora. The Indian American population is the second-largest immigrant group in the country after Mexicans. The US is also home to the second-largest Indian Diaspora globally. Though it constitutes less than one percent of the total American population, it accounts for about ten percent of all doctors and more than five percent of scientists, engineers, and IT professionals in the country.

While their ancestors were busy in building livelihoods and rarely showed an inclination to get involved in politics, today's Diaspora is playing an increasingly pivotal role in American politics, from community organizers to local politics to politics of Capitol Hill. The number of Indian Americans in high political offices has been steadily increasing, whether it is the most recent election of Indian-origin Kamala Harris to the post of Vice President, or in former President Obama's administration or in frameworks across the country, including governorships. For example, quite recently Jenifer Rajkumar, at the age of 38, became the first Indian-American woman to be elected to New York State Assembly, being the first Indian-American woman elected to any state office. Similarly, Niraj Antani, a 29-year-old Republican, also created history by becoming the first Indian-American to be elected to the Ohio state Senate.

However, the most prominent development on the "Indiaspora" is the election of Kamala Harris for the post of Vice President. She is not only the first woman to be elected on this post but also a woman of color who has marked her feat. Her victory was seen by many women as well as Indians across the globe as a notable step towards their representation in global politics, highlighting the power that the Indian Diaspora holds.

In addition to this, Indian Americans have established several advocacy organizations and political action committees on a wide range of issues. For instance, the US-India Political Affairs Committee and the Indian American Forum for Political Education have done crucial work in advocating India's cause. India has bipartisan caucuses in both houses of Congress-the Senate India Caucus and the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans. The community's political influence has grown over the years and it has played a key role in lobbying for Indian causes on Capitol Hill.

Thus, as we can conclude the relationship between India and the US can be accorded to the close military allegiance, the ever-growing people-to-people dialogue across the borders, or the inclusion of the Global Community in the pandemic era. Both nations have understood the ever-growing potential that the other partner holds in developing and deciding their political and social fate. Thus, the relationship between India and the US can be best described as one based on mutual interdependence which will evolve as time demands.

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(12) India-US Trade Deal : Why Disagreement?

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India and US have expanded their trade since India's economy began to take off in mid-1990s. And with time, along with trade relations the diplomatic relations also became strong. But during the President Trump's Tenure India-US came too close and strengthened defence partnership, cooperated on counter-terrorism efforts and boosting economic ties and hosted shows for each other but both the countries failed to sign a trade deal. Since the beginning of his term, President Trump had raised sharp disagreements with India over trade, climate change and H-1 B visa. The policy of President Trump was that he was looking at the trade relations with each country in the bilateral context and thus would want every surplus or deficit to be addressed and a balance to be brought about. This is in contrast to the earlier norms where only the global picture was considered. Thus the US got engaged in extensive debates to reduce the trade imbalance.

There have been trade issues between India and US as there is disagreement on tariffs and foreign investment limitations but particularly on agricultural trade. Recently emerged trade issues are medical devices and fast growing economy. Most importantly, the Donald J. Trump administration has exacerbated tensions by creating new dilemmas, including a focus on bilateral trade deficits and the application of fresh tariffs, prompting retaliation from Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Government.

The issue of trade surplus

The US wants India to lower its tariffs and work towards balancing the trade surplus. However, India has a view that a bilateral trade relationship shouldn't be evaluated with the balance of trade as a parameter. This would cause the overlooking of the actual value-added due to the trade between the countries.

Trade Deficit:

There is a high trade deficit between US and India and because of that Trump administration taken away the GSP (generalized System of preferences) tag and started applying new tariffs. India has relatively high average tariff rates especially in agriculture where the United States exported around \$1.5 billion worth of agricultural products to India in 2018 and imported \$2.7 billion.

Negotiations over U.S. dairy products have gone on for years. India was demanding for dairy products of cows that have been veg since birth according to the International Dairy Foods

Association. India rejected US Proposals indicating the diet of dairy animals and hence the National Milk Producers Federation and the U.S. Dairy Export Council sought India's removal from the GSP program.

Intellectual property rights include piracy of software, film, and music and weak patent protections among others. India remained on the Priority Watch List of the U.S. 2020 Special 301 report, which cited India's insufficient progress in addressing IP challenges and noted concerns over India's treatment of patents, high IP theft rates, and lax trade secret protection. Despite India's amended its patent act Washington still cited insufficient protections and threat of compulsory licensing.

High tariffs on motorcycles were debatable. It stands 50% for some Harley-Davidson models. Indian duties on large-engine motorcycles made Harleys too expensive for Indian consumers. And to make it affordable its director built an assembly plant in India for less expensive models. The tariffs on these fell to 50% from 75% after trump discussed the issue with PM Modi but still it's unacceptable at 50%.

Medical devices: The office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) expressed concern for years about customs duties on medical equipment and devices when the Indian Government applied new price controls on coronary stents and knee implants and due to the disagreement of both parties on basic essentials the trade deal turned into an India-US trade failure.

Digital economy:

India uses many US platforms and many US companies have back office operations in India. In 2018, India's central bank, RBI ordered companies, to operate payment system in India that means to store all data on local servers. A midstream change in December 2018 to e-commerce rules about subsidiaries of foreign-owned platforms earned mention in the 2019 U.S. National Trade Estimate about limiting access to India's market.

Investments:

India aims to attract foreign investment and has made FDI reforms, such as raising foreign equity caps for insurance and defense, and other strides to improve its business environment. U.S. concerns about investment barriers persist nevertheless, heightened by new Indian restrictions on how e-commerce platforms such as Amazon and Walmart-owned Flipkart conduct business. From the U.S. view, India's weak regulatory transparency and other issues, such as IPR and localization policies, add to concerns about FDI barriers. Two-way U.S.-Indian FDI is linked to U.S. jobs and exports in a range of sectors, yet U.S. FDI in India prompts some off shoring concerns.

Visas in service trade:

US take this matter as immigration problem and don't want to negotiate it in trade deliberations. Over the past fifteen years, the proportion of approved H-1B petitions from India went from just under 40 percent to more than 70 percent. India's negotiating posture has long prioritized further opening other countries' visa regimes for services workers. In 2016, India filed a trade dispute at the WTO over these visa fees, and India has also expressed concerns over visa processing delays, including more requests for evidence, which prolong review times, and increased rejection rates under the Trump administration. However, the entire gamut of the agreements does not cover labour.

Conclusion

Under Trump administration, many countries faced trade issues not only with US but also with other countries. He used to dole out threat that follow us or you will have to face disaster or it can impact our relations. Like in Iran case, he asked 5 nations including India and China to completely end their imports of Iranian oil or be subject to US sanctions. India-US administrations put efforts to negotiate a successful trade deal but due to several concerns it has not concluded. But with the new administration both countries should again start with new negotiating agreements. Some analysts expect that U.S- India trade relations may be less strained, but that Congress and the new Administration will continue to seek resolution to ongoing trade frictions in the bilateral relationship.

India would also have to create a suitable environment for private investments, as it's currently an issue and would also have to work on its own development in order to be able to take advantage of international events and not become vulnerable in the face of a crisis.

**(13) Why trade deal issues have not been solved yet?
Is there a hope during Biden presidency?**

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India's bilateral relations with the United States of America involve the major pillars of strategic partnership like security, energy and technology but the two globally powerful countries also extend greater influence over the bilateral economic ties. In the recent years, the relationship between the two countries have expanded largely into a global economic partnership with greater convergence over stating their views regarding the issues like terrorism, cyberspace and shared interests over rules-based order in the Indo Pacific region. Since the year 2001, India's representation in trade and investment forums and admission to multilateral export control regimes became a major achievement and rapidly advanced the path closer to US-India relations. While there were great achievements in diplomatic, defence, commercial, energy and health areas, the areas including trade and nuclear deals were in the category of "unfinished business" between the two countries, since the significant trade deals which were expected never emerged.

As the relations between the two gets strong, issues concerning trade and policies intensifies. The ongoing trade issues between United States and India are worth knowing as the diplomacy between the two countries deepens.

INTRODUCTION

According to the data of the commerce and industry ministry, The United States of America turned out to be biggest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) into India, replacing Mauritius, during the first half of the financial year of 2020. The DPIIT (Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade) data showed that during April to September 2020, India attracted FDI worth USD 7.12 billion from the US, The United States was the fourth biggest investor in India during that period.

As the foreign direct investment increased between The U.S. and India, analysts suggested that economic ties between the two countries might strengthen too. Relation between the two warmed in recent years, cooperation and mutual partnership have strengthened across range of areas including economics and politics. To understand the trade environment of the two country, and the issues concerning trade and economic imbalances, it is important to understand the trade of relations of the two country for past 25 years and how it evolved over the period of time.

Back in the year 1991, India launched Economic reforms under the government of Prime Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao that facilitated India to expand its economic ties with the United States. Finance Minister Manmohan Singh oversaw India opening its economy to international trade and investment, privatisation, tax reforms, deregulation, inflation controlling measures

that could catalyse decades to rapid growth of economy. During the presidency of George W. Bush, all U.S. sanctions that were imposed on India were lifted. Most of the economic sanctions were eased. Nuclear energy trade between U.S. and India also reinforced by signing the civil nuclear cooperation initiative which made India the only country outside the non-proliferation treaty to participate in nuclear commerce

One of the most prominent trade deals between the two countries was the 'Double Trade' in 2006 by which the eighteen-year ban on importing fruit was ended. In response to that, India relaxed few restrictions laid on importing Harley Davidson motorcycles from the United States. According to U.S. Bureau of economic analysis, Bilateral trade in goods and services rose from \$45 billion in 2006 to \$70 billion by the year 2010 as U.S. launched economic partnership with India: India Economic and financial Partnership, which institutionalized greater bilateral relations on economic and financial area. U.S. president Barack Obama visit to India highlighted more economic ties worth \$14.9 billion. By the year 2014, Modi and Barack Obama had an agreement on memorandum of understanding between the export- import bank. The relation between U.S. and India strengthened by the first ever Modi Trump meet while emphasizing over boosting economic ties in 2017. By analysing the trade between the two it has come into picture that India enjoys a surplus of nearly \$23 billion. However, despite the negotiations over trade deals, economic issues between the two still have not been resolved yet with divisions remaining over agricultural products, tariffs, and other areas.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The United States is India's largest direct investors. The stock of FDI inflow has increased over the period of time. In the year 2019-2020, US was India's top trading partner. From April to September 2020, India attracted FDI worth USD 7.12 billion from the US. Analyst predict that the high growth story of FDI into India will "go well" in the year 2021 as well. India's largest investments are in the outgoing manufacturing sector which accounts for 54.8% of the country's foreign investment. On 3rd August 2018, India became the third Asian Nation to be granted Strategic Trade authorization-1 (STA-1) status by the United States. STA-1 permits the export of high technology products in civil space and defence from the US to India.

Trade Relations

India is United States 9th largest trading partner and US is India's second largest trading partner. In 2017, US exported for about \$25.7 billion of goods and services to India, and imported \$48.6 billion worth of Indian goods. Major items imported by India include aircraft, fertilisers, computer hardware, scrap metal and medical equipment. Items which were majorly imported from of India involved information technology services, textiles, machinery goods, gems, chemicals, iron and steels products, coffee, tea and other edible food products. From the year 1999 to 2018, trade in goods and services between the two countries rose from \$16 billion to \$142 billion. Both the countries have discussed range of trade and investment issues. In July 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush formed a new programme,

the trade policy forum. It is run by the respective nation. The goal of the programme was to increase bilateral trade and investment flow. Trade Policy Forum included five main sub divisions i.e., Agricultural trade Group, Tariff and non-tariff barrier group, Basic exchange and cooperation agreement (BECA). U.S. and India have attached great importance to trade policy forum, even during the tenure of president Obama. TRF potential have increased over time. The commercial discussion was created out from the security and commercial dialogue in 2017. The first session of the US-India commercial dialogue was held in Washington DC on 27th October 2017. The programme focused on joint economic growth. The 11th Trade policy Forum meeting was also held in October 2017. Discussions were held on issues related to bilateral trade between the two countries, areas of mutual cooperation, market access in agriculture, non-agricultural goods and services and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). At the conclusion of Trade Policy Forum, both Ministers decided that the two countries will continue to work towards building strong trade and investment ties to realize mutual gains from the partnership. Both sides also expressed the desire to reduce the existing gaps and work towards resolution of the outstanding issues before the next round of the TPF. (Brief on India US relations June 2019)

As the trade between United States and India has increased, so have the tensions. Indian and U.S. officials have disagreed for years on tariffs and foreign investments limitations, and more issues like agricultural trade. Concerns for particularly issues like intellectual property rights have tensed United States for more than twenty years. Issues involving medical devices and fast evolving digital economy have more recently come to fore. Donald Trump administration has worsened the situation by creating new dilemmas such as focus on bilateral trade deficits and the claim of new tariffs, prompting retaliation from Prime minister Modi's government. Trade deal issues between Delhi and Washington DC are intensifying by time, Both the countries have formed certain kind of diplomacy with each other, However the trade issues are not been solved yet.

Deficits and Tariffs

Since the two countries are facing economic tensions already, Trump administration approach to trade has created friction in the deals which has led to more economic tensions with India. Bilateral Trade Deficit is one of top most concern U.S. faces with India, earlier it was not a big issue as it became during the Trump administration. Trump issued an executive order in 2017 for a study of the United States most significant trade deficits. India has recently lessened the trade deficit in goods with the United States, which went from \$24.3 billion in 2016 to \$23.3 billion in 2019. Indian Negotiators have proposed that the deficit should be reduced while purchasing products including liquefies natural gas and aircraft.

Trump administration began applying new tariffs in 2018 on steel and aluminium imports from lots of countries, using the national security exemption in U.S. trade law, India being one of those countries. The issues intensify as India, made a list of retaliatory tariffs and filed it with the world trade organization (WTO)

Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), a special trade treatment for developing countries, Trump administration removed India from this program. One of the criteria of this program is the “equitable and reasonable” access to that country’s markets for U.S. goods and services, to which the administration still noted to have trade barriers in India. Soon the Trump administration drawn out India from the GSP, India pulls out its retaliatory tariffs, after which the United States filed a dispute at the WTO.

Agricultural Products

Tensions over Agricultural trading products are the most difficult to resolve. The United States exported about \$1.5 billion worth of agricultural products to India in 2018 and imported \$2.7 billion. Exports to India include fruit, nuts, legumes, cotton and dairy products, which are important to the economies of California, Montana, and Washington. Spices, rice, and essential oils are the top agricultural items imported from India to the United States. (A field guide to US India Trade february 13,2020)

India’s 2019 retaliatory tariffs which came on top of globally applied tariff included U.S almonds, walnuts, cashews, apples, chickpeas, wheat and peas. According to the California Walnut board and commission, US hold a duty of more than 120 percent on walnuts. India is the largest market for California almonds, accounting for about \$600 million in 2018 exports according to the California Almond Board. Chickpeas, of which India is one of the world’s largest buyers, were hit with a 10 percent tariff on top of a 2017 globally applied tariff of 60 percent. The USA Dry Pea & Lentil Council described pulse exports as “devastated” by trade wars underway since 2017. (A field guide to US India Trade february 13,2020) According to International Dairy Foods Association, Discussions over US dairy products have gone long for years. It is hard for US dairy farmers to sell their products in India, because in India dairy cows are supposed to be fed ‘vegetarian food’ to which the association call this requirement as ‘scientifically unwarranted’. India rejected U.S. proposals to which national milk producer’s federation and the US dairy export council sought India’s removal from GSP program.

Intellectual Property Rights

Intellectual property rights have been one of the top most concern of U.S. since the year 1989. Concern is included over issues of piracy of software, weak patent protections, film and music over which India was one of the countries placed over top priority list of U.S. concerns. As a part of WTO agreement over trade related aspects of Intellectual property right. In 2005, India revised its patent act which hence came into force which meant that creating a replica of the product using different process would qualify as ‘infringement’. By 2018, United States levy insufficient patent protection, restrictive standards for patents, and threats of licensing. India’s copyright regime is the other US concern.

Investment Barriers

India’s foreign investment in sectors such as insurance and banking has been limited for

decades. India has substantially liberalized foreign direct investment procedures and issues regarding the same still exist. The US- India strategic policy forum and Us India business council have ordered the removal of investment limits as a chief policy issue.

Harley Davidson Motorcycles

India levies high trade tariffs on the U.S. based motorcycle Harley Davidson to which US complain about. President Trump often expressed his stand against India's high tariffs on motorcycles which accounts 50 percent for Harley Davidson. In 2007, George W. Bush administration, trade negotiators formed a deal under which Harley Davidson motorcycles would be traded with India for exchange of Indian mangoes. Trump too emphasised on this deal. According to director of Harley Davidson India, India would bring down duties by around 40 percent. Trump raised the issue of India levying duties over motorcycles in 2017 as tariffs being 75 percent for the largest engine imports. However, the tariffs fell to 50% under Modi administration in 2018, but Trump believed it was still unacceptable.

Medical Devices

Custom duties over medical equipment and devices have been one of the trade issues between the two countries. Tensions regarding India applying new price controls on coronary stents and knee implants have been major concern in 2017. Indian regulatory authority denied permission to US manufacturers to take back their medical devices from the Indian Market, hence resulting in loss faced by US suppliers. A trade association of medical device manufactures, AdvaMed, petitioned for the United States to review India's eligibility for the GSP program.

Digital Economy

India is growing itself as the hub of information technology and working great in the field of digital business, Tensions have emerged over the issue of data localization, data privacy, and e-commerce. Most of the digital systems of India are operated by US and many US companies have back office operating in India. These large platforms are been used by billions of Indian internet users; thus, PM Modi calls the digital system as the "new oil" and "new gold." Certain issues have come up here as well regarding handling data on local servers leading on to cross border transaction. In India the e-commerce sector operates a marketplace model, which act as a midstream to connect buyer and seller. In 2018, rules and subsidiaries of foreign owned platforms came into picture. In 2019, US national trade estimate about limiting access to India's markets. India is developing a comprehensive data policy which will carve out specific government requests for data.

Visas in services Trade

Immigration matters have always been an important issue in the United States. The H1B and L1 Visas permit highly skilled workers to be employed from the other countries. India is very competitive because of the large amount of highly skilled workers it provides and its professional work in the whole world. Over the last fifteen years, H1B petitions from India went under 40 percent to more to 70 percent.

Indian Government objects to U.S. laws passed in 2010 and 2015, which applies higher fees on

companies with more than fifty employees, if more than half of the employees are in United States as a non-immigrant. In 2016, India files a trade dispute at WTO over the rise in visa fees. The dispute is still going on. India stated its concern regarding the visa processing delays including prolong review time and increased rejection rates under the Trump administration. Most of these issues centre around U.S. concerns about the Indian economy, mostly because the U.S. economy presents fewer barriers than India. These Trade issues are ongoing and some are even negotiated with WTO. Both, Trump and Modi have dealt with these issues and negotiated to resolve them but somehow could not finalise the deal and concerns and issues remain the same. It can be perceived that the Trump administration tried to resolve these issues in a diplomatic way. Trump stated that “well, we can have a trade deal with India, but I am really saving the big deal for later on. We are doing a very big trade deal with India. We’ll have it,” reflecting an optimistic attitude towards the trade deal issues

Biden Presidency

Biden has been a keen proponent of U.S. India relations for years; his cabinet’s top priority has signalled an approach to partnership and alliances towards Trump’s “America First” program. As per the winning of 2020 US presidential election, Modi congratulated Biden on its victory and hope to work closely together to take US- India relations to the great level.

“My dream is that in 2020 the two closest nations in the world will be India and the United States,” he told an interviewer in 2006 when he was a U.S. senator.

Under Biden presidency, U.S. policy toward India is expected to maintain a similar policy direction as the Trump administration did on China, albeit with an enhanced emphasis on multilateralism. Reaching a trade deal (which Trump could not) and extending visa regimes (extending H-1B work visas in science and technology) would be some of the other areas of thrust for Biden’s India policy. (Biden’s Cabinet Picks Will Hold India-US Relations in Steady Course January 15, 2021)

As the Trump administration failed to carry its trade deals and policies, India still hopes that trade negotiations with the Biden administration might bring some change. Mostly issues concerning Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) might revoke. External affairs minister S. Jaishankar said that the Indian officials are ready to cut the deal with US, indicating that problem lay with the US Trade Representatives.

According to National security blueprint issued by the White House, Joe Biden administration will expand its relations with India and push global diplomacy to strengthen international alliance. There are certain hints that Biden administration is focusing on creating comprehensive economic connection with the Indian Government. The Trans- Pacific partnership (TPP) is set to develop as America’s premier trade pact across Indo-Pacific region. India’s hopes to balance Trumps “America first” with the Biden as well and Biden hope to discover the path between the tremendous global instability and economic stability it has to maintain at home country.

Biden could further lay out a unique opportunity to take advantage of the current situation and

increase its relations with India for which he needs to focus over the issues such as convergence on China does not go to waste, it could continue to apply economic pressure on Beijing to open its economy and most importantly United States need to work on expanding US- India relations over economic issues. Biden administration should recover its health and energy partnership to fight against the challenges posed by Covid-19.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. -India relations have been based on partnership and mutual trust on shared commitment to equal treatment of all citizens, human rights and democratic principles. The United States and India have shared great interests and promoted economic prosperity through trade, investment and connectivity. Both the countries are leading Global power and must ensure peace even at economic level. The United States seek out expanded trade relationship with India that is mutual and fair. Trade deal issues have been one of the top most priority of Indo-US relations. Analyst and officials tend to have an optimistic approach towards the concerns around trade deal. However, the issues are not solved yet. Trump administration has been diplomatic about the trade concerns. Biden administration's top priority is maintaining India-US relations, which gives enormous hopes to resolve the ongoing trade disputes with India. Analyst have observed that India and the US could resolve the trade deal issues by beginning to focus on what is known as "low hanging fruit" which means to establish relations over issues on which both countries would agree, which may include The US reinstating India's benefits under the GSP programme, and India doing away with duties on motorcycles. India will continue to keep a close watch over the Biden presidency to resolve trade issues. Biden will not be able to undo all the ongoing disputes, but he can push the United States coming back to the kind of economic and political openness that has always been the foundation of India-US strategically critical relationship.

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International Relations/Foreign Policy (Generalia) :

(1) Leadership to Political Leadership to Statesmanship

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Leadership to Political Leadership to Statesmanship

Genesis of leadership → When the number is one, question of leadership does not arise, when the numbers are two, germ of leadership is sowed, when the numbers are more than two, question of leadership appears visible indistinctly but when the numbers are more than three, question of leadership is manifest and, therefore, unavoidable. As a result, the question crops up instantly, what is leadership? Unpretentious simplest answer is, a leader is a person who is followed by others, whether it is in a family or in a society or in a club or in religious institution say, mosque, church, pagoda, temple or in an association or in an office, corporate and non-corporate, or in an administration/government or in a political party.

Old debate, Patriarchy predates Matriarchy or Matriarchy predates Patriarchy still remains unsettled in the disciplines concerned, although 99% of population on earth Planet hold 'Patriarchy predates Matriarchy' Therefore, avowing the proposition 'Patriarchy predates Matriarchy' this can safely be concluded that historically, leaderships originated from husbandhood (The condition of being a husband) meaning the first female of mankind accepted the first male as both partner and guardian, turned into husband and wife and started leading wedded life, which acted as the basis of family. It swelled and elongated when the couple attained parenthood by giving birth to child/children and, as a necessary adjunct, grew there management and leadership in nebulous mood and mode. And so, the sequences stand as 'husbandhood → parenthood → leadership' (Sequence-1).

Leadership is an atomic concept, which has ineludibly many wings matching with respective disciplines and needs under the circumstances in question and the most blossoming is political leadership(s) and, for that reason, political leadership postdates leadership as leadership(s) postdates parenthood(s) and parenthood postdates husbandship..Even being the youngest in

origination, political leadership ranks top of all sorts of leaderships because its ambits, dimensions, challenges, dilemmas and opportunities claim so theoretically and hence, the sequences stand as husbandhood → parenthood → leadership → political leadership (Sequence-2).

When such political leadership(s) gets sharpened and matured in the widest scales and dimensions rising above ultra plus it then attains statesmanship and thus, the sequences stand as husbandhood → parenthood → political leadership → statesmanship (Sequence-3).

Concept of leadership began ballooning in the context of time, space and dimension with various forms, natures, folds and dimension in wider scales in national, regional and global outlooks. That's why there we find the words family leader, social leader, national leader and global leader and necessarily, as well there emerge business leader, corporate leader, trade union leaders, political leader and so forth. But one must not miss to bear in mind that the very concept of leadership is 'atomic in nature and positive in manifestations under all the circumstances, favorable or not'. From such viewpoints, chief of thieves, smugglers, hooligans and so on in the same veins and spirits are not to be treated as leaders rather they may be termed otherwise. in pejorative connotations indeed, say gangster, don, mafia et cetera.

For long leaderships have been being defined from various standpoints with luminous characteristics and today the very domain is getting flooded with theories after theories encompassing both political to non-political ambits. Here our concern is leadership in political parties and administration (government) within the fold of politics. Concept of political party in a democracy was neither known in ancient time nor in middle Ages. So long Parliament beginning from the day of the signing of the Magna Carta on 15 June 1215 at Runnymede in England remained as an advisory body of the King, the necessity and concept of political party/parties was a seven heaven even.

Emergence of political parties took place in 1679 pinpointing the Exclusion Bill crisis of 1678-1681 followed by the dissolution of Parliament by Charles II. Supporters in favor of the Bill got united and petitioned for a new parliament came to be known as 'Petitioners' while those who expressed their abhorrence of the attempt to force the king to summon parliament were consequently named 'Abhorrrers'. Later 'petitioners' became known as 'Whigs' leading to the formation of Liberal party and the 'Abhorrrers' came to be identified as 'Tories' leading to the creation of Conservative party. Sway of political parties over the people began to increase and swell bit by bit and people at a certain stage effectively became dependent on political parties for their concerns and matters in a state, which can be well understood from political landscapes of the then United Kingdom, motherland of multi-party parliamentary democracy. W.S. Gilbert in 1882, understanding the Influence and gravity of political parties over the people of UK, wrote:

'How nature does always contrive
That every boy and gal
That's born into this world alive
Is either a little liberal
Or else a little conservative
Having distastes from.

Considering the functioning of diametrically opposed political parties in confrontational moods and modes in United Kingdom as threats to national unity, Founding fathers of USA thoughtfully avoided the presence and operation of political parties in the soil of America but soon it proved to be futile exercise when it was found that sharp differences arose and developed manifestly in 1796 presidential election, one under anti-Federalist camp with Jefferson and Madison at the apex supporting more say in favor of the federated united, called states in American Constitution, while other under Federalist composite with Adams and Hamilton at the top standing by federal dominance. With incumbent President [George Washington](#) having refused a third term in office, the 1796 election became the first U.S. presidential election in which political parties competed for the presidency. The Federalists became united behind Adams and the Democratic-Republicans supported Jefferson and Madison. Thus, later came into being the Republican Party and the Democratic Party.

In the British Indian sub-continent, Congress was floated with leadership of Barrister Womesh Chunder Bonnerjee with guidance and inspiration of former British Imperial civil servant (later the Indian Civil Servant), political reformer and botanist Allen Octavian Hume in 1885 followed by Muslim League founded and led by Nawab Sir Khawaja Salimullah Bahadur [GCIEKCS](#) in 1906. Alongside were born many political parties in various shapes, natures and dimensions with divergent ideologies and approaches., although only Congress and Muslim League came to formidable standing to dominate the political landscapes as a whole.

During the British periods from 1885 to 14/15 August 1947, there were born hundreds of political leaders and politicians who placed their names in the political history of the sub-continent as legendary ones notably calling to mind, among others, are MK Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Dr. Ambedkar, Vallabhbhai Jhaverbhai Patel, popularly known as Sardar Patel, J.B. Kripanali, Shaukat Ali, Mohammad Ali Jauhar, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Shubashchandra Bose, Sir Salimullah, Quad e Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Huseyn Shaheed Sarwarredhy, Dadabahi Naoroji, Gopal Krihna Gokhale, Chittaranjan Das, Annie Besant, Surandranath Benarjee, Rahimillah M.Sayani, Abul Kalam Azad and so on.

Partition of British India into two sovereign states, India and Pakistan gave birth to new political landscapes in the politics in this sub-continent. India began to continue with Congress having Mahatma Gandhi as political mentor and Jawaharlal Nehru as Prime Minister and main

focus and other regional parties markedly CPM, CPI. Later National Congress faced splits, although it ruled India for long under Nehru dynasty comprising Jawaharlal. Nehru, his daughter Srimati Indira Gandhi and her eldest son Rajiv Gandhi and it is currently being led by his wife Sonia Gandhi (although Rahul Gandhi, only son of Rajiv Gandhi and Sonia Gandhi, led the party for two years but resigned on personal ground and then Sonia Gandhi took over again). Leaders such as Jagjivan Ram, Charan Singh, Chandra Shekhar, VP Singh, Raj Narayan, Abdul Gani, Siddhartha Shankar Roy, and Pranab Mukherjee contributed a lot from their respective standpoints.

Upsurge of Bharatiya Janata Party now with Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi as the central figure transformed secular India into religious India with Hinduism as ideology. The BJP traces its roots to the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS : Indian People's Association), which was established in 1951 as the political wing of the pro-Hindu group Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS; "National Volunteers Corps") by Shyama Prasad Mukherjee. The BJP was formally established in 1980, following a split by dissidents within the Janata Party coalition, whose leaders wanted to exclude elected BJS officials from participating in the RSS (Critics of the RSS have consistently accused it of political and religious extremism, particularly because one of its members had assassinated Mahatma Gandhi) The BJS advocated the rebuilding of India in accordance with Hinduculture and called for the formation of a strong unified state and BJS subsequently reorganized itself as the BJP under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Lal Krishna Advani, and Murali Manohar Joshi.

Therefore, India began with a novel political journey with BJP Leaderships with Hinduism and united India as vision and mission while National Congress remains stick to non-secular India and thus, India became trapped in diametrically opposed confrontational politics at the negation of the very will of Mahatma Gandhi, Architect of independent, free and sovereign India. Not only this such journey also attached formal validation to Jinnah's 'Two Nations Theory' depending on which India and Pakistan came into being on 14/15 August 1947 respectively. To be more specific, according to this theory Muslims and Hindus are two separate nations by definition; Muslims have their own customs, religion, and tradition, and from social and moral points of view, Muslims are different from Hindus; and therefore, Muslims should be able to have their own separate homeland in which Islam is the dominant religion, being segregated from Hindus. The two-nation theory advocated by the All India Muslim League is the founding principle of the Pakistan Movement (i.e. the ideology of Pakistan as a Muslim nation-state in the northwestern and eastern regions of India) through the partition of India in 1947.

The most important point to be noted here is that political leaderships of BJP in India ideologically embraced religion, Hinduism, as vision and mission and, curiously enough, despite lot of unwanted events and sceneries swamping Citizenship Amendment Bill, 2019, Population Regulation Bill, 2019, Mosque of Babar issues in specific BJP is gaining and

advancing with majority Hindu supports of one billion and thirty million population. Today, India is almost a two party political system under the shadow of coalition politics. Overall landscapes encompassing politics, political parties with various ideologies, visions and missions and leaderships in India expose the natures and standards of political domains therein.

Pakistan started to endure with Muslim League headed by its Father of the Nation Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, which subsequently got split mainly into Convention Muslim League led by military turned political leader General Ayub Khan and Council Muslim League led by Mian Mumtaz Mohammad Khan Daultana with other prominent leaders Sardar Muhammad Zafarulla Sardar Shauket Hyat Khan, Chaudhry Muhammad Husain Chattha, Khawaja Muhammad Safdar, Abdul Qayyum Khan and Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi. Later, Pakistan People's Party founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was floated in 1966. Awami Muslim League (later renamed Awami League) was hovered in 1949 first led by Maulana Abul Hamid Khan Bhashani, then by Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy and finally by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, titled in 1969 Bangabandhu (Friend of Bengal) and later became Father of the Nation of Independent and sovereign Bangladesh. Unlike India, Pakistan within the short span of its political journey faced martial law twice, first in 1958 by Chief of Army Field Martial Ayub Khan and then in 1969 by Chief of Army General Yahya Khan. Political leaderships, political parties and politics were under extreme suffocation under military rule.

Bangladesh made a journey with Awami League led by the father of the nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Its journey was certainly challenging under the settings of the then bi-polar world steered by USA and USSR and it got boiled further as the country was divided into pro-Liberation and anti-Liberation forces since Bangladesh came into being as a free, independent and sovereign state on 16 December 1971 through a 9-month bloody war of liberation supported by India with Pakistan. In its first Constitution framed on 4 November 1972, four principles such as nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism were adopted banning religion-based politics. Jatiya Samajtantric Dal (JSD), the first newly born political party in independent Bangladesh, was floated in 1973 under leadership of freedom fighters Major (Rtd) MA. Jalil and ASM Rob as disapproval to misdeeds of Mujib regime. Bangladesh met with one party system called BAKSAL (Bangladesh Krishak Sramil Awami League in Bangla and in English, Bangladesh Worker-Peasant's People's League) on 24 February 1975 encompassing Bangladesh Awami League, Communist party of Bangladesh, National Awami Party (Mozaffar) and Jatiya League under the leadership of the father of the nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Leading political figures in this phase were Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani, Aftab Rahman Khan, Taj Uddin Ahmed, Monsur Ali, Syed Nazrul Islam, Kamaruzzaman, Moni Singh, Mujaffar Ahmed and so on.

Alike Pakistan, Bangladesh also confronted martial law regimes twice one in 1975 through assassination of the father of the nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and members of

his family save sheikh Hasina, currently Prime Minister, and sheikh Rehna who were then in foreign lands and other in 1982 (in fact assassination of Ziaur Rahman by an abrupt centrally disjoined coup by Major General Mumjur, GOC of Chittagong division, on 30 May 1981 paved the way smother for second martial law by HM Ershad). In both cases, military dictators general Ziaur Rahman and HM Ershad formed their own political parties named Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jatiya Party (JP) respectively. Besides, so many small parties called bi-cycle, drawing room party, wagon party, bus party, rail party (all these mean too small in size and too poor in mobilizing public opinions) were born on different occasions typically under the patronages and financial supports of those regimes

Switching over from multi-party to one party (BAKSAL in 1975) to multi-party after 15 August 1975 with the birth of so many political parties of various sizes, natures and ideologies consuming left-leaning, extreme left, right-leaning, extreme right and moderates political parties and political leaderships as well made the political landscapes in Bangladesh disturbing and puzzling as a whole. Left politics and its leaderships are virtually marginalized while right-leaning politics especially fully region-based like Jamat e Islami (most of the stalwarts because their anti-liberation activities and crimes against humanity faced trials and either were sentenced to death or imprisonment for life) and political leaderships are in disarray due to parochial and vested interests. At present political firmaments are colored with leaderships that embrace readily are--- Begum Khaleda Zia, currently Chairperson of BNP and three-term Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Dr. Kamal Hossain, chief architect of the constitution of Bangladesh and founder Gonoforum, Prof. Dr. B. Chowdhury, former President of Bangladesh and founder of Bikalpa Dhara, freedom fighter, also known as Bangabir, Kader Siddique, founder of Krishak party, Mujahidul Islam Salim, one of the founders of Communist party, barrister Moudud Ahmed, Shah Moazzam Hossain, Tofael Ahmed, Motia Chowdhury, Obaidul Kader, Mirza Fukurol Islam and so forth.

This is really very much attention-grabbing that post 1975 generated coalition/alliance politics implying today no political party singly is in a position to win majority seats in parliament to form a government and, therefore, alliance/coalition cropped up a reality. The most demerit of the politics of coalition is that it allows not too much known leaders of small parties in coalition to gain politically and materially concurrently sidetracking and cornering formidable nationally recognized leaders for allowing spaces. Today, there are at least 50 registered political parties, however, only few named Awami League, Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jatiya Party are meaningfully in the fields with representations in parliament.

The very purposes of narrating all these in the contexts of British India, independent India and Pakistan and then Bangladesh are to show and establish propositions that politics and political leaderships are intertwined, inherent and time-bound. A political leadership must have to take overall state of affairs into accounts with due importance and weightage to actors playing in such landscapes, directly or indirectly, at the same time keeping an Eagle eye on local, national,

regional and global realities to which his/her initiatives, policies, vision, mission, objectives and strategies tied essentially. Weak leadership breeds weak performance, weak performance invites weak standing at home and abroad. From realistic point of views, political leaderships, willingly or not, once get trapped in self/parochial/vested gains and interests at the negation of the welfare of the people and state in question that state of standing is really shocking all in all and thus, it may rightly be termed as 'political leadership(s) trap'. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are now within the parameter of political leadership trap and such reality also chasing largely the states in developing hemisphere in meticulous.

Leadership taking in its fold political party, parliament and government is neither amateurship nor sportsmanship rather it is both arts and science and hence, must be christened and ornamented with the best positive qualities of human beings overpowering the odds and evils all in all. It is inherently tagged with compassion, honesty, fairness and transparency, gallantness, responsibilities, responsiveness and accountabilities and sacrifices going beyond ultra plus. Knowledge and experiences both institutional and non-institutional, mission and vision, power of listening and understanding, power of digestion and bearing and power of delivery as and when required inalienably move with leaderships. Such imprints and imageries have been depicted in the thoughts and analyses of political thinkers, theorists, analysts, political scientists, sociologists and social thinkers with variations and peculiarities within respective epochs engulfing the periods from ancient to Middle Ages to the present.

One of the decisive characteristics of leadership has been exposed in the language of great Shakespeare who said:

'Cowards die many times before their deaths;
The valiant never taste of death but once.
Of all the wonders that I yet have heard,
It seems to me most strange that men should fear;
Seeing that death, a necessary end,
Will come when it will come.'" ([*Julius Caesar \(II, ii, 32-37\)*](#)).

Leadership(s) presupposes submissiveness and politeness in mental make-up and hardly a leader is full of pride of saying:

'I am the Monarch of all I survey;
My right there is none to dispute
From the centre all round to the sea
I am lord of the fowl and the brute' (William Cooper, 1731-1800)

Political leadership(s) fairly utter with confidence and valor echoing Napoleon Bonapart 'There is no Alps' recalling the historical landscapes 'When Napoleon was charged with the task of leading the French invasion into Italy via the Alps, his engineers advised him that the terrain of

glaciers and steep precipices meant an impasse with canon and other weaponry was impossible. "Impossible," he replied, "is a word found only in the dictionary of fools." He proclaimed that: "There shall be no Alps!" and set about to make it so(<https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/shall-alps-why-obstacles-way-key-entrepreneurial-success-dupsy-abiola>). Also in the words of Robert Bruce 'Impossible is a word to be found in the dictionary of fools'.

Leadership(s) these days implies emphatically radiation with centripetal and centrifugal forces being necessarily appraised of ongoing march of science and technology. That's why, political leadership(s) in explicit hardly wonders and sounds:

'Twinkle, twinkle, little star,
How I wonder what you are!
Up above the world so high,
Like a diamond in the sky.

When the blazing sun is gone,
When he nothing shines upon,
Then you show your little light,
Twinkle, twinkle, all the night' ([Jane Taylor](#), 1783-1824)
So, it is for the reason that it signifies his/her lagging far behind.

This is a story with the moral lesson, where there's a will there's a way. The story gives us a good moral lesson. It is the story of pigeons, a hunter, and a mouse. The story is very interesting and a new one. You will enjoy the short story. (<https://www.zahidenotes.com/2018/12/where-there-is-will-there-is-way-story.html>). Therefore, its appeal to leadership(s), especially to political leadership(s) is of paramount implication because political leadership(s) with a resolute will can show ways better/the best.

Leadership(s) takes as fact that life is curve and full of challenges, dilemmas and opportunities therein, not straight and not even sonnets (A sonnet is a one-stanza, 14-line poem, written in iambic pentameter: five sets of unstressed syllables followed by stressed syllables for a ten-syllable line The theme in first eight lines goes up and comes down in the next six lines). For political leaderships it is a Himalayan certainty. In the words of philosopher, scientist and former President of India APJ Abdul Kalam, widely known as Missile Man, 'PIZZA always confuses us, it comes in a Square box, yet when you open it's round. And when you start eating it it's a triangle. Life and people are like pizza look different, appear different and of course behave absolutely different'

(<https://www.pinterest.com/hengmaryzz/thinkers-so-great-wow/>). Hence, political leadership(s) has to understand the peculiarities of Pizza character so that he/she may be in a strong position to judge pizza-like human character for not being confused off and often.

Leadership(s) cannot be apathetic to the authenticity: "whole is truer than its part(s)" meaning a leader never commits a mistake to take the stocks in full in question while attaining at a conclusion and this is, speaking even commonly, is a part and parcel to political leadership(s).

Fundamentals of Inductive logic tell us: (a) nothing comes out of nothing. Every event/occurrence is a result of multiple causes, instant and distant. For instance, if a bomb explodes at a place then it needs to be noted carefully that it did not explode singly for the instant reason of its switching on but reasonably and scientifically also for the reasons of its planting in that very mode and direction and, above all, the human brain(s) behind all the plans and technicalities must be taken into account and (b) Nature behaves in the same way under the similar circumstances, which point toward that if there is a rain today, there shall be rain tomorrow provided the same weather takes place again. That's why, instead of going for any kind of SOS services to meet with the crises in question, no doubt, political leadership(s) prefers giving thoughts in wider perspectives.

In his inspiring ethical story 'The Emperor's Three Questions', Leo Tolstoy noted: "Remember that there is only one important time and that is now. The present moment is the only time over which we have dominion. The most important person is always the person you are with, who is right before you, for who knows if you will have dealings with any other person in the future? The most important pursuit is making the person standing at your side happy, for that alone is the pursuit of life."(<http://www.tnellen.com/iths/3questions.html>). Political leadership(s) attaches due weightage and importance to such veins and spirits.

Following relevant quotes may deservedly be cited here to make it clear that political leadership(s) is the highest form of arts and science applications of which depend on those who play in the domains of politics and statecrafts.

"There are those who look at things the way they are, and ask why. I dream of things that never were, and ask why not?"(Robert Kennedy). "Probable impossibilities are to be preferred to improbable possibilities." (Aristotle). "Our aspirations are our possibilities' (Robert Browning). The future belongs to those who see possibilities before they become obvious (Samuel Johnson). 'Despise no man and consider nothing impossible, for there is no man who does not have his hour and there is no thing that does not have its place' (The Talmud). 'When you say that something is impossible, you have made it impossible (Bruce Lee). "'Impossible' is a word that humans use far too often. (Seven of Nine' (Tertiary Adjunct of Unimatrix Zero One). We the willing, led by the unknowing, are doing the impossible for the ungrateful. We have done so much, with so little, for so long, we are now qualified to do anything, with nothing' (Mother Teresa)(<https://www.uky.edu/~eushe2/Pajares/impossibleG.htm>]

Legendary scientist Albert Einstein held "science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind". Likewise, it can be stated in rejuvenated and wider versions "Politics without

religion(s) is orphan, religion without politics is displeasing, indicating the theme, spirits and memos of religion(s) as one of the necessary contents of politics in its noblest manifestations shall have to be put into operation’.

Therefore, political leadership(s) cannot be in full without lessons from respective religion in particular religions in general. Core theme of religions speaks of honesty, fairness, dedication, responsibility, responsiveness, accountability, fellow- feelings, altruism, duty towards the Creator of all above, beneath and in-between land and skies signifying all the creations, parents, family, relatives, friends, nature, animal world, society and broader communities entailing state and the world at large. When a person/ leader/political leader distance himself/herself from respective religion and religions as a whole, he/she then invites sufferings from short of light within. Every state, this way or that way, is religious- politico state, avowedly or not. Similarly every person is within the fold of religion(s) whether he or she is conscious enough or not. And inescapably every leader/political leader is more or less is religious- political whether he or she senses it or not. But problem lies elsewhere as in most of the cases, say in 90% cases, appeal and activation of the teachings of religion(s) remain dormant, idle and inactive in our life and it is truer in the field of political leadership(s). There is no denying the fact that religion(s) teaches to be conscious, mobile, apologetic and pro-active as the same seem to be the basis and motto of leaderships and pointedly political leaderships.

Historically speaking, hundreds of civilizations came into being and lost into eternity. There might have been corresponding political systems and governments but our knowledge hardly go above 10000 to 15000 years back and with such limitations, it is truly impossible to draw befitting conclusions. When we hear of Maya, Mohenjo Daro, Sumerian and other remotest civilizations we wonder and ponder what a long journey human races have initiated since the march of mankind on this earth planet. We do not exactly know whether present civilization(s) is more advance or lagging behind but whatever it is, we like to stick to digging potentialities and opportunities lying in us, nature and around.

In his 1841 book ‘On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and The Heroic in History’ Thomas Carlyle made an a pen picture to show how history got shaped and reshaped due to those who rose to leaderships without political parties in contemporary concepts and contexts by virtue of power and wealth as did Plato in his ‘Republic’ and Aristotle in his ‘Politics’, Chanakya (also called Kautilya or Vishnugupta) in his ‘Arthasatra’ (Book of Politics). Having all these in true perspective, today there we find plenty of approaches and theories on leaderships **such** as Great Man Theories, Trait Theories, Contingency Theories, Situational Theories, Behavioral Theories, Participative Theories, Transactional theories, Transformational theories, Charismatic theories, Management Theories, and Relationship Theories and so on but not a single theory is enough to characterize leadership in its totality. Rather synthetic approach appears more logical, pragmatic, accommodative and acceptable on all counts. My understanding is, the moot test of

leadership should be “whether a person is followed by others institutionally/formally or non-institutionally/informally under the circumstances, approving or not.’

Therefore, a person as such may be a leader in a political party from grass-roots to national levels say, departmental secretary, joint general secretary, general secretary, vice-president, president at district level and below and at the apex committee at national level with members, departmental secretaries, organizing secretaries, joint general secretaries/ joint secretary generals, general secretary/secretary general, vice-presidents/vice-chairmen and head of the party called President/Chairman or in parliament say, whip, chief whip, chairman of standing committee, deputy speaker and the Speaker or in government say, member of the Council of Ministers(covering Full Ministers, State Ministers and Deputy Ministers, if any), Advisor to the Prime Minister. Likewise, a person may be a leader in an association , organization of volunteers, a teacher may be leader at a university, a speaker or an author who has influence over people through his/her thoughts and ideas may be a leader from such standpoints.

Leadership(s) may fall into perversion sensing a state of standing when a leader starts falling/deviating from the essentials of leadership due to his/her swelling propensity towards self and/or vested interests at the defiance of common interests of the people concern. In such situation(s), he/she feels free and unapologetic to view his leadership not as trust of followers or population concern but as a profitable capital and investment for self and/or coterie gains and interests. Sycophancies, philistinism, cronyism, malpractices and corruptions all such vices play role to contaminate leadership(s). Such deviation/fall transforms leadership into perverted leadership, which I term as ‘capitalizership’ (in fact. as of today, there we find no taxonomy for perverted leadership and I believe such coinage shall duly be in operation in politics). Aristotle in his Forms of Government in the epoch-making book ‘Politics’ also presented conforming perverted forms say, Dictatorship into Tyranny, Aristocracy into Plutocracy and Polity into Democracy and since the concept of a political party was not in usage during his time, he did/could not touch on it.

From these standpoints, *Leadership(s) in politics may be classified into party-based leadership that became functional after the birth of political parties and non-party-based leadership, which prevailed in ancient time and the periods before the genesis of political parties. Such reality made it unmistakable that there was politics in ancient time mostly known as politics in city state where citizens, due to peripheral size of population and geography of the city state, played roles through direct associations with/participation in the affairs of state and periods after ancient but before the birth of political parties where kings/emperors/monarch ruled through respective moods and modes.*

Therefore, the asking grows instantly, what is statesmanship? In a nutshell, when political leadership(s) gets habituated to view all in the broadest canvass going above parochial party or vested gains and interests holding firmly the great avowed motto ‘Collective prevails over

singular, state prevails over collective' then such very state of mind attains statesmanship. Here a statesman is a super political leader whose vision and mission evolve without a break around national interests and gains being respectful to necessity, reality and initiatives as and when required. In its simple definition. Statesmanship is statecraft explaining excellence, wisdom and skill with far-reaching effects in running a government or a ministry and, accordingly, it entails individual responsibility and collective responsibility, separately or collectively, while talking of a council of ministers or else called leadership(s) in government. In a government even a minister can singly proves his her excellence with far-reaching effects arriving at the level of statesmanship but rare it is. Conventionally, the head of a government either in a parliamentary model or in a presidential model or in a mixed model (French model, Srilanka's model for instance) is credited with such excellence. That's why come the names of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Abraham Lincoln, Weinstein Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, Jawaharlal Nehru, MA Jinnah, Barak Obama, and Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, Dr. Mahathir Mohammad, Lee Kuan Yew, Nelsen Mandela, J.R. Jayewardne and so on. Crude reality is that 'poverty of statesmen' has become a chronic crisis almost everywhere in the world.

Statesmanship can also be manifested in a political party without going to power that is in opposition, although in the rarest situation it may be possible in a ruling party and the star-like illustration is Mahatma Gandhi. When a political leader from his party's end rises above mere party stands on a national/regional issue for a greater interests of the nation and country he/she then attains the standing of statesmanship.

In its border connotation, statesmanship implies art and skill of administration, which encompasses non-political and public and private bureaucratic domains passing messages that even a bureaucrat in the administration attains the standing of statesmanship if he/she perform his/her responsibilities with utmost sincerity, honesty, fairness and matching integrity on all counts. Similar may takes place in private sector, especially in the days of corporate leaderships and management. Truer it is that even in armed forces covering three services---land, navy and air---such kind of statesmanship is possible.

Therefore, the focal point is that statesmanship in broader context includes political and non-political domains; political domain has two wings one is from the seat of power and other is from the seat of opposition and non-political domain has also two wings one is in public administration, roughly called bureaucracy and the other being private zone in other ways called leadership and management in corporate domain. Theoritically and operationally, a statesman is also a leader but a leader is not a statesman. But as ill luck would have it, political parties both ruling and opposition(s) are beating drums persistently branding their so-called leaders as statesmen of the first water.

Here it may be deserving to draw attention to the brainstorming write-up on 17 October 2016 'Statesmanship Beyond the Modern State' wherein the writers Patrick Overeem and Femke E. Bakker identifying three concepts of statesmanship wrote "The *aim* of statesmen remains, of course, to promote the widest possible common good—or, in contemporary parlance, the general interest. This ultimately conservative goal to preserve the common good of one's own polity while developing its good relations with other polities is what, according to Kissinger, distinguishes the statesman (Metternich) from the revolutionary—whether he is a "conqueror" who mainly relies on military prowess (Napoleon) or a "prophet" who prefers standing aloof on the moral high ground (Czar Alexander). This aim remains crucial to all kinds of statesmanship, including those of the third generation. To qualify for statesmanship, officials who are not politicians will also have to help keep their polity afloat and steer it safely. Coats's definition of this aim as the upholding of the constitution to make politics possible also applies to them. When, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court decided on the stalled 2000 presidential race between Bush and Gore, it did exactly that: irrespective of the side it chose, by cutting the knot it made the continuation of American politics possible.

As to *scope*, second, things are more subject to change. In practice, judges and administrators are mostly not directly concerned with the survival and well-being of the polity as a whole; their decisions usually concern a narrower interest. This is highlighted by Selznick in the opening sentence of his aforementioned classic, when he notes that besides a focus on "*political* statesmen, leaders of whole communities who sit in the high places where great issues are joined and settled" now "an additional emphasis is necessary" on the leadership of more or less autonomous groups and organizations *within* society. Here statesmanship is shown by actors who are responsible for only a part of the polity. Increasingly, however, one could also imagine "new statesmen" dealing with interests of collectives *larger* than one body politic. Officials negotiating international treaties on climate change or free trade, for example, can show "statesmanship" within a scope that goes beyond the nation-state. Thus, it seems that in third-generation statesmanship, the scope is no longer fixed to one particular size (whether it is the polis, the empire, or the nation-state) but varies with the size of the relevant governance level. Still, these "new statesmen" do serve the general interest of large rather than small communities.

The *means*, third that "new statesmen" employ also in part differ from those used by first- and second-generation statesmen. Coats is very succinct in describing the means employed by ancient and modern statesmen, but he suggests that both types of political leaders make use of public rhetoric and high-level negotiations. Such means are typically less available to judges and civil servants. Behind the scenes, they do of course use argumentation, negotiation, and decision making, too, but always less publicly and less politically. So, they seem to employ comparable means in a different manner.

Last but not least, what would be the proper *virtues* of contemporary statesmen? The literature on judicial and administrative statesmanship says very little about the (compositions of) virtues characteristically shown by the “new statesmen.” It seems clear, however, that their virtues have to be at least partially different from those of more traditional statesmen. It is difficult to conceive, for instance, how they can exemplify Aristotelian magnanimity in their “disguised” roles. And undoubtedly, both judges and civil servants, more than politicians, have to complement their statesmanship with craftsmanship, combining moral virtue with skilled professionalism. To complicate matters further, judicial statesmanship may require other virtues than administrative statesmanship. And different statesmen in different situations may excel in different virtues. Just as the transition from ancient to modern statesmanship implied changes in moral orientation, so will the further shift toward these new forms of statesmanship.’ (<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10457097.2016.1229563>).

For an ordinary reader and political activist one may readily take resort to what American, lawyer, politician and diplomat Adlai Ewing Stevenson voiced in a very simple words ‘Politician is a statesman who approaches every question with an open mouth.’ Dr. Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, also branded as Monarch of diplomats of his time, held ‘the statesman's duty is to bridge the gap between his nation's experience and his vision.’

Importantly more to be noted here that in the past I was actively associated with Jatiya Party headed by HM Ershad, then ruling party in Bangladesh, in various capacities including as Secretary for International Affairs for 12 years onward from 1986-1998 and had opportunities to learn a lot about national, regional and international landscapes of politics, diplomacy, economics, trade and commerce and so on being very close to multi-faceted events and leaderships therein.

And for the last few years, I have been delivering speeches on so many topics including leaderships at various national institutes, centers and universities in Bangladesh notably come Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC) at Savar, National Academy for Planning, and Development (NAPD), Bangladesh Police Staff College (BPSC), Bangladesh Police Academy (BPA) at Sardah, Bangladesh Naval Academy (BNA) at Chittagong, Artillery Center and School (AC&S), Bangladesh Army at Chittagong, Jagannath University at Dhaka. There my intense studies on leaderships got enriched to a large extent through meaningful interactions with the participants and students (customarily, senior officers in respective services). What is more, I have so far written more than fifteen articles on leaderships in different viewpoints. All these reasonably convinced me to take notes on leaderships both from theoretical and practical standpoints since scholarly focuses on leaderships without having operational hindsight cannot be true reflections of conceptual understanding of leadership leading to political leadership to statesmanship. And in the end best it is to voice in line with friend, philosopher and guide, also called Missile Man of India, APJ Abdul Kalam "Dream, dream, dream. Dreams transform into

thoughts and thoughts result in action.""If you fail, never give up because FA IL means "First Attempt in Learning" and let such utterances be inspiring for this Age and the Age to come.

(Dr. Sinha MA Sayeed (titled 'Global voice' for the book O United Nations), writer, columnist, public speaker, member of International Political Science Association,IPSA, and Chairman of Leadership Studies foundation, LSF,at sinha_sayeed611@yahoo.com)

(2) Not impossible. The MENA region can compete with the world in development and progress

Amro Selim

Chairman ,

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and member in the Alliance of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in New York):

Unfortunately, the name of some of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa region has been associated in recent years in the international media with severe conflicts, even though they possess many enormous natural and human resources that if their countries could cooperate and unite in order to achieve real peace with each other, then they would be able to reflect these The dark image and its transformation into a green oasis may be a symbol of peace and economic prosperity in the world, as did the countries of Southeast Asia and succeeded in moving their people from poverty to richness, and became economically and educationally developed to compete with major powers in many fields.

Many resources

This region is widely considered rich in natural resources. If we look at northern Iraq, Basra and Cyrenaica in Libya and Khuzestan in Iran, Gafsa in Tunisia, the eastern region in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Hasaka and DeirEzzor in Syria, and Hadramawt and Saba in Yemen, we will find that most of the natural and mineral resources, most notably oil. And gas is harvested from their lands, and despite this they suffer from the lack of optimum utilization of these resources in a way that enables them to achieve a giant economic renaissance in the near future.

If we look at southern Algeria, we will find oil and gas, while Iran, specifically in Khoristan, is famous for its abundant quantities of oil and gas, as well as northern Iraq and Basra, and Cyrenaica and Fezzan in Libya, you will find the same thing, and the Western Sahara in Morocco comes from phosphates, oil and gas, and most of the global production of oil and gas comes from The countries of the region such as Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Kuwait and gulf countries, in addition to that a country like Egypt possesses a huge human capacity with a variety of disciplines that needs to be integrated into the regional labor market more broadly to give the desired effect as it has great archaeological, as well as country like Israel, which has a scientific research system that occupies an advanced position at the level of the world, so that if it enters into peaceful negotiations with the Palestinian side, it can be a real peace element in the region. There is also Sudan, which is characterized by the

quality of agricultural land with high fertility and abundant various food crops that may be the food basket of the region if It has been invested properly, and Turkey it has entered into many political conflicts, although it can invest its wealth in peaceful, positive and effective cooperation with the rest of the region, is a major producer of wheat as it is characterized by an abundance of vegetables, fruits and sheep and an abundance of water sources about 120 natural lakes and 579 artificial lakes. The region has a distinctive cultural and historical diversity that makes them the most prominent in the world, although this diversity is not managed in a proper way to be a source of conflict and conflict instead of positive cooperation, as the area contains a huge archaeological heritage from many eras. Different, Egypt alone has more than a quarter of the world's monuments to make the region sit on the throne of the world's regions as a tourist. All this could turn the region into a gigantic attraction point for millions of world tourists if the best use of these historical resources is made for the purpose of tourist attraction and cultural exchange.

Young wealth

The region ranks third in the world in terms of the proportion of youth to the total population, as they constitute more than 60% of them under the age of 30 years, although more than 30% of them suffer from unemployment and most of these young people have university degrees, but they need training that qualifies them for the labor market, which is The easy thing is, as IMF experts estimate that if employment could increase by 0.5 percentage points annually until 2030, then economic growth could reach more than 5% annually - up from its current level of about 3.9%.

Global interests

Exiting the cycle of conflicts that some countries in the region are witnessing is not only a regional benefit, but that the global interests of the powers and peoples of the West and the East together, whether economic, security and social, grow and flourish with the stability of the region, which is consequently reflected in the economic performance of their governments, which will increase the national product. It will attract more investments as long as there is calm and stability in the region, and investors are reassured about that and have seen it themselves on the ground, which in turn will lead to reducing unemployment, providing more job opportunities, and opening factories, companies and various institutions. Here, the state's income and resources will increase, and it will be able to spend more. On health and education, and it will require the greatest need for scientific research to develop its products and resources, which will also encourage the private sector to invest in it, especially since the region possesses

vast and varied economic and natural resources and human energies that qualify it for the optimal use of those wealth, but it is unfortunately buried inside the well of conflicts and civil wars, all of that. It will lead to raising the individual's standard of living, and thus his ability to spend on his family or start a family whose children will receive a correct education Which qualifies them to get suitable jobs in the future, meaning that the vast majority of the region's residents and residents will not need to get involved in hostilities or there will be no justification for that. The economic wheel is rotating for everyone with a measured balance, and the political and media tools discharge energies in an effective and effective way, so it will decrease. The conflict is at its lowest level, and here the state can play a greater role in the lives of citizens in a positive way, which will be reflected in the stability of the whole world, and thus the development of the interests of other countries in the region, so that they also achieve the benefit they want through peaceful, constructive cooperation that stimulates the better utilization of various resources.

Let us not forget here that the majority of the region's citizens do not want anything but a decent, stable and calm life from life in which they live with their families in peace and tranquility. Most of the peoples of the region grew up in agricultural environments and were brought up in simple rural families, so stability and staying next to the land and cultivating it and happiness in seeing it grow and prosper is One of their utmost ambitions, I will not forget the scenes that I saw during my travels in Egypt, especially on the agricultural roads, where agricultural lands and farms surround you on both sides of the road, to see the simple family standing in a row starting from the father and the mother to the young children, the father holds the ax to plant the land, while The children throw the seeds, and the mother prepares the food for them to gather together to eat in their little green land while they are so happy as if they own the planet with what it contains.

(3) India-Tajikistan Relations: From Civilizational Friends to Strategic Partners

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Abstract

[Tajikistan and India relations are shaped by shared history, culture and civilizational links, and in modern times, these ties are driven by convergence of geo-political concerns and interests. Taliban takeover of Afghanistan changed the threat perceptions and frequent diplomatic visits between the two countries resulted in closer defence cooperation. But the lack of direct overland connectivity has proved a major hindrance, especially in economic and trade relations. Both sides are committed to exploring alternative routes to increase economic activities. Indian entry to Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and challenges like rising radicalization, state-sponsored terrorism, foreign troops withdrawal from Afghanistan and possible return of Taliban have given fresh impetus to cooperation in the realms of security, defence, trade and diplomacy.]

Keywords

India, Geo-politics, Tajikistan, Terrorism, Strategic Partnership

Introduction

Tajikistan and India are two close neighbours who have shared historical, cultural and civilizational links through history. In modern times, these ties are driven by convergence of geo-political concerns and interests. The increasing threats of separatism, cross-border terrorism and religious extremism have led to greater security and strategic cooperation between the two countries. Taliban takeover of Afghanistan changed the threat perceptions and frequent diplomatic visits between the two countries resulted in closer defence cooperation.

Tajikistan-India bilateral diplomatic ties were established in 1992. Tajik President's state visits in 1995, 2001 and 2006 led to the establishment of development partnership and mutual understanding on security and stability of the region. Each visit shaped bilateral ties in some new dimensions. Indian Prime Minister's visit in 2003 laid down the framework for mutual geo-strategic cooperation in the region while Tajik President's visit in 2012 elevated bilateral partnership to the level of long-term strategic partnership. Capitalizing on this mutual trust, confidence and goodwill, Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi's visit to Tajikistan in 2015 built deeper development partnerships between the two countries. . During Tajik president's visit in 2016, India regarded Tajikistan as a major mainstay against the forces of terrorism and extremism and Tajikistan recognizes Indian participation imperative for the security, stability and development of the entire region. Visible results of these diplomatic visits are the establishment of Joint Working Group on Terrorism, Defence and India-Tajikistan Joint Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation along with several business forums, which were instrumental in taking bilateral ties forward in the fields of

security, defence and trade spheres. Military hospital at Farkhor, upgradation of Ayni airbase and Varzob-1 hydropower plant, fruit processing plant and IT Centre of Excellence in Dushanbe and other several humanitarian aid and development grants with training and scholarship to Tajik students and defence personnel under ITEC and ICCR are some features of this development partnership. Although bilateral relations between Tajikistan and India in diplomatic, economic, defence and security spheres have progressed well but not to its full potential.

Tajikistan is the nearest Central Asian republic to India but due to lack of direct land connectivity, ties of two countries especially in the spheres of trade and economic cooperation are still lagging behind. In this context, it is vital for both countries to seek alternative routes like North-South Transport Corridor and also at the same time seek access to Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade Transit Agreement and UN convention on landlocked countries to seek transit of goods between two countries. Diplomatic efforts have yielded results in enhancing India's geo-political profile in Central Asia and Tajikistan and defence and security cooperation is an important part of this. With new challenges like rising radicalization, drug trafficking and deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and developments like Indian entry to SCO, it necessitates closer partnership in defence and security arenas. This period also becomes important with rising dominance of China in the region and its support to Pakistan. India needs to engage with Russia to reach a consensus for getting a foreign airbase at Ayni that could be a significant step. This study shows how both countries recognize the centrality of each other in forging a long-term strategy to combat cross border terrorism, Islamic radicalization, separatism and securing their national and economic interests.

This article delves deep into the civilizational, cultural, diplomatic, trade, defence and strategic cooperation between two countries and examines how shared cultural history in the past and mutual concerns related to security in present is driving two nations closer.

Historical and Cultural Relations

In the past, Tajikistan and India have enjoyed shared cultural, civilizational and trade relations. Linguistically and culturally, we belong to the same family. Further the similarities between the cultural traditions of Central Asian and Indian people under Avestan and Vedic period only points to our shared historical and cultural relations. Tajik President's own chronicle, "Tajikistan in the mirror of history-from Aryan to Samanids" recalls the old relationship between the people of two countries and points to common Aryan ancestry. Some of the examples of these cultural relations are the adoption of the game of chess and popularity of Indian literary heritage "Panchtamtra" in the Central Asian region (Gulshan, 2015). It is interesting to note that these civilizational links date back to even pre-historic times. Recent research and archaeological excavations clearly show the similar agricultural practices, town planning and regular contact between Indus Valley and Central Asian people. These civilizational links between lands of Amu Darya and Ganga got further strengthened when Bactria, Sogd and Parthia came under a common state along with Gandhara and North-Western India during the period of Achaemenid, Indo- Greek and Kushan empires. Kushan Empire

marked the highest level of Cultural exchanges that resulted in the infusion of Indian culture, traditions and Buddhism to the Central Asian region. It was during this time of history that the Great Silk Road served as a medium of exchange of goods, services and ideas rendering peace and prosperity to the people of the region. To sum up, Professor K. Warikoo (2016) states that, "Geographical proximity, ethno linguistic affinity and shared history have formed the basis of a special relationship between India and Tajikistan". This bilateral engagement between the people continued during Turkish and Persian empires that strengthened ties further. There were continuous exchanges of leaders, people, poets, Sufi saints and intellectuals between seats of learning like Samarkand, Bukhara and Delhi. Tajik and Indian poets and scholars made equal contributions to the advancement of Indo-Persian literature in the Indian subcontinent. The popularity of Rabindranath Tagore's poetry in Tajikistan and Bedil's poetry in India and the Indian Prime Minister presenting a miniature painting of Abdul Qadir Bedil to Tajik President points towards shared spiritual and cultural heritage (Olimov, 2016). Mughals who came from this region made India their new home but given their emotional and psychological connections with their homeland, they continued their engagements with the region in one or the other form. According to Richard Foltz, this two hundred years of continuous engagement with the Central Asian region and especially influence of Tajik nobility (who belonged to the same Indo-Aryan Branch of Aryans of which one part settled in North and North-West India) in Mughal courts led to the development of India's cosmopolitan culture. It would be naive to assume that this engagement was just one way, but traveling of Buddhism, traditional knowledge of medicine and herbs and India traders, poets and monks to this region only points that our shared past experienced mutual influence. Now, with India and Central Asia coming under the Russian and British empires respectively and later on rivalry and mutual suspicion between the two empires widened the distance between two regions of shared close cultural and historical relations. As Professor K. Warikoo (2016) points out that, "This Russian policy of strategic diversion was countered by the British by adopting a sustained forward policy in the region". By the treaty of 1907, both Tsarist Russia and British decided that Wakhan Corridor, a narrow strip of Afghan territory, would be separating Russian Central Asian territories and British Indian possessions and rendering a serious long-term blow to the connectivity between the two regions. Thus it is clear that this 'Great Game' rivalry between two empires put a stoppage to the centuries old civilizational links between the two regions. Tajik people and poets like Mirzo Tursun-Zoda supported Indian freedom movement. Indian independence resulted in the forming of two separate states namely India and Pakistan proved catastrophic to the age-old connections with the Central Asian region as direct land connectivity to the wider South Asian region was lost. And again during the Soviet era, there was commonality of interests and close cooperation in science, politics, economics and culture. Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic enjoyed close trade and cultural relations with India. These relations were regulated through Moscow and the extent and intensity of these relations were still limited. However, with the signing of Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1971, cultural exchanges between India and Central Asian republics increased considerably (Singh, 2003). During this period of time, Hindi

films enjoyed much popularity in Central Asia. During Cold War era, India despite being the founding member of Non-alignment movement remained a close ally of Soviet Union and for that matter Central Asian republics. Friendly Indo-Soviet ties were instrumental in forging deeper Indian contacts with Central Asia in comparison to other southern neighbours and this very good mutual understanding along with age old brotherly bonding and commonality of interest and views in modern times provided India an added advantage to establish political relations with newly emerged Central Asian republics after the disintegration of Soviet Union.

Soviet disintegration resulted in the emergence of five Central Asian Republics namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the 1990s. India was one of the first countries to recognize their Independence and started to establish diplomatic relations with newly emerged republics by segregating its overall Soviet-era ties by Republic wise. The sudden break up of Soviet Union brought socio-economic miseries to these republics and these miseries coupled with the transitional pain resulted in widespread poverty, unemployment and political instability in many countries. These countries started to interact with regional and global powers to overcome this situation. During this time, India was in shock due to break up of its dependable ally and political and economic instability at home further delayed Indian outreach to the region. However India was quick to realize this delay and now it has a strategic partnership with three of the five Central Asian republics and trade is also picking up, though slowly. Indian measures like 'Connect Central Asia' policy, and also holding an India-Central Asia Dialogue at Track II annually in one of the republics have contributed to the closer ties (Singh, 2003). Though India and Central Asian countries enjoy friendly relationship, the economic and trade engagement between the two sides has been much below its potential. The countries of Central Asia are rich in hydrocarbons, mineral and other natural resources and are close to India geographically. Geographically, the strategic location of these countries also makes them a bridge between different regions of Asia and between Europe and Asia. Although the significance of the region in India's economic and energy security is clear, lack of direct surface connectivity has been affecting the economic engagement. However, the recent progress in North-South Transport Corridor will certainly improve the connectivity between the two regions.

Geographically, Tajikistan is nearest to India and given its geo-strategic position, it is important not only to India but also regional and global actors as well. Further, Tajikistan is rich in mineral and natural resources and it has a fast-growing consumer market and India is important to it due to its status as an emerging economic and political power in the world. Mutual interests of both sides rest primarily on economic and trade cooperation, regional security and stability and maintaining of strategic order. As far as this modern relationship between two countries is concerned, it is simply not based on close civilizational, cultural and trade ties but both sides find several commonalities. In the present time, the similarity of worldviews, common threat concerns like cross-border terrorism, religious extremism and separatism, high level of mutual confidence and trust, their commitment to build modern secular, pluralist and democratic polity, securing stability and peace in Afghanistan, promoting social-ethno-linguistic and

cultural harmony, adherence to non-interference and peaceful co-existence and promoting overall trade, cultural and technological cooperation are imparting new colors to the dynamic partnership between two countries. Tajikistan provides a special place to India in its foreign policy due to its close geographical proximity and age-old close historical, cultural and trade ties and mutual concerns related to regional security and stability. Referring to these bilateral relations between two countries, Tajik President stressed: “the Republic of Tajikistan within the framework of its bilateral and multilateral relations with India is looking at it as a factor for peace and stability in the region”. The disintegration of USSR followed by Tajik civil war disrupted Tajikistan-India relations for some time. But it also gave an opportunity to engage with new sovereign Tajik state. Attempts by outside powers to secure geo-political and economic interests (New Great Game) coupled by rising threats of cross-border terrorism; extremism and volatile Afghanistan situation have turned Tajikistan a high priority in India's foreign policy, which led to high-level diplomatic exchanges between the two countries.

Diplomatic and Economic Cooperation

Formal diplomatic ties were established between the two countries on 28 August, 1992. Since then, Indo-Tajik cooperation has covered a broad spectrum of fields from diplomatic, economic, cultural, defence and security to education, human resource development, science and technology, academic and humanitarian arenas. Diplomatic visits by leaders from both sides have helped in strengthening bilateral ties in these spheres and thus taking bilateral cooperation to new heights. Tajik President has visited India several times so far. It was during the first state visit of Tajik President in 1995 when a mutual understanding was reached on Afghanistan for security and stability of the region (MEA, 2017). However, the Taliban took over Afghanistan and escalation of cross-border terrorism in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir started a new phase in the bilateral cooperation between two countries. Here it is also important to note that Pakistani sponsored extremism and terrorism in Afghanistan had a direct spill over effect on Tajikistan and thus worsened its internal security scenario. Now worried about their respective internal security and stability, both countries cooperated well in supporting Northern Alliance led by Tajik leadership of Ahmad Shah Masood against the Taliban. Against these developments, landmark visits by Tajik President in 1999 and 2001 and Indian Prime Minister in 2003 concretized the ties in geo-political and security realms in the wake of rising threats of state sponsored terrorism and religious extremism and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee described this joint Tajik-Indian action as a “stabilizing factor” for the region (MEA, 2018). It was due to these diplomatic efforts that India was able to garner Tajik support for Indian claim of permanent membership at United Nations Security Council and entry to Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). At the same time Tajikistan found a reliable partner in its pursuit of regional security and stability and economic development of the country.

Although each visit brought both countries closer but due to political instability at home which resulted in political indecisiveness in foreign affairs and lack of political and bureaucratic will to implement the already signed mutual agreements failed to raise India's geo-political and strategic profile in the Central Asian region. However, developments like Kargil war and

persistent volatile security situation in the neighbourhood provided a new urgency to the bilateral cooperation especially in the fields of security and defence. The visit of Indian defence Minister in 2002 points to this urgency and growing defence cooperation between two countries. The military hospital at Farkhor and Ayni air base for infant Tajik air force are physical signs of this new cooperation.

Indian President Pratibha Patil's visit enhanced goodwill, trust and mutual confidence between the two countries. During the state visit of Tajik President in 2012, both sides decided to elevate their bilateral relations to the level of a long-term strategic partnership. Indian Prime Minister's visit in 2015 provided further impetus to these relations. On his last stoppage to Tajikistan, Narendra Modi remarked: "This is the last stop on my visit to the five Central Asian countries. But, we sometimes save the special one for the last". He pointed out to closest linguistic, civilizational and historical links with Tajikistan. Tajik President's visit to India in 2016 reinforced the commitment of both countries to take bilateral ties to a new level by improving overall bilateral security cooperation, capacity building, and information exchanges and via active coordination at regional and multilateral platforms. India regarded Tajikistan's role as a 'mainstay' against forces of extremism, religious radicalization, and terrorism (MEA, 2015). These diplomatic visits also resulted in the strengthening of cooperation between two countries in areas like human resource development by providing increased number of scholarships and training to Tajik students via ITEC in areas ranging from English language, banking, and finance, IT to industrial development and management and defence training and identifying new areas of cooperation like tourism, agriculture and space. Tajikistan attracts the largest share of humanitarian and development assistance in the form of aids and material support and it has significantly built the IT capacity of Tajikistan while at the same time enhancing Indian strategic outreach in the region (Gulshan, 2015).

Diplomatic ties shaped by regular visits of leaders, bureaucrats and other cultural and academic missions resulted in the signing of several mutual agreements and MOUs including those of economic and trade nature and helped in strengthening defence, security and strategic cooperation, but the lack of direct over land connectivity hindered trade cooperation. Though economic and trade ties between Tajikistan and India go back to Silk Road days, in present times it's a low-key affair due to structural and connectivity hurdles. There is a vast potential of trade between resource rich Tajikistan and technology-rich India. Private sector cooperation is an important aspect of trade relations that can increase the competitive nature of Tajikistan's manufacturing units thus leading to Tajikistan's export diversification and economic independence in the wake of dominating cheap Chinese goods. In return India can avail the benefit of the vast potential of hydro power in Tajikistan for its energy security. The areas of cooperation between two countries are like pharmaceuticals, education, health, energy, telecommunication, and infrastructure.

Structural changes in the trade relations between two countries are the need of the hour. The reasons for this low level of trade between the two countries are of direct overland connectivity due to political differences between India and Pakistan, expensive and unreliable Mumbai-

Bandar Abbas- Dushanbe route, macroeconomic instability in Central Asia inadequate banking facilities, strict visa regimes, language barriers and absence of direct and daily air connectivity are some of them (Warikoo, 2015).

Indian access to Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade Transit Agreement can tap the vast potentiality of trade between India and Central Asia. And, further establishment of India-Pakistan-Afghanistan-Central Asia Transport Corridor will reduce the cost of transportation significantly (Warikoo, 2016). Political relations need to be improved between India and Pakistan and political stability in Afghanistan is the need of the hour. However, Indian hopes lie mainly on the North-South Transport Corridor and recent progress in this project is a positive sign. According to the respective embassy websites, both countries have a Joint Inter- governmental commission led by the ministry of economy and trade that reviews the existing level of cooperation in several fields. Apart from this, several major agreements and bilateral treaties like Agreement for Bilateral Investment Protection, Air Services Agreement and Agreement on Long-term Cooperation in Trade, Economic and Industry and institutional arrangements like setting up of an Indo-Tajik Joint Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation and business forums and even after their several rounds of meetings have strengthened bilateral trade while at the same time identifying the new areas of cooperation. A number of civilian projects like the reconstruction of the Varzob-1 hydro power plant, Fruit Processing Plant and IT Centre in Dushanbe have strengthened the existing relations between two countries. Indian Prime Minister's visit to Tajikistan in 2015, where he addressed an agricultural workshop, points to the vast potential of cooperation in farming techniques, equipment and space technology (MEA, 2015).

Defence and Strategic Cooperation

One of the vibrant dimensions of these ever growing bilateral ties is the increasing cooperation in security and defence related fields between the two countries. Mutual interests concerning peace, security and stability of Central Asia in the wake of volatile Afghan situation coupled with rising threats of religious extremism and cross-border terrorism brought two countries closer in defence and strategic partnership. These developments increased the diplomatic efforts between two countries for closer defence ties. In this context, Indian Prime Minister's visit in 2003 laid down the framework for mutual geo-strategic cooperation in the region while Tajik President's visit in 2012 elevated bilateral partnership to the level of long-term strategic partnership (MEA, 2012). Today, joint military exercises, defence personnel training, Ayni airbase, military hospital, defence material supplies and Joint Working Group on Terrorism are the hallmark of this partnership. Although, Indian entry to SCO provided it some influence but entry to other regional organizations like 'Dushanbe Four' is still needed to push these ties forward. It is clear that Pakistan has a role in spreading religious extremism and cross-border terrorism that is harming both Tajikistan and India. Pakistan is using this platform to secure a position in the Central Asian region and is denying India's entry to this organization which is a Tajik Initiative to counter narco trade and promoting economic cooperation and sharing

electricity. Indian entry into this organization can add greater significance to it (Dutta, 2015). The establishment of Joint Working Group on terrorism, defence and sharing of intelligence and expanding cooperation between heads of relevant organizations are positive signs of our growing security and defence cooperation with the country. During Indian Prime Minister's visit to the country in 2015, both sides expressed satisfaction with growing defence ties and at the same time reaffirmed their commitment for closer cooperation in this field. During Tajik president's visit in 2016, India regarded Tajikistan as a major mainstay against the forces of terrorism and extremism and Tajikistan recognizes Indian participation imperative for the security, stability and development of the entire region (Sharma, 2016).

Tajikistan and India are faced with a wide range of common questions connected with most important challenges such as terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking. However, these security challenges to regional peace and stability are not the only reasons of Indian outreach in this region, given fast developing Pakistan-China axis in the region, Indian need to maintain its strategic influence in the region. Stephen Blank (2012) in this regard opines that, "Two key Indian objectives are to deny Pakistan and China, her key rivals and threats, opportunities to increase their strategic capability by gaining predominant influence in Central Asia or by threatening India's assets there. Enhancing Indian influence in the region equates to a strategy of strategic denial". Both Russia and Central Asian states have welcomed Indian role in this region and Central Asian states especially Tajikistan and Uzbekistan recognize India as an important factor in the regional peace and stability in Afghanistan and Central Asian region. Further, India's accession to SCO provides it a legitimate platform to enhance its political and strategic profile in the region. However, India's increasing closeness to the USA may result in the formation of Russia-China-Pakistan axis and may harm its economic and strategic aspirations in the region. Russian cooperation is vital for India's presence in this region and for this India needs to sort out the apprehensions of the long-standing ally in this regard.

Way Forward

In the wake of volatile Afghanistan situation and escalation of cross-border terrorism situation in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in the 1990s, India started defence cooperation with Tajikistan in order to counter state-sponsored terrorism, extremism and separatism. It is the most vibrant aspect of bilateral cooperation between the two countries and has been consistently growing in newer areas. But, just one-way cooperation in defence and security has its own limitations. Tajikistan needs to reciprocate Indian eagerness to become the major security and defence partner of the country by providing it access to use Ayni airbase and other similar projects. Indian and Tajik diplomatic pro-activeness is required to take Russia in confidence to make it a reality. What is important to note here is that similar kind of security situation has arisen in the extended neighbourhood of India. With the new challenge like emergence of new radical Islamist groups like ISIS, rise in cross-border and state sponsored terrorism, withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and resurgent Taliban, Al-Qaeda and extremist groups coupled with fast changing geo-political global power equations and security environment necessitates deeper defence and security cooperation between Tajikistan,

Afghanistan and India. Pakistan is continuing with its old tactics of sponsoring cross-border terrorism to disturb peace and stability in Afghanistan and India. Non-state actors like Haqqani Network and Taliban and other militant groups sponsored by Pakistan are continuously attacking Indian humanitarian and development projects in the region in order to curb growing Indian influence in Afghanistan and Central Asian republics. Apart from India and Afghanistan, countries like Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Iran are also suffering from the terrorism emanating from Pakistan-based terror camps. India needs to formulate a proper action plan to take these countries on board to united stand against state-sponsored terrorism and diplomatic efforts to isolate Pakistan over this. With the formation of the hostile China-Pakistan axis through China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that violates India's territorial integrity, India needs to pursue a well-coordinated defence and security policy as part of its foreign policy with regional and global powers like Russia and USA. Although in the case of Central Asia and for that matter Tajikistan, India is doing this since the emergence of extremist Taliban and the rise of state-sponsored terrorism in the 1990s. But general observation has been that India has been reluctant to expand its geo-political profile in the Central Asian region and Tajikistan in particular in comparison with regional players like Iran and China. What is worth mentioning in the relationship of two countries is the fact that both are strategic partner to each other and recognize the centrality of each other in maintaining peace and stability in Central and South Asian region. During Tajik president's visit in 2016, India regarded Tajikistan as a major mainstay against the forces of terrorism and extremism and Tajikistan recognizes Indian participation imperative for the security, stability and development of the entire region. Capitalizing on this mutual trust, confidence and goodwill and building deeper development partnerships will certainly bode well for India's broader aspirations in energy-rich Central Asia in general and strategically located Tajikistan in particular.

Conclusion

Emphasis on having close historical, cultural, and civilizational and trade ties between the two countries needs to be matched by significant improvement in economic and trade relations. Proactive diplomacy is the need of the hour to address the vital issues of connectivity, ensuring stability, security and peace in the region along with economic prosperity via human resource development, shared knowledge and innovation. Both countries need to build a long-term strategy and secure their national interests by curbing the menace of separatism, cross-border terrorism and religious extremism. There are immense opportunities and challenges before the two countries, but sustained and close cooperation in diplomatic, trade, defence and security arenas will certainly move the relations between the two countries to new heights. As Bedil, the Tajik poet urged, "The Sea of time and place, for you, is but one gulp limit, not your boundless imagination".

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